Cryptography & Key Management
83 records. Direct records match this topic; context records explain their connections.
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control · Context
A008 — Prevent leakage of credentials and secrets
Prevent leakage of credentials and secrets
control · Context
B002 — Detect adversarial input
Detect adversarial input
control · Context
B004 — Prevent AI endpoint scraping
Prevent AI endpoint scraping
control · Context
B005 — Implement real-time input filtering
Implement real-time input filtering
control · Context
B010 — Promote secure patterns in generated code
Promote secure patterns in generated code
control · Context
E005 — Document data storage security
Document data storage security
control · Context
HIPAA-164.312(e) — Transmission security for ePHI (integrity controls and encryption in transit)
Transmission security for ePHI (integrity controls and encryption in transit)
control · Context
A.8.24 — Use of cryptography
Use of cryptography
control · Context
AC-17 — Remote Access
Remote Access
control · Context
AC-18 — Wireless Access
Wireless Access
control · Context
AC-19 — Access Control for Mobile Devices
Access Control for Mobile Devices
control · Context
IA-7 — Cryptographic Module Authentication
Cryptographic Module Authentication
control · Context
SC-10 — Network Disconnect
Network Disconnect
control · Context
SC-11 — Trusted Path
Trusted Path
control · Context
SC-12 — Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management
Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management
control · Context
SC-13 — Cryptographic Protection
Cryptographic Protection
control · Context
SC-17 — Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
control · Context
SC-20 — Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)
Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)
control · Context
SC-21 — Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver)
Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver)
control · Context
SC-22 — Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service
Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service
control · Context
SC-23 — Session Authenticity
Session Authenticity
control · Context
SC-28 — Protection of Information at Rest
Protection of Information at Rest
control · Context
SC-37 — Out-of-band Channels
Out-of-band Channels
control · Context
SC-40 — Wireless Link Protection
Wireless Link Protection
control · Context
SC-45 — System Time Synchronization
System Time Synchronization
control · Context
SC-8 — Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
control · Context
NIST-AGI-06 — Prompt-injection prevention and limits on resulting harm
The paper explicitly asks which controls help prevent direct and indirect prompt injection and which controls can limit its impact after an injection succeeds.
control · Context
NIST-TEVV-05 — Test direct and indirect prompt injection
Appendix B includes integrity tests for direct and indirect prompt injection, poisoning, obfuscated inputs, and retrieval weaknesses that could alter intended outputs or outcomes.
control · Context
PR.DS-01 — Data Security: The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected
Data Security: The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected
control · Context
PR.DS-02 — Data Security: The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected
Data Security: The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected
control · Context
PR.DS-10 — Data Security: The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected
Data Security: The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected
control · Context
500.15 — Encryption of nonpublic information
Encryption of nonpublic information
control · Context
PCI-Req3 — Protect stored account data
Protect stored account data
control · Context
PCI-Req4 — Protect cardholder data with strong cryptography during transmission over open, public networks
Protect cardholder data with strong cryptography during transmission over open, public networks
control · Context
CC6.7 — The entity restricts the transmission, movement, and removal of information to authorized internal and external users and processes, and protects it during transmission, movement, or removal to meet the entity's objectives.
The entity restricts the transmission, movement, and removal of information to authorized internal and external users and processes, and protects it during transmission, movement, or removal to meet the entity's objectives.
risk · Direct
Credential and secret leakage through AI inputs, outputs, logs and generated code
API keys, tokens, private keys, and connection strings pasted into prompts, returned in outputs, hardcoded in generated code, or captured in conversation logs are exposed to unauthorized parties or persisted outside secret management, enabling account takeover and lateral movement.
risk · Direct
Credentials and sensitive data transmitted in clear text
Authentication credentials or sensitive system communications transmitted unencrypted over networks, and absence of mutual sender/receiver authentication, enable interception, credential theft, and spoofing.
risk · Direct
Compromised or counterfeit certificates / certificate authority
Adversary counterfeits or compromises a certificate authority so that malware or connections appear legitimate, defeating trust in TLS and code-signing and enabling man-in-the-middle or malicious-code delivery.
risk · Direct
Weak or absent encryption and key management
Sensitive data stored or transmitted without adequate encryption, or use of weak/flawed cryptography and poor key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction — enabling interception, disclosure, or tampering of data.
risk · Direct
Communications interception, eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle
Passive monitoring/sniffing of communications, interception of unencrypted or weakly encrypted channels, wireless interception, and man-in-the-middle attacks capture or corrupt transmitted data — including TEMPEST-type emanation capture.
standard · Context
AIUC-1 (Jul 2026)
AIUC-1 — AI agent security, safety and reliability standard (requirement level)
standard · Context
CCPA/CPRA
CCPA/CPRA — California Consumer Privacy
standard · Context
COBIT 2019
COBIT 2019 Governance & Management Objectives
standard · Context
COSO ERM 2017
COSO ERM – Integrating with Strategy and Performance (2017)
standard · Context
COSO IC 2013
COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013)
standard · Context
EU DORA
EU DORA — Digital Operational Resilience Act
standard · Context
EU AI Act
EU AI Act — principal obligation areas (Chapters II, III, V and IX)
standard · Context
EU GDPR
EU GDPR — General Data Protection Regulation
standard · Context
HIPAA
HIPAA — Security, Privacy & Breach Notification
standard · Context
IIA 2024 Standards
IIA 2024 Global Internal Audit Standards
standard · Context
Three Lines Model: Assurance and Advice in Support of Effective Governance
Three Lines Model: Assurance and Advice in Support of Effective Governance
standard · Context
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
standard · Context
ISO 31000:2018
ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management (principles/framework/process)
standard · Context
EU NIS2
EU NIS2 Directive
standard · Context
NIST SP 800-53 Rev5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 — Security and Privacy Controls
standard · Context
NIST Agent Identity (draft, Feb 2026)
NIST NCCoE: Software and AI Agent Identity and Authorization
standard · Context
NIST TEVV-Athlon (draft, Aug 2026)
NIST AI 200-2: TEVV-Athlon Framework for Evaluating AI Systems
standard · Context
NIST CSF 2.0
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
standard · Context
NYDFS Part 500
NYDFS Part 500 — NY Cybersecurity Regulation
standard · Context
PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS v4.0.1
standard · Context
SOC 1
SOC 1 (SSAE 18 / ISAE 3402) — service-org ICFR control objectives
standard · Context
SOC 2 (TSC)
AICPA SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (2017, rev. 2022)
standard · Context
SOX / PCAOB (ICFR)
SOX 404 / PCAOB AS 2201 — ICFR control taxonomy
unified · Context
UC-AI-18 — Defend AI interfaces against adversarial input, injection, and endpoint abuse
Protect the inference and agent interfaces of AI systems with layered input defenses: screen prompts, uploaded content, retrieved data, and tool results for prompt-injection and jailbreak patterns before they reach the model or trigger actions; detect and alert on adversarial-input campaigns; and rate-limit, authenticate, and monitor endpoints to prevent scraping, model extraction, and resource-exhaustion abuse. Tune detections from evaluation findings and retain filter configurations and detection logs as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-AI-22 — Prevent leakage of credentials and secrets through AI systems
Detect credentials, tokens, private keys, and connection strings in prompts, pasted content, retrieved data, and generated code using pattern- and entropy-based scanning; warn users and block or redact detected secrets before model processing, logging, and storage; guide code-generating systems to reference secret managers and environment variables rather than hardcoding credentials; and store any user-supplied credentials only in a dedicated secret manager encrypted at rest. Retain detection rules, redaction logs, and storage configurations as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-AI-25 — Guide code-generating systems toward secure patterns and safe dependencies
Configure code-generating AI systems with secure-by-default guidance: steer generated code toward parameterized queries and safe frameworks for common vulnerability classes, established authentication and authorization libraries, secure session and cookie settings, input validation and safe error handling, and logging that excludes secrets; require pinned, verified dependency specifications so hallucinated or typosquatted packages are not introduced; and test the guidance against a vulnerability benchmark on change. Retain system-prompt and policy configurations and benchmark results as evidence.
unified · Direct
UC-CRYPTO-01 — Encrypt data at rest and in transit
Sensitive and nonpublic data at rest is rendered unreadable using strong, industry-accepted encryption, or truncation/tokenization for stored account data, with storage and retention minimized to defined business need. Data in transit is protected with strong cryptography and trusted certificates over all open, public, or external networks, rejecting fallback to insecure protocols. Transmission, movement, and removal of information, including to removable media, is restricted to authorized users and processes, and the integrity of data in both states is protected. Where encryption of nonpublic information is infeasible, compensating controls are documented, approved by the CISO, and reviewed at least annually.
unified · Direct
UC-CRYPTO-02 — Use approved algorithms and validated cryptographic modules
A cryptography standard defines approved algorithms, protocols, key lengths, and certificate profiles aligned to current industry guidance, and prohibits deprecated primitives (e.g., SSL/early TLS, SHA-1, RSA below 2048 bits). Cryptographic operations protecting sensitive data use independently validated cryptographic modules operating in approved modes. The standard is reviewed at least annually against emerging cryptanalytic and post-quantum developments.
unified · Direct
UC-CRYPTO-03 — Manage cryptographic keys and certificates across their lifecycle
Cryptographic keys are generated, distributed, stored, used, rotated, revoked, and destroyed under documented procedures, with keys held in HSMs or hardened key stores and access limited to authorized custodians under dual control and split knowledge where warranted. Public key certificates are issued from approved certificate authorities, inventoried, monitored for expiry, renewed before lapse, and revoked promptly on compromise. Key-management activities are logged and periodically audited.
unified · Direct
UC-CRYPTO-04 — Protect data in use from unauthorized access
Data being processed in memory or active sessions is protected against unauthorized access and exposure through techniques commensurate with risk, including process isolation, memory protections, masking of sensitive fields on display, and confidential-computing or equivalent enclave technologies for high-sensitivity workloads. Access to data in use is limited to the processing identity, and residual data is cleared from memory and temporary storage after use.
unified · Context
UC-NET-02 — Authorize and secure remote, wireless, and mobile access
Establish usage restrictions, configuration and connection requirements, and explicit authorization for each type of remote access, wireless access, and organization-controlled mobile device before connection is permitted. Protect these connections with mutual authentication, encryption, and wireless link-level protections commensurate with the signal exposure and threat environment, and monitor for unauthorized access points and connections.
unified · Context
UC-NET-03 — Provide trusted channels and control session lifecycle
Provide trusted, mutually authenticated communication paths for security-relevant interactions, and protect the authenticity and integrity of communication sessions to prevent hijacking, insertion, and replay. Terminate network connections at the end of a session or after a defined period of inactivity, and use separate out-of-band channels for delivering sensitive items such as credentials and keys.
unified · Context
UC-NET-07 — Secure name resolution and time services
Provide authoritative name-resolution service with origin authentication and integrity verification (e.g., DNSSEC), and perform data-origin authentication and integrity validation in recursive or caching resolvers. Architect name-resolution services to be fault tolerant and to enforce internal and external role separation, and synchronize system clocks to authoritative time sources so events can be correlated reliably.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Trust Services Readiness
Runs on the existing Audit engagement with its system description, service commitments, review period, control and risk registers, and available evidence; assesses CC1–CC9 design readiness and consumes reviewed companion assessments for selected optional Trust Services categories. Delivers the criterion-to-control mapping, criterion-level evidence and design conclusions, owned gap register, and approved SOC 2 readiness disposition to management for remediation and examination planning; Type II testing, management-owned PBC preparation and management assertion remain separate workflows.
workflow · Context
Technical Security Testing & Pentest Engagement
Runs ON an existing Audit item (audit_type: it_audit) that represents the authorized penetration-test engagement — the workflow instance attaches to that record and enriches it (scope, ratings, dates, and the assurance conclusion write back to its fields); it never creates a duplicate engagement record. In scope: authorized technical testing (reconnaissance, discovery, exploitation validation, severity rating, reporting, and retest) of the defined system boundary against its control baseline and assessment objective, with each confirmed finding recorded as an Issue linked to the anchor Audit and its affected Controls. Out of scope: any testing beyond the agreed rules of engagement, and the downstream remediation program itself — confirmed control gaps and open POA&M findings are handed to the Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation workflow, and the assurance conclusion to the Cybersecurity Assurance Review workflow. No upstream workflow feeds this engagement; its inputs are the anchor Audit, the in-scope system boundary (Process items), the control baseline (Control items, framework nist-800-53), the assessment objective and signed authorization, and any open Issue items (source: penetration_test / vulnerability_scan) from prior engagements.
workflow · Context
Cryptographic Key Management Review
Periodic cryptographic key management review as a decision-aware workflow covering inventory, custody, rotation, algorithm strength, and verified remediation. The workflow instance attaches to the existing Audit item opened for this review cycle (audit_type it_audit or compliance; Audit.scope = the review scope statement; Audit.period_start/period_end = the review period; Audit.lead_auditor = the review owner) — enrich that record, never create a duplicate — and it links to the cryptographic Control items under review (domains cryptography_key_management, e.g. UC-CRYPTO-02, UC-CRYPTO-03). In scope: all managed key stores — cloud KMS, HSM partitions, certificate stores, secrets managers, and code-signing infrastructure — across in-scope environments. Out of scope: application-layer data classification and the identity provider, which are covered by their own reviews. No upstream workflow feeds this review; it is triggered by its periodic cadence, an incident, an audit request, or an algorithm-deprecation notice — scope is set on the Audit at kickoff, not handed off. The named deliverables are the signed cryptographic key management attestation (mapped to ISO 27001 A.8.24 and NIST SP 800-53 SC-12/SC-13) and the indexed, redacted evidence package filed against the anchor Audit; there is no downstream handoff workflow.
workflow · Context
Data Encryption & In-Use Protection Operations
Standing operator workflow for the quarterly encryption sweep across data at rest, in transit, and in use, including CISO-approved compensating controls where encryption is infeasible, with a dashboarded readiness classification and corrective-action tracking. Each quarterly instance runs against — and enriches — the existing Control item for the data-encryption / in-use-protection control (domains cryptography_key_management + data_protection_privacy, quarterly frequency, control_owner set); it never creates a duplicate control. It consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward — the still-open corrective-action Issue items and the active compensating-control Control items already linked to that anchor Control (there is no upstream handoff package). Named deliverables: the sensitivity-classified inventory register; the at-rest, in-transit, movement-control, and data-in-use findings registers; the CISO-approved compensating-control register; the program-health dashboard; the corrective-action register; and the archived operating record. In scope: every data store, transmission channel, and removable-media pathway that holds or moves sensitive or account data, plus high-sensitivity workloads that process data in use. Out of scope: key and certificate inventory and rotation, which are reviewed under the separate key-management program. Terminal by design: no downstream workflow consumes this cycle's output — open corrective actions and compensating controls carry forward as explicit inputs to the next quarterly cycle.
workflow · Context
Secure Connectivity & Network Trust Services Operation
Standing operator workflow for remote/wireless/mobile access re-authorization, session trusted-channel and termination verification, and DNSSEC/name-resolution and time-service assurance, as a decision-aware quarterly cycle that contains rogue access before continuing and routes gaps to tracked corrective action. Each quarterly instance attaches to the existing standing Process item (process_type: security_process, frequency: quarterly) for Secure Connectivity & Network Trust Services — it enriches that Process cycle-over-cycle, never creating a duplicate — and that Process is related to the existing Control items UC-NET-02, UC-NET-03, and UC-NET-07 the cycle operates. In scope: remote-access methods, wireless networks, and organization-controlled mobile devices; systems hosting security-relevant sessions; authoritative DNS zones, recursive and caching resolvers, and authoritative time sources. Out of scope: endpoint hardening and identity/credential lifecycle beyond out-of-band key delivery. The cycle runs on its own quarterly trigger and consumes no upstream workflow handoff package; it produces the re-authorization register, the sweep and containment logs, the session-trust and name-resolution/time assurance records, the connectivity trust-posture dashboard and summary, and a corrective-action register — closing into an internal carry-forward that seeds the next quarterly instance (no handoff to a distinct downstream workflow).
workflow · Context
AI Guardrail Configuration & Agent Permission Review
Each monthly or release-triggered instance runs against the existing Control item for AI guardrail configuration and agent permission review (framework aiuc-1 + iso-42001 + eu-ai-act; frequency monthly and per release; control_owner AI Platform Security Lead) — the run enriches that Control's execution history and is its evidence of operation, never a duplicate. The decision-aware cycle confirms the in-scope agent population and baseline; reviews input defenses and endpoint limits, tool allow-lists, permissions and sandboxing, output filters and grounding, misuse refusals, secrets redaction, and secure-code-generation defaults; decides on agent permission scope and on guardrail drift with a remediation branch for each; and consolidates the results into a signed guardrail attestation with cycle metrics and owned actions, booking every residual gap as an Issue (source: management_identified) linked to the anchor Control. In scope: every production AI agent and inference endpoint, its guardrail configuration, tool-call and detection logs, and configuration artifacts. Out of scope: model development, pre-deployment evaluation, and vendor AI due diligence, which have their own workflows. The cycle hands off only to its next instance through the carry-forward Issues that the guardrail attestation step links to the anchor Control.
workflow · Context
Quarterly Third-Party AI Evaluation Cycle
Each quarterly instance runs against the existing Control item for independent third-party AI evaluation (framework aiuc-1 + iso-42001 + eu-ai-act; domains ai_governance; frequency quarterly; control_owner AI Product Lead) — the run enriches that Control's execution history and is its evidence of operation, it never creates a duplicate Control; the one record it does create is a per-quarter Audit item (audit_type: it_audit) for the evaluator engagement. The decision-aware cycle confirms the quarter's in-scope systems and risk taxonomy, engages an independent evaluator with the test plan, categories, and pass thresholds fixed in advance, provisions contained test access, triages every finding by category and severity against the tested control, routes failed thresholds through remediation and evaluator retest, gates acceptance of the evaluator report, publishes the accepted evidence (trust-portal summary, customer-facing attestation, evidence register), and tunes guardrails from the findings. In scope: every in-scope AI system and agent under the AIUC-1 program and its six mandatory third-party test categories (B001 adversarial robustness, C010 harmful outputs, C011 out-of-scope outputs, C012 agent-specific risk, D002 hallucinations, D004 tool calls). Out of scope: internal red-teaming, pre-release model evaluation, and vendor AI due diligence, which run in their own workflows. It hands off only to the next quarterly run of itself, seeding it with the open carry-forward finding Issues that the publish-evidence-and-tune-guardrails step links to the anchor Control.
workflow · Context
Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation
Run this assessment on the EXISTING Audit item for the engagement (audit_type: it_audit or compliance) — enrich that record, never create a duplicate: Audit.scope carries the authorization boundary and Audit.period_start/period_end the assessment window. Consumes, from the upstream SSP-development / system-categorization effort, the approved System Security Plan (SSP), the FIPS 199 system categorization, and the tailored NIST 800-53 baseline (existing Control items, framework: nist-800-53). Assess each in-scope control with 800-53A examine/interview/test methods, record satisfied / other-than-satisfied determinations, open a POA&M Issue for every gap, re-validate remediation, and issue the Security Assessment Report (SAR). In scope: control assessment, determinations, the POA&M lifecycle, and the SAR for the authorization boundary agreed at kickoff. Out of scope: the authorization (ATO) decision itself and the steady-state continuous-monitoring cadence. On completion, the frozen SAR and POA&M package are handed to the NIST RMF System Authorization (ATO) Cycle.
workflow · Context
ISO 27001 Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit
Attach to the existing Audit engagement, owned by Internal Audit, using its approved Statement of Applicability, risk treatment plan, scope, review period and operating evidence; produce the Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit report, four signed theme conclusions and finding register for the engagement and remediation owners. Apply the approved Statement of Applicability to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A.5.1–A.5.37, A.6.1–A.6.8, A.7.1–A.7.14 and A.8.1–A.8.34; document each exclusion and assess direct and inherited responsibilities. This Annex A assessment contributes to the engagement and does not independently establish full ISMS conformity or issue certification. Stage 1 and readiness remain separate workflows; any certification decision remains with the authorized certification body.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Type II Interim Testing
Interim fieldwork for the Type II examination: cycle walkthroughs, design assessment against the Trust Services Criteria, the first operating-effectiveness testing wave over the agreed interim evidence window, and exception triage feeding remediation and retest planning before the period closes. Interim SOC 2 Type II fieldwork for the listed control selections and agreed interim window. Later-period testing and the service auditor's independent opinion remain outside this module. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.