PCI DSS v4.0.1
84 records. Direct records match this source; context records explain their connections.
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control · Direct
PCI-Req1 — Install and maintain network security controls
Install and maintain network security controls
control · Direct
PCI-Req10 — Log and monitor all access to system components and cardholder data
Log and monitor all access to system components and cardholder data
control · Direct
PCI-Req11 — Test security of systems and networks regularly
Test security of systems and networks regularly
control · Direct
PCI-Req12 — Support information security with organizational policies and programs
Support information security with organizational policies and programs
control · Direct
PCI-Req2 — Apply secure configurations to all system components
Apply secure configurations to all system components
control · Direct
PCI-Req3 — Protect stored account data
Protect stored account data
control · Direct
PCI-Req4 — Protect cardholder data with strong cryptography during transmission over open, public networks
Protect cardholder data with strong cryptography during transmission over open, public networks
control · Direct
PCI-Req5 — Protect all systems and networks from malicious software
Protect all systems and networks from malicious software
control · Direct
PCI-Req6 — Develop and maintain secure systems and software
Develop and maintain secure systems and software
control · Direct
PCI-Req7 — Restrict access to system components and cardholder data by business need to know
Restrict access to system components and cardholder data by business need to know
control · Direct
PCI-Req8 — Identify users and authenticate access to system components
Identify users and authenticate access to system components
control · Direct
PCI-Req9 — Restrict physical access to cardholder data
Restrict physical access to cardholder data
risk · Context
Excessive privilege and wrong assignment of access rights
Overly broad or wrongly assigned access rights, applications/services running with excessive privileges, and failure to enforce least privilege — a compromise or insider then gains broad access to systems and data.
risk · Context
Abuse of rights, forged rights, and repudiation of actions
Authorized users or administrators exploit legitimate access beyond permitted scope, fabricate or forge credentials/rights to gain privileges, and repudiate performed actions — undermining accountability and audit-trail integrity.
risk · Context
Unauthorized use of equipment and unauthorized access escalation
Use of systems, networks, or devices without authorization, and users with authorized access reaching resources that exceed their authorization, potentially to exfiltrate data or conduct attacks.
risk · Context
Weak authentication and password management
Absent password policy, no MFA, credentials transmitted in clear text, and no session lock/logout on unattended workstations, making account compromise, brute-force login, and session hijacking easy.
risk · Context
Uncontrolled copying to removable media / unmanaged software installs
Absence of controls over copying data to removable devices, and users freely downloading/installing untested or unlicensed software, expands the attack surface and introduces malicious or unlicensed code into the environment.
risk · Context
Phishing, spear-phishing and social engineering
Adversary counterfeits trustworthy communications (email, phone, spoofed websites) to trick individuals — including high-value executives — into revealing credentials or sensitive information, or into enabling wire-transfer/BEC fraud.
risk · Context
Litigation, investigation and enforcement exposure
Adverse judgments, class actions, contract/IP disputes, government subpoenas, DOJ/FTC/SEC investigations, consent decrees, or deferred-prosecution agreements imposing penalties, remediation, and management distraction.
risk · Context
Internet-exposed or misconfigured systems
Adversary gains access through the Internet to systems not authorized for Internet connectivity or that do not meet configuration requirements, and exploits attacks over unauthorized ports, protocols, and services.
risk · Context
Poor configuration management and insecure baseline drift
Without documented, enforced baseline configurations and change control, systems drift into insecure states, contain unauthorized changes, or expose unnecessary network services, expanding attack surface.
risk · Context
Credentials and sensitive data transmitted in clear text
Authentication credentials or sensitive system communications transmitted unencrypted over networks, and absence of mutual sender/receiver authentication, enable interception, credential theft, and spoofing.
risk · Context
Compromised or counterfeit certificates / certificate authority
Adversary counterfeits or compromises a certificate authority so that malware or connections appear legitimate, defeating trust in TLS and code-signing and enabling man-in-the-middle or malicious-code delivery.
risk · Context
Weak or absent encryption and key management
Sensitive data stored or transmitted without adequate encryption, or use of weak/flawed cryptography and poor key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction — enabling interception, disclosure, or tampering of data.
risk · Context
Data exfiltration and theft of information by attackers
Adversary (outsider, insider, nation-state, or competitor) installs malware or sniffers to locate and exfiltrate sensitive/proprietary information, or steals data by external actors — including systems-security losses from hacking.
risk · Context
Residual data on improperly disposed or re-used media
Retrieval of recycled or discarded media, and disposal/reuse of storage without proper erasure, exposes residual sensitive information; also insecure/incomplete data deletion in multi-tenant/cloud environments.
risk · Context
Manual journal entries and management-override risk
Manual/automated journal entries posted with transposition errors, wrong account codes, or amounts; recurring entries not updated; and top-side entries used to override controls and manage earnings at period-end.
risk · Context
Revenue-recognition misstatement (fictitious, mis-timed, mis-measured)
Fictitious or channel-stuffed revenue, revenue not recorded for delivered goods, incorrect transaction-price allocation or percentage-of-completion, and principal-vs-agent gross/net errors — the highest-risk assertion cluster in the revenue cycle.
risk · Context
Segregation-of-duties conflicts in financial processes
Incompatible duties (initiate, approve, record, and custody) concentrated in one role or via broad system access enable unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to be recorded and concealed.
risk · Context
External fraud — third-party theft, forgery, payment and account fraud
Third parties defraud the entity: cheque/payment-card forgery, counterfeit currency, identity theft, account takeover with stolen credentials, fraudulent loan applications, and first-party (bust-out) fraud by customers.
risk · Context
Missing or insufficient security and privacy policies
Because documented, approved, and enforced security and privacy policies are missing and roles and duties are undefined, personnel operate without guidance on required controls and behaviours, so controls are applied inconsistently and accountability gaps leave violations undetected and unaddressed.
risk · Context
Insufficient personnel screening and vetting
Failure to vet employees, contractors, or third parties before granting access enables insider threats or introduces compromised individuals; adversaries may deliberately place subverted individuals into (privileged) positions.
risk · Context
Missing or insufficient logging and audit trails
Absence of logging/audit trails means unauthorized activity cannot be detected, investigated, or attributed, and adversary actions (obfuscation of intrusion detection, tampering with logs) go unnoticed.
risk · Context
No security monitoring or supervision of privileged activity
Absence of monitoring mechanisms and supervision of personnel actions (especially privileged users) allows undetected misuse, and no process exists to supervise and escalate detected security breaches.
risk · Context
Cloud multi-tenancy isolation and data-scavenging exploits
Adversary exploits multi-tenancy in a cloud environment to observe organizational processes, violates isolation mechanisms, or scavenges data used and deleted by cloud processes, compromising confidentiality and availability.
risk · Context
Communications interception, eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle
Passive monitoring/sniffing of communications, interception of unencrypted or weakly encrypted channels, wireless interception, and man-in-the-middle attacks capture or corrupt transmitted data — including TEMPEST-type emanation capture.
risk · Context
Poor network architecture and unprotected public connections
Because externally-facing connections lack perimeter controls (firewalls, DMZ) and the network lacks segmentation, redundancy, and defense-in-depth, attackers can breach the boundary and move laterally and single points of failure go unmitigated, resulting in intrusion, data exfiltration, and outage.
risk · Context
Remote-work, mobile and split-tunneling exposure
Uncontrolled work outside the premises, split-tunneling, and exploitation of mobile devices/personal systems outside physical and firewall protection expose information through insecure environments and reintroduce compromised devices into the enterprise.
risk · Context
Theft of equipment, media or unattended devices
Physical stealing of storage media, printouts, or computing/network equipment (including unattended laptops outside the perimeter), potentially exposing stored data. Unprotected storage locations increase exposure.
risk · Context
Applications running with excessive privilege / insecure design
Applications or services running under privileged accounts, opening unnecessary network connections, or lacking secure-by-design architecture mean a single compromise grants broad system access and expands attack surface.
risk · Context
Malware delivery, insertion and compromise of systems
Adversary crafts and delivers known, modified, or targeted malware (via email, web, removable media, or downloadable software) and compromises system software to take control, exfiltrate data, or degrade functions.
risk · Context
Vulnerabilities introduced during software development
Inherent weaknesses in programming languages and development environments introduce errors and exploitable vulnerabilities into software products, and software malfunctions cause incorrect outputs, crashes, or security weaknesses.
risk · Context
Loss of system maintainability
Loss of the ability to maintain, update, or repair information systems due to missing documentation, tools, skills, or unversioned software — leaving systems unpatchable and increasingly fragile over time.
risk · Context
Inadequate vulnerability scanning and pre-release testing
Software released without adequate testing, and no regular vulnerability scanning or penetration testing, leaves exploitable defects undiscovered until they manifest — or are exploited — in production.
risk · Context
Exploitation of known, unpatched vulnerabilities
Use of software with publicly known, unpatched flaws (CVEs) that adversaries readily exploit — including recently discovered vulnerabilities exploited before mitigations are in place, and internal-system vulnerability exploitation.
risk · Context
Zero-day exploitation
Adversary employs attacks that exploit as-yet-unpublicized vulnerabilities (targeted, based on reconnaissance, or nontargeted), compromising systems before any patch or signature exists.
standard · Direct
PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS v4.0.1
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-03 — Enforce least privilege, need-to-know, and segregation of duties
A documented access control policy grants access strictly on business need-to-know, with entitlements defined through roles that default to least privilege. Segregation-of-duties conflicts (e.g., request versus approve, develop versus deploy) are defined in a conflict matrix, enforced in systems, and mitigated with compensating controls where unavoidable. Role and entitlement definitions are approved by data or system owners and re-approved whenever they change.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-09 — Authenticate all users with multi-factor authentication
Every user is uniquely identified and authenticated before access, with multi-factor authentication enforced for remote access, privileged access, and access to sensitive data environments. Authentication follows secure log-on practices: credentials are validated only over protected channels, and federated identity assertions (e.g., SAML/OIDC tokens) are signed, protected, and verified. External and non-organizational users are held to the same authentication rigor, with authentication strength documented against the risk of the interaction.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-04 — Control storage media through use, storage, and destruction
Restrict access to and use of removable and other storage media to authorized personnel and approved media types, and physically secure media commensurate with the classification of the data it holds. Sanitize or destroy media and equipment containing storage using approved techniques before disposal, reuse, or release from control, and verify that data can no longer be read or recovered before protections are discontinued. Retain records of media use, movement, sanitization, and destruction.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-01 — Harden systems to approved secure configuration baselines
Establish, document, and maintain current baseline configurations and mandatory secure settings for all system components, including network security controls, aligned to accepted industry hardening standards. Configure systems for least functionality by disabling or restricting unnecessary ports, protocols, services, and functions. Monitor deployed configurations for deviations from baseline and for changes that introduce vulnerabilities, remediating drift as findings, and reassess baselines periodically and upon significant change.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-04 — Build security and privacy into software design and upkeep
Engineer security and data-protection requirements into systems and software from design onward, applying secure coding standards, pre-release security testing, and privacy-preserving defaults such as data minimization and pseudonymization. Maintain software after release by remediating identified vulnerabilities and applying security patches within risk-based timeframes. Replace or remove software that is unsupported or no longer justified by risk.
unified · Context
UC-CRYPTO-01 — Encrypt data at rest and in transit
Sensitive and nonpublic data at rest is rendered unreadable using strong, industry-accepted encryption, or truncation/tokenization for stored account data, with storage and retention minimized to defined business need. Data in transit is protected with strong cryptography and trusted certificates over all open, public, or external networks, rejecting fallback to insecure protocols. Transmission, movement, and removal of information, including to removable media, is restricted to authorized users and processes, and the integrity of data in both states is protected. Where encryption of nonpublic information is infeasible, compensating controls are documented, approved by the CISO, and reviewed at least annually.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-14 — Establish and maintain approved security policies and procedures
Establish, approve, publish, and maintain the organization's information-security policy suite as a governed whole: a top-level policy plus the topic-specific policies, each with an accountable owner, board/management approval, planned review cycles, and communication to relevant parties. Domain-specific policy content is governed by its own unified control; this objective owns the suite-level lifecycle (inventory, approval chain, review cadence, communication, exceptions).
unified · Context
UC-LOG-01 — Log security-relevant events across all systems
Enable audit logging on all systems, applications, and network components, generating records for a defined catalog of security-relevant event types — at minimum authentication, all access to sensitive or regulated data (such as cardholder data), privileged actions, account and configuration changes, and security-tool events. Review and update the event catalog periodically with system owners, ensure logging is enabled by default on newly deployed components, and verify logging coverage on a defined cadence.
unified · Context
UC-VULN-02 — Test security through independent penetration exercises
Commission penetration tests of systems, applications, and networks at least annually and after material changes, performed by qualified testers independent of the target's operation and governed by documented rules of engagement. Include both internal and external testing perspectives, validate the exploitability of identified weaknesses, and report results to accountable management. Track corrective actions from each exercise to verified closure, and use the results as a separate evaluation of whether security controls are present and functioning.
unified · Context
UC-VULN-05 — Block malware, spam, and phishing across all systems
Deploy centrally managed anti-malware protection on all system components commonly affected by malicious software, with real-time and periodic scanning, automatic signature and engine updates, and tamper protection so users cannot disable or alter it. Quarantine or block detected code, alert responders, and log all detections; periodically re-evaluate components deemed not commonly affected. Filter email and web channels for spam and phishing at entry and exit points, and support the technical controls with user awareness on malware and phishing.
workflow · Context
Cybersecurity Assurance Review
Cybersecurity Assurance Review — a CAE-owned assurance engagement that runs on the EXISTING Audit item opened from the audit plan (audit_type=it_audit, status PLANNED, lead_auditor and scope already set): the workflow instance attaches to that item and enriches it end to end, never creating a duplicate engagement record. It covers the three IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement domains (governance, risk management, and control activities) over the cyber estate bounded in the engagement memo (in scope: named legal entities, networks, cloud tenants, and OT/ICS where included; out of scope: areas whose assurance is documented as delivered by other engagements), testing against the NIST 800-53 Rev 5 catalog with CSF 2.0 / ISO 27001 as the aggregation frame. It originates from the audit plan (no upstream workflow) and produces the findings register (one four-Cs Issue per finding), the cyber posture summary carrying the per-domain and overall Standard 14.5 conclusions, and the approved engagement package — which it hands to the downstream Audit Report Drafting workflow.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Trust Services Readiness
Runs on the existing Audit engagement with its system description, service commitments, review period, control and risk registers, and available evidence; assesses CC1–CC9 design readiness and consumes reviewed companion assessments for selected optional Trust Services categories. Delivers the criterion-to-control mapping, criterion-level evidence and design conclusions, owned gap register, and approved SOC 2 readiness disposition to management for remediation and examination planning; Type II testing, management-owned PBC preparation and management assertion remain separate workflows.
workflow · Context
ITGC Change & Provisioning Testing
Runs ON a control item (a change-management or access-provisioning ITGC). Validates the change and provisioning populations for the period, draws reproducible samples, tests each sampled ticket against the control attributes (approval before migration, segregation of developer and migrator, approval before access, access matches the requested profile), records design and operating conclusions on the control, and raises every exception as an issue.
workflow · Context
Technical Security Testing & Pentest Engagement
Runs ON an existing Audit item (audit_type: it_audit) that represents the authorized penetration-test engagement — the workflow instance attaches to that record and enriches it (scope, ratings, dates, and the assurance conclusion write back to its fields); it never creates a duplicate engagement record. In scope: authorized technical testing (reconnaissance, discovery, exploitation validation, severity rating, reporting, and retest) of the defined system boundary against its control baseline and assessment objective, with each confirmed finding recorded as an Issue linked to the anchor Audit and its affected Controls. Out of scope: any testing beyond the agreed rules of engagement, and the downstream remediation program itself — confirmed control gaps and open POA&M findings are handed to the Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation workflow, and the assurance conclusion to the Cybersecurity Assurance Review workflow. No upstream workflow feeds this engagement; its inputs are the anchor Audit, the in-scope system boundary (Process items), the control baseline (Control items, framework nist-800-53), the assessment objective and signed authorization, and any open Issue items (source: penetration_test / vulnerability_scan) from prior engagements.
workflow · Context
User Access Review & Recertification
Runs on the existing Control item for UC-ACCESS-02 (user access review) — with UC-ACCESS-03 linked by item relationship — enriching that Control, never creating a duplicate; each quarterly or event-triggered cycle is a workflow instance attached to it, so archived instances accumulate as the de-facto control execution log. A decision-aware workflow covering entitlement extraction, manager certification, revocation, and independent verification. Consumes at start the prior cycle's scope-change carry-forward Issues and prior signed report (both attached to the same Control) plus the period's source-of-record entitlement extracts and period-end HR roster. Produces a signed, audit-ready recertification evidence package and control-owner report as the named deliverable. In scope: SOX-significant applications, systems holding data classified Confidential or above, identity infrastructure (directory, SSO, PAM), and privileged-reach platforms, across all account populations (standard, privileged, service, shared, emergency break-glass, third-party); triggered on scheduled cadence or by event (post-incident, auditor request). Out of scope: lifecycle provisioning and the privileged-access model itself — systemic findings hand off to the Joiner-Mover-Leaver Access Lifecycle (lifecycle gaps) and Privileged Access & Authorization Model Management (privileged-model findings) workflows.
workflow · Context
Joiner-Mover-Leaver Access Lifecycle
Run one instance per HR-triggered joiner, mover, or leaver event as a decision-routed access-lifecycle control that enriches the EXISTING Control item for JML / user-access provisioning-deprovisioning (control library, domains=access_control_identity, framework nist-800-53 + iso-27001) - attach the instance to that control, never create a duplicate. Consume the authoritative HR event record from the external HR system of record (the trigger): classify the event, then provision role-based access, adjust with SoD checks on transfer, or evidence timely removal on exit, and file the named audit-ready access-lifecycle evidence package before closing. In scope: identity-provider, directory, HR-system, ERP, and connected-SaaS entitlements for the affected worker. Out of scope: HR record creation itself, physical-security badge policy, and system-owner entitlement design. The run is terminal - no upstream or downstream AssureSwarm workflow: it starts from the external HR event and ends at the archived evidence package attached to the Control item. The anchor Control links (item relationship) to the access Risk it mitigates.
workflow · Context
Authentication Platform & Session Policy Operations
Monthly authentication-platform operating cycle. Anchor: this instance runs on the existing Process item for authentication-platform / session-management operations (process_type: security_process, frequency: monthly) — enrich that standing Process each cycle, never create a duplicate — with the four operated Control items UC-ACCESS-09/11/12/13 (framework tags carrying the standards mapping, domains: access_control_identity) linked to it. In scope: MFA enforcement and enrollment across remote, privileged, and sensitive-data access; secure log-on and federation-trust verification; lockout and anomalous-logon defense; session lifecycle controls (inactivity lock, automatic termination, concurrent-session limits, re-authentication for sensitive operations); and system-use, last-logon, and failed-attempt notices, across the IdP or SSO tenant, VPN or remote-access gateway, PAM tooling, and applications classified as housing sensitive data. Out of scope: identity provisioning and joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle, access certification, and privileged-access request approval, which are operated by their own workflows. There is no upstream workflow dependency: the instance is self-originating on its own initial inputs — the authentication-platform inventory (a document on the anchor Process, refreshed each cycle) and the prior-cycle operating record (the prior Workflow instance on the same Process plus its carried-forward open Issue items). The four operating areas run in parallel and reconverge at the platform-posture disposition. Named deliverables: the MFA enforcement-coverage register, the authentication-posture memo, the lockout-and-anomaly log, the session-policy compliance matrix, the banner-and-notice verification record, the platform-health dashboard and readiness summary, and the corrective-action register — each attached to its step, with every gap raised as a self_assessment Issue linked to the Control it degrades. There is no downstream handoff: this terminal recurring cycle seeds its own successor via carry-forward Issue items at close.
workflow · Context
Data Encryption & In-Use Protection Operations
Standing operator workflow for the quarterly encryption sweep across data at rest, in transit, and in use, including CISO-approved compensating controls where encryption is infeasible, with a dashboarded readiness classification and corrective-action tracking. Each quarterly instance runs against — and enriches — the existing Control item for the data-encryption / in-use-protection control (domains cryptography_key_management + data_protection_privacy, quarterly frequency, control_owner set); it never creates a duplicate control. It consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward — the still-open corrective-action Issue items and the active compensating-control Control items already linked to that anchor Control (there is no upstream handoff package). Named deliverables: the sensitivity-classified inventory register; the at-rest, in-transit, movement-control, and data-in-use findings registers; the CISO-approved compensating-control register; the program-health dashboard; the corrective-action register; and the archived operating record. In scope: every data store, transmission channel, and removable-media pathway that holds or moves sensitive or account data, plus high-sensitivity workloads that process data in use. Out of scope: key and certificate inventory and rotation, which are reviewed under the separate key-management program. Terminal by design: no downstream workflow consumes this cycle's output — open corrective actions and compensating controls carry forward as explicit inputs to the next quarterly cycle.
workflow · Context
Endpoint, Media & Information Handling Custody
Standing monthly operator desk for endpoint, media, and information-handling custody. The workflow instance is the monthly operating cycle attached to the EXISTING Control item for this custody control (control_id UC-ASSET-04/06/08 and UC-NET-12, Control.frequency monthly, Control.framework spanning nist-800-53, iso-27001, soc2, pci-dss) — each cycle enriches that standing Control rather than creating a new one. In scope: fleet endpoint safeguard and acceptable-use verification, off-premises and external-system use, port/I/O/sensor and collaboration-device restriction, removable-media authorization/custody/sanitization/destruction, and the information-transfer rulebook and agreements across electronic, physical-courier, and verbal channels. Out of scope: identity/access provisioning and network-perimeter engineering, which run under their own controls. No upstream workflow feeds this desk — the prior cycle's close-and-archive export is the carry-forward input that seeds each run (the fleet inventory, media custody register, and transfer rulebook are its own standing inputs). Named deliverables: the fleet-safeguard exception list, the endpoint-posture and custody-cycle disposition decisions, the removable-media authorization log and custody register, sanitization verification evidence and retained destruction certificates, the transfer-rule status, and two corrective-action registers backed by Issue items. Endpoint, media, and transfer streams run in parallel and reconverge at two decision checkpoints that route exceptions to tracked corrective action; terminal by design — it hands off to nothing but its own next monthly cycle.
workflow · Context
Secure Baseline & Integrity Drift Management
Standing monthly operator workflow for the secure-baseline and integrity-drift cycle: maintain and approve hardening baselines and least-functionality settings against accepted industry standards, run configuration-compliance scanning and remediate drift as findings, triage file-integrity, hash/signature, and secure-boot alerts while verifying security functions self-test correctly, and keep the configuration management plan current annually or after significant environment change. In scope: system components and network security controls governed by CM-2/CM-6/CM-7/CM-9 and SI-6/SI-7 (ISO 27001 A.8.9, PCI DSS Req.1/Req.2, NIST CSF PR.PS-01/DE.CM-09). Out of scope: incident containment and response — unexplained changes are escalated as potentially adverse events to the detect-to-respond incident-analysis practice rather than contained here. Anchor: each monthly run is a recurring workflow instance attached to the EXISTING secure-configuration Control item (the CM-2/CM-6/CM-7 hardening-baseline control — domains=secure_configuration_change_management, frequency=monthly, framework nist-800-53/pci-dss/iso-27001); the cycle enriches that standing Control and never creates a new one. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle — it is self-seeding: its inputs are the prior instance's archived operating record, the approved hardening-baseline standards (Policy items linked to the Control), the open drift/integrity backlog and baseline-reassessment carry-forward (Issue items linked to the anchor Control), and the CM-plan review calendar. Named deliverables: the approved hardening-baseline standards and least-functionality list, the configuration-compliance scan-result register, the integrity-alert and self-test register, drift and corrective-action findings (Issue items linked to the Control), the reviewed configuration management plan (Policy item), the cycle-health dashboard and readiness summary, and the signed, archived cycle operating record. The only cross-workflow handoff is the adverse-event escalation package handed to the detect-to-respond incident-analysis practice.
workflow · Context
Malware, Email & Web Content Defense Operations
Standing operator workflow for anti-malware coverage, detection handling, spam and phishing filtering, and mobile-code and website-content control, run on a monthly cadence by the security operations malware defense lead. Each monthly run is a new workflow instance attached to the existing Process item "Malware, Email & Web Content Defense Operations" (process_type: security_process, frequency: monthly), with Item relationships to the Control items it operates — UC-VULN-05 (malicious code protection) and UC-NET-13 (mobile code) in the control library (framework: nist-800-53, iso-27001, pci-dss). In scope: every system component commonly affected by malicious software, the email and web filtering entry and exit points, the mobile-code technologies in use, and website category and reputation filtering. Out of scope: endpoint patching and vulnerability remediation, incident response beyond first-line quarantine and alerting, and network firewall rule management. No upstream workflow feeds it: the monthly scope, the in-scope component and channel list, the accountable owners, and the prior-cycle carryover — the previous instance's open Issue items and step documents — are its own initial inputs. It produces the coverage reconciliation report, the detection-and-response log, the mobile-code authorization list, the tuned email/web and website-content filtering packages, a capability-health dashboard, a signed readiness classification, and a corrective-action register. It is terminal by design: rather than hand off to a downstream workflow, the close-and-archive step preserves the signed operating record under retention and loops carry-forward Issue items into the next monthly cycle.
workflow · Context
Secure Development & Release Security Gate
Each run attaches as a workflow instance to the existing Control item for the secure-development/release-security-gate control (domains: secure_development_sdlc + vulnerability_patch_management) — enrich that Control, never create a duplicate; release runs and the quarterly checkpoint are separate instances on the same anchor Control. This workflow originates on its own artifacts (the release candidate, design artifacts, and the standing portfolio registers) and receives no upstream handoff package. Decision-aware: it branches on trigger type. In scope — for a release or major upgrade entering development, run security-and-privacy-by-design engineering, security test-plan execution, and runtime-hardening verification as parallel evidence streams, then resolve the release security disposition and assemble the release security evidence package with its acceptance-criteria index; for the quarterly portfolio checkpoint, run the vulnerability, patch, and end-of-life software review, publish the portfolio-health dashboard, and log corrective actions. Out of scope — the final production go/no-go, which the separate SDLC gate review workflow owns using the evidence package this workflow hands off to it. The release track and the quarterly track never force each other's steps.
workflow · Context
Identity Assurance Review
This review runs on an Audit engagement item created for the review cycle (audit_type: it_audit; scope: the identity assurance boundary) — the workflow instance attaches to that Audit, and the five in-scope UC-ACCESS Control items (UC-ACCESS-07/08/09/11/12) link to it. It is self-originating: no upstream workflow feeds it — it starts from the review trigger, the governing controls, and the collected evidence. Review the IAL, AAL, and FAL assurance requirements against the current identity proofing, authentication, and federation controls for the in-scope systems, then remediate, document, and hand off open gaps. It produces the target-level register, the current-state control inventory, the scored gap register, the per-control assurance determination memo, and the compiled assurance review package; each open gap is recorded as an Issue (POA&M) item linked to its UC-ACCESS Control and the anchor Audit. In scope: NIST SP 800-63 identity assurance levels for the systems named in the locked workplan. Out of scope: broader access provisioning, joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle, and privileged-access certification. Hands off the assurance determination and any open POA&M items to the Security Control Assessment and POA&M Remediation workflow.
workflow · Context
Audit Logging Coverage & Integrity Operations
Monthly operator cycle that verifies audit-logging coverage against the security-relevant event catalog, validates record content-completeness and clock synchronization, and confirms log protection, alerting, and retention, producing the coverage matrix, record content-completeness results, clock-drift report, and retention and capacity attestation evidence pack each cycle. Each instance attaches to the EXISTING audit-logging Control in the control library (control_id UC-LOG-01; framework nist-800-53 / iso-27001 / pci-dss / nydfs-500; domain logging_monitoring_detection; monthly frequency), with UC-LOG-02 / UC-LOG-03 linked by item relationships — enrich that Control's operating history, never create a duplicate control. Every gap, remediation, and carry-forward is logged as an Issue related back to that Control. In scope: every in-scope system, application, and network component, the security-relevant event catalog, and log protection and retention configuration. Out of scope: SIEM detection-rule tuning and incident investigation — surfaced detection gaps hand off to the SOC / SIEM-operations and incident-response workflows, not this cycle. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle; the prior cycle's open corrective-action and carry-forward Issue items (related to the anchor Control) plus the prior cycle's archived workflow instance are its only inputs, and close-and-archive seeds the next monthly run of itself.
workflow · Context
Onboarding & Access Provisioning
Runs on the existing personnel item. Provision a joiner access from an approved role profile, evidence each grant, and approve the provisioning record that ITGC access testing samples. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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ISO 27001 SoA Review & Controls Assessment
Review the ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability and assess the controls behind it. Each run attaches to an Audit item created for the review cycle (audit_type = compliance, e.g. "ISO 27001 SoA Review 2026-H2"), which accumulates the scope, the per-control test instances, the assessment package, the approval, and the rating. The workflow locks the assessment workplan, reconciles every Annex A control's applicable/excluded decision and justification against the current risk treatment plan, verifies implementation evidence, assesses the sampled controls for design and operating effectiveness, routes deficiencies to owners, and approves and publishes the version-controlled Statement of Applicability (SoA) — then classifies the disposition and prepares, approves, hands off, and archives the review package. In scope: reconciling and assessing the SoA's Annex A control applicability decisions and their implementation for the ISMS in scope, and publishing the approved SoA version. It consumes the ISMS Risk Assessment & Treatment Cycle's handoff package (the current risk register, the risk treatment decisions, and the required-controls determination) and hands its named deliverable — the approved, version-controlled published SoA and the assessment package — off to the downstream ISO 27001 Certification Readiness workflow. Out of scope: the enterprise risk assessment and treatment decisions that determine which controls are required (owned upstream by the ISMS Risk Assessment & Treatment Cycle) and the certification audit preparation that follows (owned by the downstream ISO 27001 Certification Readiness workflow, which consumes this review's approved package). The trigger is the scheduled SoA review interval or a material change to scope, risk, or the control environment.
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Transfer & Access Modification
Runs on the existing personnel item. Modify a mover access for a new role, remove entitlements the prior role no longer justifies, and approve the modification record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation
Run this assessment on the EXISTING Audit item for the engagement (audit_type: it_audit or compliance) — enrich that record, never create a duplicate: Audit.scope carries the authorization boundary and Audit.period_start/period_end the assessment window. Consumes, from the upstream SSP-development / system-categorization effort, the approved System Security Plan (SSP), the FIPS 199 system categorization, and the tailored NIST 800-53 baseline (existing Control items, framework: nist-800-53). Assess each in-scope control with 800-53A examine/interview/test methods, record satisfied / other-than-satisfied determinations, open a POA&M Issue for every gap, re-validate remediation, and issue the Security Assessment Report (SAR). In scope: control assessment, determinations, the POA&M lifecycle, and the SAR for the authorization boundary agreed at kickoff. Out of scope: the authorization (ATO) decision itself and the steady-state continuous-monitoring cadence. On completion, the frozen SAR and POA&M package are handed to the NIST RMF System Authorization (ATO) Cycle.
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ISO 27001 Stage 1 ISMS Documentation Review
Certification-body Stage 1 review of the ISMS against ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clauses 4–10: context and leadership, planning and support, operation, and performance evaluation with improvement - walking each clause group against the governing documents and the operating processes that carry it, and concluding Stage 2 readiness with dual sign-off. Stage 1 documentation and readiness review for ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clauses 4–10, conducted under the engagement methodology. It informs Stage 2 planning and does not issue a certification decision. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
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ISO 27001 Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit
Attach to the existing Audit engagement, owned by Internal Audit, using its approved Statement of Applicability, risk treatment plan, scope, review period and operating evidence; produce the Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit report, four signed theme conclusions and finding register for the engagement and remediation owners. Apply the approved Statement of Applicability to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A.5.1–A.5.37, A.6.1–A.6.8, A.7.1–A.7.14 and A.8.1–A.8.34; document each exclusion and assess direct and inherited responsibilities. This Annex A assessment contributes to the engagement and does not independently establish full ISMS conformity or issue certification. Stage 1 and readiness remain separate workflows; any certification decision remains with the authorized certification body.
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SOC 2 Type II Interim Testing
Interim fieldwork for the Type II examination: cycle walkthroughs, design assessment against the Trust Services Criteria, the first operating-effectiveness testing wave over the agreed interim evidence window, and exception triage feeding remediation and retest planning before the period closes. Interim SOC 2 Type II fieldwork for the listed control selections and agreed interim window. Later-period testing and the service auditor's independent opinion remain outside this module. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
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Employee Onboarding
Run on an existing personnel item using signed engagement, screening references and an approved role profile. Produce an Onboarding Readiness Package with IT access evidence for HR, the manager and subsequent access reviews.
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System ITGC Operation
Operate and evidence the IT general controls on a system: authentication and password configuration, access provisioning and deprovisioning, the periodic user access review, change management (testing, sign-off, logs), and subservice SOC report reliance.
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Annual Policy Review
Runs on the existing policy item. Canonical annual policy review: establish scope, obtain the policy owner and policy team sign-offs, record any required change path, and approve a documented review outcome and next review date. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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Policy Change
Runs on the existing policy item. Canonical policy-change governance: scope and propose a controlled change, obtain policy-team approval, publish only the approved version, and close with a traceable document and communication record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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Policy Lifecycle Management
Run one policy through its full lifecycle, anchored to a Policy item in the policy library — created at authoring for a net-new policy, enriched in place on each refresh cycle (never duplicated). In scope: authoring and control/authority linkage, stakeholder review, formal approval, publication and workforce attestation, acknowledgement tracking, disposition, and scheduled alignment refresh. Consumes read-only upstream: the enterprise risk assessment (Risk items), control design (Control items), and obligation mapping — this workflow neither produces nor edits them. Produces four named deliverables: the published policy version, a frozen workforce attestation completion record, a section-by-section alignment verdict, and a single approval-ready policy package. Out of scope: enterprise risk assessment, control design, and obligation mapping. The approved policy package is handed off to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle, which runs the recurring regulatory attestation; the acknowledgement campaign launched here is the one-time publication attestation and is explicitly flagged in the handoff as not-to-be-repeated downstream.
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Regulatory Obligation Implementation
Implement a new or changed regulatory obligation end to end on the Audit item created for this implementation (audit_type = compliance or readiness): its scope names the obligation and authority, its period_end holds the effective (compliance-by) date, and the workflow instance attaches to it. There is no native Regulation type, so the regulator, region, and obligation summary live in the anchor Audit.description with the operative source text uploaded to the gap-analysis step. The work — gap analysis, policy updates (Policy items), control design (Control items), process operationalization (a Process item), and coverage validation — enriches that Audit rather than creating a parallel record. In scope are the legal entities, products, systems, and vendor relationships (Vendor items) the obligation touches; entities and processing below the regulation's applicability thresholds are out of scope. This workflow consumes the obligation map handed off from Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping and hands its named deliverable — a validated coverage package (the gap list, the drafted policies and controls, the operationalized process, and the validation run) — to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle.