Third-Party / Supply-Chain Risk
275 records. Direct records match this topic; context records explain their connections.
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control · Context
A004 — Protect IP & trade secrets
Protect IP & trade secrets
control · Context
A005 — Prevent cross-customer data exposure
Prevent cross-customer data exposure
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E001 — AI failure plan for security breaches
AI failure plan for security breaches
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E002 — AI failure plan for harmful outputs
AI failure plan for harmful outputs
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E003 — AI failure plan for hallucinations
AI failure plan for hallucinations
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E006 — Conduct vendor due diligence
Conduct vendor due diligence
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E012 — Document regulatory compliance
Document regulatory compliance
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E016 — Implement AI disclosure mechanisms
Implement AI disclosure mechanisms
control · Context
CCPA-1798.140 — Service-provider and contractor contract requirements
Service-provider and contractor contract requirements
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APO09 — Managed Service Agreements
Managed Service Agreements
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APO10 — Managed Vendors
Managed Vendors
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APO14 — Managed Data
Managed Data
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BAI09 — Managed Assets
Managed Assets
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BAI10 — Managed Configuration
Managed Configuration
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DSS04 — Managed Continuity
Managed Continuity
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E15 — Assesses Substantial Change
Assesses Substantial Change
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P15 — The organization communicates with external parties regarding matters affecting the functioning of internal control.
The organization communicates with external parties regarding matters affecting the functioning of internal control.
control · Context
P5 — The organization holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.
The organization holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.
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P9 — The organization identifies and assesses changes that could significantly impact the system of internal control.
The organization identifies and assesses changes that could significantly impact the system of internal control.
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DORA-Art28-44 — Managing of ICT third-party risk
Managing of ICT third-party risk
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AIA-Art13 — Transparency and provision of information to deployers (high-risk)
Transparency and provision of information to deployers (high-risk)
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AIA-Art16 — Obligations of providers of high-risk AI systems
Obligations of providers of high-risk AI systems
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AIA-Art20 — Corrective actions and duty of information for non-conforming high-risk AI systems
Corrective actions and duty of information for non-conforming high-risk AI systems
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AIA-Art21-22 — Cooperation with competent authorities; authorised representatives of non-EU providers
Cooperation with competent authorities; authorised representatives of non-EU providers
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AIA-Art23-25 — Obligations of importers and distributors; responsibilities along the AI value chain
Obligations of importers and distributors; responsibilities along the AI value chain
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AIA-Art26 — Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systems
Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systems
control · Context
AIA-Art43 — Conformity assessment of high-risk AI systems
Conformity assessment of high-risk AI systems
control · Context
AIA-Art47-49 — EU declaration of conformity, CE marking and registration in the EU database
EU declaration of conformity, CE marking and registration in the EU database
control · Context
AIA-Art50 — Transparency obligations for certain AI systems (deepfakes, chatbots, emotion recognition)
Transparency obligations for certain AI systems (deepfakes, chatbots, emotion recognition)
control · Context
AIA-Art53 — Obligations for providers of general-purpose AI (GPAI) models
Obligations for providers of general-purpose AI (GPAI) models
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AIA-Art55 — Obligations for GPAI models with systemic risk
Obligations for GPAI models with systemic risk
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AIA-Art73 — Reporting of serious incidents (providers; deployers inform providers)
Reporting of serious incidents (providers; deployers inform providers)
control · Context
GDPR-Art28 — Processor obligations and data processing agreements
Processor obligations and data processing agreements
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GDPR-Art44-49 — International transfers of personal data
International transfers of personal data
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HIPAA-164.314 — Organizational requirements (business associate contracts, group health plan requirements)
Organizational requirements (business associate contracts, group health plan requirements)
control · Context
Principle 11 — Communicate Effectively
Communicate Effectively
control · Context
Principle 12 — Enhance Quality
Enhance Quality
control · Context
Std 11.1 — Building Relationships and Communicating with Stakeholders
Building Relationships and Communicating with Stakeholders
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Std 11.2 — Effective Communication
Effective Communication
control · Context
Std 12.1 — Internal Quality Assessment
Internal Quality Assessment
control · Context
Std 12.2 — Performance Measurement
Performance Measurement
control · Context
Std 8.3 — Quality
Quality
control · Context
A.5.19 — Information security in supplier relationships
Information security in supplier relationships
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A.5.20 — Addressing information security within supplier agreements
Addressing information security within supplier agreements
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A.5.21 — Managing information security in the ICT supply chain
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain
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A.5.22 — Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services
Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services
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A.5.23 — Information security for use of cloud services
Information security for use of cloud services
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A.5.29 — Information security during disruption
Information security during disruption
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A.5.30 — ICT readiness for business continuity
ICT readiness for business continuity
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A.5.4 — Management responsibilities
Management responsibilities
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A.6.2 — Terms and conditions of employment
Terms and conditions of employment
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A.6.4 — Disciplinary process
Disciplinary process
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A.6.6 — Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements
Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements
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A.7.5 — Protecting against physical and environmental threats
Protecting against physical and environmental threats
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A.7.8 — Equipment siting and protection
Equipment siting and protection
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A.8.12 — Data leakage prevention
Data leakage prevention
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A.8.14 — Redundancy of information processing facilities
Redundancy of information processing facilities
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A.8.30 — Outsourced development
Outsourced development
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31000-P5 — Dynamic
Dynamic
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A.10.2 — Allocating responsibilities
Allocating responsibilities
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A.10.3 — Suppliers
Suppliers
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A.10.4 — Customers
Customers
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A.3.3 — Reporting of concerns
Reporting of concerns
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A.4.2 — Resource documentation
Resource documentation
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A.4.3 — Data resources
Data resources
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A.4.4 — Tooling resources
Tooling resources
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A.4.5 — System and computing resources
System and computing resources
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A.8.2 — System documentation and information for users
System documentation and information for users
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A.8.3 — External reporting
External reporting
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A.8.4 — Communication of incidents
Communication of incidents
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A.8.5 — Information for interested parties
Information for interested parties
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NIS2-Art21d — Supply chain security
Supply chain security
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NIS2-Art21e — Security in acquisition, development and maintenance of network and information systems (incl. vulnerability handling and disclosure)
Security in acquisition, development and maintenance of network and information systems (incl. vulnerability handling and disclosure)
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AC-4 — Information Flow Enforcement
Information Flow Enforcement
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CA-3 — Information Exchange
Information Exchange
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CM-1 — Policy and Procedures
Policy and Procedures
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CM-14 — Signed Components
Signed Components
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CP-2 — Contingency Plan
Contingency Plan
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CP-6 — Alternate Storage Site
Alternate Storage Site
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CP-7 — Alternate Processing Site
Alternate Processing Site
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CP-8 — Telecommunications Services
Telecommunications Services
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MA-1 — Policy and Procedures
Policy and Procedures
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MA-3 — Maintenance Tools
Maintenance Tools
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MA-4 — Nonlocal Maintenance
Nonlocal Maintenance
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MA-5 — Maintenance Personnel
Maintenance Personnel
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PE-13 — Fire Protection
Fire Protection
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PE-14 — Environmental Controls
Environmental Controls
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PE-15 — Water Damage Protection
Water Damage Protection
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PE-18 — Location of System Components
Location of System Components
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PE-23 — Facility Location
Facility Location
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PL-4 — Rules of Behavior
Rules of Behavior
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PM-17 — Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information on External Systems
Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information on External Systems
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PM-23 — Data Governance Body
Data Governance Body
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PM-24 — Data Integrity Board
Data Integrity Board
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PM-30 — Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy
Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy
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PS-6 — Access Agreements
Access Agreements
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PS-7 — External Personnel Security
External Personnel Security
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PS-8 — Personnel Sanctions
Personnel Sanctions
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PS-9 — Position Descriptions
Position Descriptions
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SA-1 — Policy and Procedures
Policy and Procedures
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SA-10 — Developer Configuration Management
Developer Configuration Management
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SA-20 — Customized Development of Critical Components
Customized Development of Critical Components
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SA-21 — Developer Screening
Developer Screening
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SA-22 — Unsupported System Components
Unsupported System Components
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SA-23 — Specialization
Specialization
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SA-4 — Acquisition Process
Acquisition Process
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SA-9 — External System Services
External System Services
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SR-1 — Policy and Procedures
Policy and Procedures
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SR-10 — Inspection of Systems or Components
Inspection of Systems or Components
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SR-11 — Component Authenticity
Component Authenticity
control · Context
SR-12 — Component Disposal
Component Disposal
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SR-2 — Supply Chain Risk Management Plan
Supply Chain Risk Management Plan
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SR-3 — Supply Chain Controls and Processes
Supply Chain Controls and Processes
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SR-4 — Provenance
Provenance
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SR-5 — Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods
Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods
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SR-6 — Supplier Assessments and Reviews
Supplier Assessments and Reviews
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SR-7 — Supply Chain Operations Security
Supply Chain Operations Security
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SR-8 — Notification Agreements
Notification Agreements
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SR-9 — Tamper Resistance and Detection
Tamper Resistance and Detection
control · Context
NIST-AGI-07 — Prompt provenance and data-flow tracking
The proposed project explores tracking the provenance of user prompts and input data so that risk assessments and policies can take those sources into account when deciding whether an agent may act.
control · Context
NIST-TEVV-04 — Test for disclosure of confidential information
Appendix B includes confidentiality attacks that test whether an AI system reveals confidential information or internal functionality, including user information and system-prompt leakage.
control · Context
GV.SC-01 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
control · Context
GV.SC-02 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally
control · Context
GV.SC-03 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes
control · Context
GV.SC-04 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality
control · Context
GV.SC-05 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties
control · Context
GV.SC-06 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships
control · Context
GV.SC-07 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship
control · Context
GV.SC-08 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities
control · Context
GV.SC-09 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle
control · Context
GV.SC-10 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement
control · Context
ID.RA-09 — Risk Assessment: The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use
Risk Assessment: The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use
control · Context
PR.IR-02 — Technology Infrastructure Resilience: The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats
Technology Infrastructure Resilience: The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats
control · Context
PR.IR-03 — Technology Infrastructure Resilience: Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations
Technology Infrastructure Resilience: Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations
control · Context
500.11 — Third-party service provider security policy
Third-party service provider security policy
control · Context
500.16 — Incident response and business continuity management
Incident response and business continuity management
control · Context
500.8 — Application security
Application security
control · Context
SOC1-12 — Vendor / subservice organization management — controls provide reasonable assurance that subservice organizations relevant to user entities' ICFR are appropriately managed and monitored.
Vendor / subservice organization management — controls provide reasonable assurance that subservice organizations relevant to user entities' ICFR are appropriately managed and monitored.
control · Context
CC1.5 — The entity holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.
The entity holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.
control · Context
CC3.4 — The entity identifies and assesses changes that could significantly impact the system of internal control.
The entity identifies and assesses changes that could significantly impact the system of internal control.
control · Context
CC9.2 — The entity assesses and manages risks associated with vendors and business partners.
The entity assesses and manages risks associated with vendors and business partners.
risk · Direct
GPAI transparency, systemic-risk and synthetic-content obligations
GPAI providers failing transparency/copyright/training-data obligations; systemic-risk models (>10^25 FLOPs) lacking red-teaming, incident reporting, and cybersecurity; unlabeled deepfake/synthetic content; and concentration of GPAI capability creating ecosystem single points of failure.
risk · Direct
AI supply-chain compromise and provider concentration
Because the organization relies on third-party pretrained models, datasets, and libraries that may carry backdoors, malicious code, or bias, and concentrates on a few external AI API providers, AI-dependent workflows are exposed to both supply-chain compromise and provider outage or insolvency, resulting in compromised model behaviour or sudden loss of AI capability.
risk · Direct
Physical climate risk to facilities and supply chains
Extreme weather (flooding, wildfires, hurricanes, heat stress), sea-level rise, and resource scarcity damage owned/leased facilities, disrupt supplier operations, and impair logistics beyond insurance coverage.
risk · Direct
Social and human-rights failures in operations and supply chain
Failure to respect human rights — forced or child labour, discrimination, unsafe conditions — in operations and supply chains, resulting in legal liability, boycotts, and ESG rating downgrades.
risk · Direct
Missing security terms in contracts and no disciplinary process
Employment and supplier contracts omit security/confidentiality obligations, and there is no disciplinary process for security violations — removing legal recourse and the deterrent effect against repeat offenders.
risk · Direct
Cross-border personal-data transfer without safeguards
Transferring personal data to jurisdictions lacking equivalent protection without SCCs, BCRs, adequacy decisions, or other recognized mechanisms, exposing individuals and the organization to legal risk.
risk · Direct
Geopolitical, macroeconomic and sovereign risk
Armed conflict, political instability, sanctions, trade-policy reversals (tariffs, export bans, data-localization, forced tech transfer), expropriation/nationalization, and adverse macroeconomic cycles disrupt operations, supply chains, and cost structures.
risk · Direct
Critical vendor failure, insolvency or concentration
A key supplier, SaaS provider, or outsourced partner becomes insolvent, exits the market, or suffers a prolonged outage; sole-source and shared-tier concentration (multiple tier-1 vendors on a common tier-2) creates hidden single points of failure with no backup.
risk · Direct
Supply-chain disruption of critical inputs
Geopolitical events, natural disasters, port congestion, or logistics failures interrupt supply of critical raw materials or components (semiconductors, rare earths); just-in-time models are exposed to demand spikes.
risk · Direct
Malicious supply-chain injection of tampered hardware/software
Adversary creates false-front suppliers or intercepts the supply chain to insert counterfeit or tampered hardware, corrupted software/firmware, or malicious components into products and information systems.
risk · Direct
Third-party compliance failure creating vicarious liability
A vendor, subcontractor, or channel partner violates labor, environmental, anti-bribery (FCPA/UKBA), or data-protection rules, exposing the company to liability and reputational harm; fourth-party/N-tier dependencies are opaque.
risk · Direct
Vendor/outsourcing service non-performance and disputes
Outsourced processing, IT, payroll/HR, print/mail, or sub-custodian providers fail to meet service levels, deliver defective software, make incorrect payments, or breach contractual deliverables, causing processing errors, outages, and loss.
risk · Direct
Weak supplier security requirements and monitoring
Because supplier contracts omit security requirements and SLAs and third-party service delivery is not monitored, processors and sub-processors operate without equivalent, audited obligations, so third-party weaknesses and breaches propagate into the organization undetected.
standard · Context
AIUC-1 (Jul 2026)
AIUC-1 — AI agent security, safety and reliability standard (requirement level)
standard · Context
CCPA/CPRA
CCPA/CPRA — California Consumer Privacy
standard · Context
COBIT 2019
COBIT 2019 Governance & Management Objectives
standard · Context
COSO ERM 2017
COSO ERM – Integrating with Strategy and Performance (2017)
standard · Context
COSO IC 2013
COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013)
standard · Context
EU DORA
EU DORA — Digital Operational Resilience Act
standard · Context
EU AI Act
EU AI Act — principal obligation areas (Chapters II, III, V and IX)
standard · Context
EU GDPR
EU GDPR — General Data Protection Regulation
standard · Context
HIPAA
HIPAA — Security, Privacy & Breach Notification
standard · Context
IIA 2024 Standards
IIA 2024 Global Internal Audit Standards
standard · Context
The Role of the Internal Audit Function in Enterprise Risk Management
The Role of the Internal Audit Function in Enterprise Risk Management
standard · Context
Three Lines Model: Assurance and Advice in Support of Effective Governance
Three Lines Model: Assurance and Advice in Support of Effective Governance
standard · Context
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
standard · Context
ISO 31000:2018
ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management (principles/framework/process)
standard · Context
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 (AI)
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 Annex A (AI Management System)
standard · Context
EU NIS2
EU NIS2 Directive
standard · Context
NIST SP 800-53 Rev5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 — Security and Privacy Controls
standard · Context
NIST Agent Identity (draft, Feb 2026)
NIST NCCoE: Software and AI Agent Identity and Authorization
standard · Context
NIST TEVV-Athlon (draft, Aug 2026)
NIST AI 200-2: TEVV-Athlon Framework for Evaluating AI Systems
standard · Context
NIST CSF 2.0
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
standard · Context
NYDFS Part 500
NYDFS Part 500 — NY Cybersecurity Regulation
standard · Context
PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS v4.0.1
standard · Context
SOC 1
SOC 1 (SSAE 18 / ISAE 3402) — service-org ICFR control objectives
standard · Context
SOC 2 (TSC)
AICPA SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (2017, rev. 2022)
standard · Context
SOX / PCAOB (ICFR)
SOX 404 / PCAOB AS 2201 — ICFR control taxonomy
unified · Direct
UC-ACCESS-21 — Manage subservice organizations supporting the system
Subservice organizations relevant to user entities' control objectives are identified, contractually bound to security and processing commitments, and monitored through review of their independent assurance reports, complementary user-entity controls, and performance. Identified issues are tracked to resolution.
unified · Context
UC-AI-03 — Document AI system resources and dependencies
Maintain a documented inventory of the resources each AI system depends on, covering data resources, tooling such as frameworks, libraries, and models, and system and computing resources, together with their owners and locations. Record sufficient detail for each resource to support impact assessment, reproducibility, and supplier accountability. Keep the inventory current through the change process and review it periodically.
unified · Context
UC-AI-10 — Meet transparency obligations for AI systems
Provide users, deployers, and other interested parties with documentation and instructions for each AI system describing its intended purpose, capabilities, limitations, performance characteristics, and required human-oversight measures. Disclose when people are interacting with an AI system, and mark AI-generated or manipulated content, including deepfakes, in a machine-readable and clearly perceptible way where required. Keep transparency materials current with system changes and retain distribution evidence.
unified · Context
UC-AI-11 — Operate AI concern, incident, and external reporting channels
Operate channels through which personnel and other stakeholders can report concerns about the organization's role in developing or using AI systems, with documented triage and follow-up. Define and execute procedures for communicating AI incidents to affected users and interested parties, and for making required reports to regulators and other external bodies within mandated timeframes. Retain concern reports, incident communications, and resolution records as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-AI-13 — Assign AI value-chain roles and discharge obligations
For each AI system, determine and document the organization's role in the value chain, such as provider or deployer, and allocate life-cycle responsibilities among the organization, partners, suppliers, and customers. Maintain a register of the obligations attached to each role, including provider duties for high-risk systems (quality management, conformity assessment, CE marking, registration) and deployer duties (instruction-compliant operation, oversight assignment, log retention), tracking each obligation to an owner and evidence. Review the register when systems or regulations change.
unified · Context
UC-AI-14 — Manage responsible AI with suppliers and customers
Govern supplier relationships that provide AI systems, components, or data through a documented process that verifies supplier alignment with the organization's responsible-AI requirements. Ensure the organization's responsible development and use of AI considers customer needs and expectations, and provide customers with the information they need to use AI systems responsibly. Retain supplier evaluations and customer communications as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-AI-15 — Fulfill general-purpose AI model provider obligations
Where the organization provides general-purpose AI models, maintain model technical documentation and information for downstream providers, implement a policy to comply with applicable copyright law including reservation-of-rights opt-outs, and publish a sufficiently detailed summary of training content. For models designated as posing systemic risk, additionally perform state-of-the-art model evaluations including adversarial testing, assess and mitigate systemic risks, track and report serious incidents to the competent authority, and ensure adequate cybersecurity protection for the model and its infrastructure.
unified · Context
UC-AUDIT-18 — Communicate with stakeholders on assurance matters
The internal audit function builds relationships and communicates regularly with its stakeholders - the board, management, and relevant external parties such as regulators and external auditors - to develop trust and mutual understanding on internal control and assurance matters. Communication approaches are tailored to stakeholder needs and delivered through defined channels, and significant control matters are shared with external parties as appropriate. Communication plans and records evidence operation.
unified · Context
UC-AUDIT-19 — Operate an audit quality assurance and improvement program
The chief audit executive develops, implements, and maintains a quality assurance and improvement program covering all aspects of the internal audit function, including ongoing monitoring and periodic internal quality assessments of conformance with applicable professional internal auditing standards. Performance objectives and measures for the function are established and tracked, and results, action plans, and progress are reported to senior management and the board, which oversee audit quality.
unified · Context
UC-BCDR-01 — Maintain business continuity and disaster recovery plans
Maintain documented, management-approved business continuity and disaster recovery plans that cover critical business functions and ICT services, recovery time and recovery point objectives, assigned roles, and how information security is preserved at required levels during disruption. Base the plans on a business impact analysis, distribute them to responsible personnel, and review and update them at least annually and after significant organizational or technology changes.
unified · Context
UC-BCDR-04 — Provide redundant and alternate processing, storage, and telecom
Implement redundancy and alternate capability sufficient to meet availability and recovery objectives: an alternate storage site for backup media, alternate processing capability sufficiently separated from the primary site to avoid shared hazards, and diverse or alternate telecommunications services with priority-of-service provisions. Ensure alternate facilities provide security controls equivalent to the primary site and can assume operations within recovery time objectives.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-06 — Verify authenticity and integrity of hardware and software
Assess the authenticity and integrity of hardware and software before acquisition and use, sourcing components from trusted suppliers. Verify digital signatures or equivalent integrity evidence on software, firmware, and updates before installation, and block or investigate components that fail verification.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-08 — Control maintenance tools, personnel, and remote sessions
Approve, inspect, and control maintenance tools and media brought into facilities, checking them for improper modification and malicious code. Authorize and supervise maintenance personnel against a current list of approved individuals, with escorts for those lacking required access authorizations. Require nonlocal maintenance sessions to use approved connections and strong authentication, record the session, and terminate connections when maintenance is complete.
unified · Context
UC-DATA-11 — Control data flows, leakage, and cross-border transfers
Enforce approved authorizations for information flows within and between systems using technical flow-control mechanisms, and deploy data-leakage-prevention measures on systems and channels that could exfiltrate sensitive data. Transfer personal data across borders only under a valid transfer mechanism (adequacy decision, standard contractual clauses, binding corporate rules, or a documented derogation), with the transfer risk assessed and the safeguard recorded.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-07 — Hold individuals accountable for control responsibilities
Management requires all personnel to apply information security in accordance with established policies and procedures and holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities. Accountability is enforced through defined expectations, documented rules of behavior acknowledged before access is granted and re-acknowledged when updated, performance measures and incentives, and disciplinary consequences for violations.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-20 — Govern data as an asset with accountable oversight bodies
Establish data governance: policies and standards for managing data through its life cycle, and formally chartered governance bodies (e.g., a data governance body and, where required, a data integrity board) with defined membership and responsibilities. These bodies oversee data management, data quality and integrity, and the review and approval of data-sharing and matching agreements, and report on data governance at defined intervals.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-29 — Maintain secure acquisition, development, and maintenance policies
Establish, document, and disseminate policies and procedures governing security in system and services acquisition, in-house application development, configuration management, and system maintenance — including secure development standards, evaluation criteria for externally developed applications, and baseline configuration requirements. Review, assess, and update these policies and procedures at least annually under accountable security leadership and after significant changes.
unified · Context
UC-HR-02 — Formalize security responsibilities in employment terms
Employment contracts and terms state each individual's information security responsibilities, including obligations that survive employment. Personnel sign confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements and access agreements before being granted access, and re-sign when agreements are materially updated. Position descriptions document role-specific security duties, and signed acknowledgments are retained as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-HR-04 — Enforce a formal disciplinary process for violations
A formal, communicated disciplinary process is applied to personnel who violate information security policies, providing graduated, consistent sanctions proportional to severity and intent. Violations, sanctions applied, and notifications to defined roles are documented and retained, and outcomes feed back into awareness and control improvements.
unified · Context
UC-HR-05 — Hold third-party personnel to equivalent security terms
Contracts with suppliers and external organizations whose personnel access systems or data require equivalent personnel security measures, including screening, confidentiality agreements, and defined security responsibilities, and oblige the provider to notify the organization of personnel transfers or terminations affecting access. Third-party compliance with these personnel requirements is monitored.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-03 — Protect facilities against fire, water, and environmental hazards
Design and equip facilities to protect technology assets from fire, water, temperature, humidity, and other physical and environmental threats. Deploy and independently maintain fire detection and suppression, water damage detection with accessible shutoff valves, and environmental monitoring and control at required levels. Configure alarms to notify responsible personnel automatically when protective systems activate or parameters go out of range.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-04 — Site facilities and equipment to minimize hazards and exposure
Position facilities and system components to minimize damage from physical and environmental hazards and to reduce opportunities for unauthorized access and observation. Consider physical and environmental risk when selecting facility locations, and apply compensating safeguards for equipment sited in higher-risk locations.
unified · Context
UC-RISK-11 — Assess changes that could significantly affect risk and control
The organization identifies and assesses internal and external changes - new business models, leadership, systems, regulations, and operating environment - that could significantly affect its risk profile or system of internal control. Risk assessments and responses are updated dynamically as changes and emerging risks are detected. Change-triggered assessments and resulting updates are documented.
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UC-SDLC-06 — Maintain configuration control over systems and code
Maintain configuration management over solution components throughout development and operation: identify configuration items, establish and protect baselines for code, dependencies, and build settings, record and verify configuration information, and review deviations. Require developers to track the integrity of changes to configuration items, implement only approved changes, and track and resolve resulting security flaws.
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UC-SDLC-10 — Oversee outsourced development and vet developers
Direct, monitor, and review outsourced and third-party development: contractually define secure-development requirements, intellectual property ownership, and audit rights, review deliverables against requirements, and obtain evidence of security testing. Screen developers of critical systems against defined criteria before granting them access to development environments.
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UC-SDLC-11 — Apply specialized development to critical components
Identify components critical to security or mission and, where commercial items cannot meet requirements, use customized or specialized development, such as reimplementation, custom variants, or context-specific augmentation, to reduce supply-chain and assurance risk. Document the rationale and assurance evidence for each specialized component.
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UC-SDLC-12 — Manage solution assets and retire unsupported components
Manage application and infrastructure assets through their life cycle: maintain an accurate record of solution assets, ownership, and licensing, and optimize their use and cost. Identify system components approaching end of support and replace or upgrade them, or apply documented compensating controls with explicit risk acceptance, before support lapses.
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UC-TPRM-01 — Operate a third-party security risk management program
Establish and operate a management-approved third-party and supply-chain risk management program with a written strategy, policies, and procedures, reviewed at defined intervals and after significant changes to the supply chain or threat landscape. Define and communicate roles and responsibilities for supplier, customer, and partner relationships, and integrate third-party and supply-chain risk into enterprise and cybersecurity risk management. Maintain a register of third-party relationships and contractual arrangements prioritized by criticality, and assess criticality, substitutability, and concentration risk before contracting. Apply risk-based due diligence, embed security requirements, audit and access rights, termination rights, and sub-outsourcing conditions in agreements, and protect organizational information processed, stored, or transmitted on external systems. Define, agree, and periodically review service agreements and supplier performance, reassess third parties on a defined cycle, operate controls to identify and address weaknesses across the relationship life cycle, and maintain documented, tested exit strategies for providers supporting critical or important functions.
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UC-TPRM-02 — Perform risk-based due diligence before engaging vendors
Before entering a formal relationship, perform security due diligence on prospective vendors and business partners proportionate to their criticality, evaluating security posture, financial and operational risk, and supply-chain exposure, and document the acceptance decision. Use acquisition strategies, sourcing methods, and selection criteria designed to reduce supply-chain risk before contract award.
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UC-TPRM-03 — Bind vendors to security and privacy terms by contract
Include binding security and privacy requirements in contracts and agreements with vendors, service providers, and processors before access, service delivery, or data exchange begins: required security controls, confidentiality, breach notification, audit rights, subcontractor terms, and data handling, return, and deletion obligations. Document and authorize each information exchange or system interconnection under an appropriate agreement, and review agreements periodically. Ensure agreements satisfy the contractual clause requirements mandated by applicable privacy and security regulations for the data and services involved.
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UC-TPRM-04 — Monitor vendor performance, services, and risk
Continuously monitor third-party performance, service delivery, and security posture against contractual and risk requirements throughout the relationship. Conduct periodic reassessments and reviews, such as questionnaires, assurance reports, and audits, at a frequency based on criticality, and manage changes to supplier services. Record, prioritize, and track identified vendor risks through response and remediation.
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UC-TPRM-05 — Include suppliers in incident notification and response
Establish agreements or contractual provisions requiring suppliers to notify the organization of security incidents and supply-chain compromises within defined timeframes. Include relevant suppliers and third parties in incident-response planning, exercises, response, and recovery activities, with coordination roles defined in advance.
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UC-TPRM-06 — Manage secure termination and disposal at relationship end
Include termination and post-relationship provisions in supplier agreements and supply-chain risk plans: return or verified destruction of data, revocation of access and credentials, service transition, and retention of required evidence. Dispose of data, documentation, tools, and system components securely at end of life or end of relationship using defined techniques, and record each disposal.
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UC-TPRM-07 — Verify component authenticity, provenance, and integrity
Document and maintain the provenance of critical systems, components, and data through the supply chain, for example with bills of materials and chain-of-custody records. Apply anti-tamper and anti-counterfeit measures: tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and design, inspection of systems and components at receipt and on indication of tampering, and verification of component authenticity with training and reporting of suspected counterfeits.
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UC-TPRM-08 — Govern security of external and cloud service use
Define and enforce processes for acquiring, using, managing, and exiting external system services and cloud services in line with the organization's information security requirements. Require external providers to comply with those requirements, define oversight roles and responsibilities on both sides, agree service and exit terms, and monitor provider compliance on an ongoing basis.
unified · Direct
UC-TPRM-09 — Protect supply chain information through OPSEC
Apply operations security safeguards to supply-chain activities: identify sensitive information about suppliers, shipments, configurations, and delivery schedules, protect it from collection by adversaries, and limit its disclosure to parties with a validated need to know.
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Fraud & Forensic Investigation Engagement
Fraud & Forensic Investigation Engagement as a decision-aware workflow. It runs on a dedicated Audit item (audit_type: investigation) created for this allegation at intake — the confidential case record — with the workflow instance attached to that item and its visibility restricted to the named investigation team. In scope: one specific fraud allegation, worked predication-gated and confidentially from intake through evidence preservation, forensic procedures, interviews, loss quantification, and audit-committee reporting; the named deliverables are the chain-of-custody register, the findings memorandum with its loss-quantification schedule, and the privilege-marked audit-committee fraud report. Out of scope: the enterprise fraud risk profile (owned by Fraud Risk Assessment & Anti-Override Control Review, which receives scheme intelligence from this case rather than being rerun here) and any unrelated conduct discovered in passing (which gets its own intake record). It consumes the hotline intake package from Control Responsibility Communications & Ethics Hotline when so routed, and hands each control breakdown off as an Issue item — control-gap findings to Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring and ICFR-affecting deficiencies to SOX Deficiency Remediation — rather than duplicating that work.
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SOC 2 Trust Services Readiness
Runs on the existing Audit engagement with its system description, service commitments, review period, control and risk registers, and available evidence; assesses CC1–CC9 design readiness and consumes reviewed companion assessments for selected optional Trust Services categories. Delivers the criterion-to-control mapping, criterion-level evidence and design conclusions, owned gap register, and approved SOC 2 readiness disposition to management for remediation and examination planning; Type II testing, management-owned PBC preparation and management assertion remain separate workflows.
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Continuous Monitoring & Agent Evaluation
Runs on the existing standing Audit item for a monitoring cycle. Inputs are the approved KRI definitions, current Issue, Remediation, Control, System and Personnel records, and the agent-drafted suggestions and step results produced since the previous cycle. Deliver the monitoring dashboard, breach triage and quality scorecard to the engagement lead, with owned corrective actions and the next run date.
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Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring
Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring runs on the EXISTING parent Audit item — the issued engagement whose report findings are being followed up — enriching that Audit and its linked findings rather than creating a new engagement; the workflow instance attaches to that Audit item, and each report finding is an Issue item linked to it. It tracks issued-report findings and their agreed management actions from registration through evidence validation, closure, extension, risk acceptance, escalation, and committee reporting, and produces a verified disposition register and a signed final evidence-and-decision package. In scope: all open findings from the engagement plus any prior-cycle findings still open against the same auditee. Out of scope: re-performing engagement fieldwork and re-wording report findings (both belong to the upstream Audit Report Drafting workflow) and assembling the board pack (the downstream Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflow consumes this cycle's outputs). It consumes the issued final report and findings register handed off from Audit Report Drafting and hands its verified outputs to Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting.
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Quality Assurance & Improvement Program Cycle
Operate the Quality Assurance & Improvement Program (QAIP) cycle: ongoing-monitoring evidence, periodic self-assessment, external quality assessment (EQA) support, improvement planning, and board reporting. This cycle runs on an Audit item created per cycle (audit_type = internal — the schema has no quality_assessment option; scope = "QAIP cycle FYxx"; period_start/period_end span the period under assessment); the workflow instance attaches to that Audit item and every cycle output — the per-standard conformance ratings matrix, the below-GC finding Issue items, the improvement and action plan, and the QAIP results report — links back to it. It consumes the period's existing engagement Audit items and their completed engagement-workflow runs as the population and test evidence, plus the standing QAIP framework, charter, and methodology-manual Policy items. In scope: assessing the internal audit function's conformance with the Global Internal Audit Standards for the period. Out of scope: engagement-level rework — this cycle assesses quality, it does not redo fieldwork, which belongs to the engagement workflows. There is no upstream feeder; this workflow starts the quality chain and hands its approved results — overall conclusion, per-domain ratings, and conformance-statement wording — to Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting.
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Third-Party Vendor Assurance Engagement
Runs on the existing Audit item for this engagement (audit_type=vendor_review) — the workflow enriches that already-planned engagement record, it never creates a duplicate — consuming the confirmed scope, criteria, and calendar handed off from Audit Engagement Planning. An IA-led third-party vendor assurance engagement that concludes on the design and operating effectiveness of the organization’s TPRM program — governance, risk tiering, vendor control-environment reliance, monitoring, exclusions, and reporting. Vendors under test are the existing Vendor items, each finding is an Issue item, and the named deliverable is a reperformable engagement workpaper package. In scope: assuring the program (IA evaluates management’s third-party risk management; it does not operate it). Out of scope: operating the vendor lifecycle (onboarding, tier refresh, remediation), which belongs to the second-line Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle workflow; deep single-report SOC work, which can be delegated to the reusable Vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 Report Review & CUEC Mapping workflow; and ICT arrangements caught by regulatory regimes, which route to Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance. Findings and the engagement conclusion exit through Audit Report Drafting, and action plans route to Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring.
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Internal Audit Charter, Independence & Board Governance Cycle
Runs on one Audit item created per governance cycle (audit_type: internal; scope set to the internal-audit charter/independence/board-governance cycle for the period) — the workflow instance attaches to that cycle item and writes to it throughout. The internal audit function and its board-approved charter — a Policy item (policy_type: charter) with its own version lineage — already exist and are reviewed, reaffirmed, or amended here, never recreated. The cycle as a decision-aware procedure: the CAE delivers functional reporting to the audit committee, affirms organizational independence in writing and treats any impairment, reviews and reapproves the board mandate and charter with its unrestricted-access provisions, runs the executive session and committee action on the CAE and the plan and budget, executes the stakeholder communication plan, and retains the governance evidence. Consumes upstream: closed assurance-engagement records (Audit items with their linked Issue findings) produced by the individual engagement workflows, the recommendation-tracking register (Issue items), and the prior cycle's carry-forward (open Issue items plus the prior run's carry-forward list). Named deliverables: the CAE functional reporting pack, the written organizational-independence affirmation, the reaffirmed or reapproved audit charter, the audit-committee minutes and resolution records, the stakeholder communication log, and the control-linked governance evidence set. In scope: the board-governance cycle for the internal audit function itself — charter, independence, committee reporting, and stakeholder communication; out of scope: the individual assurance engagements whose results feed the committee report, which run under their own workflows. Terminal by design: no downstream workflow is chained from this cycle; open threads carry forward to seed the next run of this same cycle.
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Vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 Report Review & CUEC Mapping
Reach a defensible reliance conclusion on a service organization's SOC 1/SOC 2 report. The workflow instance runs on an Audit item (audit_type: vendor_review) created for this vendor's SOC report period — enrich that item, never duplicate it; its native fields carry the report and reliance metadata (external_firm = CPA firm, opinion = service auditor's opinion, period_start/period_end = report coverage, report_date, rating = overall reliance verdict). Consumes the vendor risk handoff package from the Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle workflow — the existing Vendor item, its tier, and the dependent Process items. In scope: report scope and type confirmation, the service auditor's opinion and exception analysis, complementary user entity control (CUEC) mapping, bridge/gap-period coverage, and the documented reliance decision — producing the SOC reliance memo and the reviewer-ready reliance package. Out of scope: the vendor's initial risk tiering and onboarding, and ongoing control monitoring. Hands the completed reliance package to the Continuous Controls Monitoring (ISCM) Cycle (and Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance) workflows.
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Business Continuity & DR Test Exercise
Run one operating cycle of an existing business continuity / disaster recovery plan-testing Control (the BC/DR test control this instance attaches to, UC-BCDR-04 "tests"): plan, execute, and evaluate a BC/DR exercise against the RTO and RPO objectives, then fold the resulting gaps back into the BC and DR plans as versioned redlines — a decision-aware workflow. It consumes as declared inputs the in-force BC and DR plans (existing Policy items), the business impact analysis (BIA), and prior after-action reports; it creates an Audit item (audit_type=operational) as the definitive exercise record, and produces named deliverables: an approved exercise package, an actual-versus-target RTO/RPO scorecard, remediation findings (Issue items), and a signed-off after-action report with an indexed evidence package. In scope: scoping, running, and evaluating one scheduled or triggered BC/DR exercise for the selected in-scope systems and business services, and folding resulting gaps back into the BC and DR plans. Out of scope: real incident response, and recovery-objective (RTO or RPO) changes to systems outside the agreed exercise scope. Standalone: no upstream or downstream workflow is required; any cross-workflow linkage — for example a related incident-response or BIA-maintenance workflow — is expressed as a declared input, not a predecessor.
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CSF 2.0 Profile & Maturity Assessment
Runs on an Audit item created for this assessment cycle (audit_type = readiness) — the CSF assessment engagement the workflow instance attaches to and enriches as it progresses (scope, period, rating, and report fields are written on that Audit item; every in-scope Control is linked to it so the controls-scoped profile is queryable). Build, against that boundary, a NIST CSF 2.0 Current Profile, a Target Profile, an organizational Tier rating, a subcategory gap analysis, and a CISO-ready remediation roadmap. The workflow originates on its own — scoping ingests prior CSF profiles and open POA&M (Issue) items as data, not as a named upstream handoff. In scope: rating the in-scope control set against the CSF 2.0 Core, setting target outcomes, assigning a Tier, and producing a prioritized roadmap. Out of scope: executing the remediation projects themselves and re-performing independent assurance testing. The named deliverable is the assessment package (profiles, gap analysis, Tier, posture report, roadmap, closure artifact), handed off to TWO downstream workflows that consume it rather than repeat the profiling: the Cybersecurity Assurance Review (always) and the AI Governance & Risk/Impact Assessment (only when AI systems fall inside the boundary).
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Security Policy Suite Review
Standing operator workflow for the security policy owner's annual (and change-triggered) review, redline, reapproval, and dissemination of the full security policy suite -- secure acquisition/development/configuration-management/maintenance, asset/media/physical protection, access/identity/personnel security, communications/cryptography, security awareness and cyber-hygiene, audit-logging/monitoring/system-integrity, contingency planning and disruption mitigation, and incident response. Anchor: each run is a workflow instance attached to the existing "Security Policy Management" Process item (process_type=security_process, process_owner=policy owner, frequency=annual) -- that instance IS the cycle record the tracked review items roll up to; the eight policy families are the existing Policy items the cycle enriches (never recreates). In scope: reviewing each Policy item against current risk and threat inputs, consolidating findings into one suite-level revision disposition, routing redlines to the right stakeholders, reapproving under accountable security leadership (writing Policy.approved_by / version / effective_date / next_review_date back onto each policy), and tracking dissemination and workforce acknowledgment as a single evidence set. Out of scope: authoring net-new policy domains and operating the technical controls the policies govern. The workflow has no upstream feeder workflow -- its inputs are the policy register (the eight Policy items), the prior-cycle workflow instance and its exported operating record, and the annual review calendar carried on Policy.next_review_date -- and no named downstream workflow; open corrective actions (Issue items) carry forward as explicit inputs to the next cycle. The eight domain reviews run in parallel and converge on a single revision-disposition decision.
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Environmental & Utility Systems Maintenance
Standing operator workflow for the monthly environmental and utility systems preventive-maintenance calendar — fire/water/environmental protection, emergency power and lighting, protected cabling, and electromagnetic shielding — producing the single maintenance-and-inspection log required as evidence. Anchor: each monthly cycle runs as a new workflow instance attached to the existing umbrella physical/environmental-maintenance Control item in the control library (control_category=physical, frequency=monthly, framework nist-800-53|iso-27001|nist-csf-2), with the specific UC-PHYS-03/05/06/07 Control items linked — the run enriches that Control's execution history, never creates a duplicate control. Consumes its inputs directly with no feeder workflow: the PM calendar entry, the fire/water/power/lighting/cabling/shielding asset inventories, and the independent maintenance vendor's service tickets and test records (the vendor is a Vendor item in the third-party register; its tickets attach as step evidence). The prior cycle's archived export and its still-open deficiency Issues (linked to the anchor Control) are the only carry-forward channel. In scope: the physical environmental and utility protection systems for the in-scope facilities and rooms (fire detection and suppression, water-damage detection and shutoff valves, temperature/humidity monitoring, UPS and generators, emergency lighting and power shutoffs, protected cabling and wiring closets, and electromagnetic shielding). Out of scope: logical access, network security, and the building's base construction. There is no downstream workflow: this standing cycle drains to its own retained archive and seeds next month's cycle with the corrective-action Issues left open.
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Equipment Maintenance, Movement & Marking Control
Standing operator workflow that runs on the existing physical-equipment Control item (the UC-PHYS-04/08/10/12 control, domains=physical_environmental_security, frequency=quarterly): each maintenance, movement, or installation/relocation event opens one workflow instance against that Control item and enriches it with the cycle's evidence, never creating a duplicate control. It covers equipment maintenance, asset movement, and installation/relocation siting and marking, converging into the quarterly reconciliation that ties all three evidence streams together. In scope: scheduled and unscheduled maintenance events, asset delivery/removal/movement events through isolated loading areas, and installation/relocation siting and hardware marking within the facility's data halls, plus the quarterly reconciliation of the three. Out of scope: media sanitization and data-disposal workflows and physical access-control administration, which are governed by their own controls. Named deliverables: the maintenance record pack, the asset movement record with designated-asset tracking reconciliation, the siting-and-marking record, and the consolidated quarterly reconciliation evidence set, plus Issue items for faults, movement investigations, and marking gaps. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle and it hands off to no downstream workflow; it is triggered directly by a maintenance, movement, installation/relocation, or quarterly-reconciliation event, is owned by the Data Center Operations Coordinator, and its close-and-archive step seeds its own next cycle via carry-forward Issue items linked to the Control.
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Change & Release Management (CAB)
Change & Release Management (CAB) as a decision-aware workflow that runs one recurring weekly instance against the EXISTING change-management ITGC Control item in the control library (domains: secure_configuration_change_management; mapped via Control.framework to nist-800-53, cobit-2019, iso-27001, and soc1, alongside the related UC-CONFIG-02/03, UC-ACCESS-16, and UC-SDLC-06/07/08/09 controls) — it enriches that control's operating evidence each cycle, it does not create the control. Upstream it consumes the open change-request queue and the emergency-change log exported from the ticketing system, plus the prior cycle's closure export as its carry-forward backlog. It covers change intake, security and risk impact analysis, environment segregation and configuration-baseline control, acceptance testing, the single CAB authorization gate, the emergency-change path, and controlled deployment with rollback and post-implementation verification — producing the prioritized CAB agenda and authorization packet, per-change risk-assessment memos, the environment-and-baseline verification memo, acceptance-testing summaries, the deployment-and-verification record, and the archived per-cycle evidence set. In scope: application, database, infrastructure, configuration, and procedure changes across development, test, and production environments. Out of scope: authoring the change itself — this workflow governs authorization and release, not development of the underlying code or configuration. Studio ships no native Change Request item type, so per-change records live as lines in step documents and in the workflow instance rather than as items. This is a terminal workflow with no downstream handoff: closure archives the cycle evidence set in place under retention, and the next cycle's intake reads this instance's closure export as its carry-forward source.
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Authorized Software & Component Integrity Control
Authorized Software & Component Integrity Control run as a decision-aware monthly cycle that enriches the existing "Authorized Software & Component Integrity" Control item in the control library (control_id UC-CONFIG-05/UC-CONFIG-06, frequency monthly, domains secure_configuration_change_management + third_party_supply_chain_risk) — each run is a workflow instance attached to that Control item, never a newly created control. It originates on its own (parallel entry threads consuming the cycle's own software-inventory, catalog/allowlist, install-rights, supplier-intake, and telemetry feeds) and also carries forward the prior cycle's still-open Issue items linked to the same Control. In scope: reconciling installed software across the in-scope endpoints, servers, and system images against the approved catalog and technical allowlist (the discrepancy register), triaging unauthorized installations to catalog-update / removal / escalation, verifying installation rights stay restricted to the authorized-installer roster from trusted sources (the install-rights and trusted-source exception list), tracking usage against license entitlements (the license-position report), and verifying supplier trust and signature integrity for every component acquired this cycle (the component verification register). Named deliverables — the discrepancy register, triage dispositions, catalog/allowlist change record, per-host removal evidence, install-rights and trusted-source exception list, component verification register, blocked-component investigation findings, and license-position report — are archived as the signed monthly cycle record on the workflow instance. Out of scope: incident containment and forensics — any suspected-malicious component is handed off, evidence intact, to the incident-response workflow, which owns that containment; this control cycle does not duplicate it.
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Controlled Hardware & System Maintenance
Standing operator workflow for the hardware and system maintenance desk, anchored on the existing Process item "Hardware & System Maintenance" (process_type: it_general_control, process_owner: the maintenance coordinator, frequency: monthly): each monthly cycle runs as one workflow instance on that Process — enrich the standing Process, never create a duplicate desk. It schedules and approves maintenance, repair, and replacement, routes execution across on-site, off-site, and nonlocal (remote) sessions with the right tool, personnel, and connection controls, and verifies security controls after every completion. The governing requirements are the linked Control items UC-CONFIG-07 and UC-CONFIG-08 (framework nist-800-53, nist-csf-2; MA family). In scope: scheduling, approval, execution, and post-work verification of maintenance, repair, and replacement for in-scope hardware and systems across on-site, off-site, and nonlocal sessions, plus support/spare-parts tracking and end-of-life disposition. Out of scope: procurement of net-new assets and software patch/change management, which run in their own workflows. No upstream workflow feeds this desk; it consumes its own maintenance queue, open work requests, the asset/hardware register export (there is no native Asset item type — the register is uploaded at the first step), and manufacturer maintenance schedules, and it seeds its own next cycle at close. Named deliverables: an approved maintenance schedule (XLSX), per-mode execution-evidence logs, a post-maintenance security-control verification report, a support/spare-parts disposition status, a maintenance-desk health dashboard, and a closure record — with exceptions, control drift, and gaps promoted to Issue items and a corrective-action register. Downstream, end-of-life "remove from service" dispositions hand off to the equipment-disposal / media-destruction workflow, and any out-of-scope drift found during post-maintenance verification hands off to the incident or change-management workflow.
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Network Segmentation & Boundary Rule Management
Network Segmentation & Boundary Rule Management as a decision-aware operator workflow covering trust-zone maintenance, gated rule-change implementation, boundary threat monitoring, the quarterly segmentation and rule-set review, and cross-domain exchange-policy enforcement. This cycle runs on the EXISTING boundary-protection Control item (domains network_communications_security; framework NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, ISO 27001, SOC 2; frequency quarterly; the boundary control owner as control_owner) — each quarterly run is one workflow instance attached to and enriching that Control, never a new control record. In scope: the trust-zone model, the managed interfaces (firewalls, gateways, proxies) mediating traffic between zones, the external boundary and key internal boundaries, and the cross-domain interconnection points, all under a deny-by-default baseline (NIST 800-53 SC-7, SC-16, SC-46; NIST CSF 2.0 PR.IR-01; ISO 27001 A.8.22; SOC 2 CC6.6). No upstream workflow feeds this cycle; it self-seeds from its own prior-cycle carry-forward — open corrective-action Issue items linked to the Control plus the prior run's closure record and archived rule-change record log. Named deliverables: the reconciled trust-zone model, the verified rule-change record log, the boundary threat-monitoring summary, the cross-domain exchange-policy enforcement report, the quarterly segmentation & rule-set review report, the boundary-posture dashboard, and corrective-action Issues linked to the Control. Downstream, it hands off only to its own next cycle via the carry-forward closure record; a confirmed intrusion is escalated to the incident-response workflow (out of scope), as are host/endpoint controls.
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Resilience & Failover Readiness Verification
Standing quarterly operator workflow that verifies alternate storage, alternate processing, and diverse telecommunications capability (UC-BCDR-04) and validates the safe-mode, alternate-communications, and alternate-security-mechanism design configured on critical systems (UC-BCDR-11). Each quarterly instance runs against the EXISTING UC-BCDR-04 alternate-capability Control item in the Control library (frequency quarterly), with the UC-BCDR-11 degraded-mode Control item linked as the second in-scope control — it enriches the evidence trail on those existing controls, never creating a duplicate control. Self-originating: it consumes no upstream workflow handoff, reading the two governing Control items (control_id UC-BCDR-04 and UC-BCDR-11), the prior quarter's archived readiness instance, and the open corrective-action Issues carried forward on those controls; all operational reference data (backup schedule, alternate-site media/replication log, site records, telecom inventory, system design specs and configs) enters as PBC uploads on the verifying step, since none of it is item-typed. In scope: confirming that this alternate capability and degraded-mode design remain current, hazard-separated, secured to primary-site parity, and ready to assume operations within RTO. Out of scope: the live failover exercise that actually cuts over to the alternate site, run separately by the assure-line DR test workflow that consumes the readiness state this workflow maintains. Named deliverables: six verification memos (storage-site, processing-capability, telecom, safe-mode, alternate-communications, alternate-security), a readiness dashboard and a signed readiness summary, and a corrective-action register — every gap converts into an owned corrective-action Issue (issue_type: deficiency, source: self_assessment) linked to the impaired Control, with any recovery-time-impacting gap escalated immediately rather than held for end-of-cycle closure. Downstream handoff: the archived readiness summary and dashboard serve as the readiness-state package the assure-line DR test workflow reads (no terminal handoff node exists yet — see the closure step).
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Supply-Chain Integrity & OPSEC Operations
Standing monthly operator workflow run against the existing supply-chain integrity Control item (UC-TPRM-07, frequency=monthly, domains=third_party_supply_chain_risk), with the OPSEC need-to-know Control (UC-TPRM-09) linked as the second in-scope control — enrich these existing Control items, never recreate them; the workflow instance attaches to the anchor Control as the durable operating record. Two concurrent workstreams. In scope: receipt-time tamper-evidence and authenticity inspection of critical systems and components, provenance and chain-of-custody upkeep, suspected-counterfeit disposition (each raised as a finding Issue linked to the anchor Control and the implicated Vendor) with inspector-training refresh where a lapse is found, and the OPSEC need-to-know review of the sensitive supply-chain information register with remediation of any overexposure. Named deliverables: the authenticated provenance and chain-of-custody register, the counterfeit-disposition cases, the OPSEC exposure-review worksheet, and the confirmed need-to-know-restricted disclosure footprint. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle — its inputs are the period's own receiving log and the sensitive supply-chain information register. This is a terminal standing control: procurement and vendor onboarding, contract-level third-party risk assessment, and facility physical security are out of scope, each handled by its own workflow; a substantiated counterfeit or compromised supplier is escalated to the third-party/vendor risk workflow rather than resolved here.
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Outsourced & Critical-Component Development Oversight
Quarterly outsourced- and critical-component development oversight, run as a recurring operating cycle against the EXISTING Control item for outsourced/critical-component secure development (UC-SDLC-10 / UC-SDLC-11; domains secure_development_sdlc + third_party_supply_chain_risk; NIST 800-53 SA-20/SA-21/SA-23, ISO 27001 A.8.30) — the workflow enriches that Control, it never creates a duplicate. Each quarter it inventories the active outsourced/third-party development engagements (enriching the Vendor register), verifies contract secure-development / IP-ownership / audit-rights terms, traces deliverables to requirements with security-test evidence on file, screens critical-system developers before access, refreshes the register of components critical to security or mission, and re-tests the specialized-development rationale and assurance evidence. It consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward Issue items (open corrective actions, contract renewals, components due for rationale review) and the archived prior workflow instance's registers; every gap it surfaces becomes an Issue linked to the anchor Control, giving one queryable corrective-action population. In scope: active outsourced and third-party development engagements and the register of components critical to security or mission; out of scope: internal-only development with no third-party contributor and general procurement risk unrelated to development. Self-terminating: no downstream workflow consumes this cycle's output — corrective actions are tracked to closure within this workflow and carried forward to the next quarter.
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Technology Lifecycle & Capacity Review
Standing operator workflow for the quarterly solution-asset lifecycle review and the availability/capacity planning cycle, from asset reconciliation and end-of-support disposition through capacity monitoring, corrective planning, and prior-period target validation. Each quarterly run is a recurring workflow instance attached to the EXISTING technology-lifecycle-and-capacity-management Control item (UC-SDLC-12/13; frequency = quarterly; control_owner = the IT control owner) — the instance enriches that standing Control and its linked records, never a fresh duplicate; the governing COBIT 2019 / NIST 800-53 mapping rides on Control.framework. In scope: the in-scope solutions, applications, and supporting infrastructure components (the services they run are Process items) with named owners, and the services carrying agreed availability and capacity (SLA/SLO) targets. Out of scope: the projects that execute an approved replacement or upgrade (each tracked externally as its own project item) and live incident response for availability outages. Named deliverables: the reconciled solution-asset register and optimization actions, the ranked end-of-support exposure list and disposition, funded replacement/upgrade plans (Issue items) and compensating-control records (Control items) with signed risk acceptances (policy_exception Issues carrying exception_expiry_date, on treatment: accept Risks), the capacity/availability dashboard and corrective plans, and the validated prior-period target package. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle and there is no separate downstream workflow to hand off to — the still-open replacement/upgrade plans, capacity corrective plans, and risk-acceptance expiries (their existing Issue and Risk items, linked to the anchor Control) carry forward as explicit inputs to the next quarterly run of this same workflow.
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AI Operations Monitoring & Incident Response
Each monthly instance runs against the existing Control item for AI operations monitoring and incident response (framework eu-ai-act + iso-42001; domains ai_governance / logging_monitoring_detection / incident_management_response; frequency monthly; control_owner AI Operations Manager) — the run enriches that Control's execution history and is its evidence of operation, it never creates a duplicate. The decision-aware cycle covers event-logging and retention verification, alert resolution, human-oversight confirmation, AI-use screening against legal prohibitions, and AI concern-and-incident triage through required communications and regulator reporting, consolidating all five streams into a named cycle report and cycle dashboard while every residual gap is booked as an Issue (source: management_identified) linked to the anchor Control. In scope: every deployed production, limited-risk, and high-risk AI system under the EU AI Act, its event-log sources and monitoring dashboards, the human-oversight roster, the AI use inventory, and the AI concern-reporting channels. Out of scope: pre-deployment model development and conformity assessment, and third-party/vendor AI due diligence, which are governed by their own workflows. This cycle consumes no upstream workflow handoff; it hands off only to the next monthly run of itself, seeding it with the open carry-forward Issues (corrective actions, in-flight blocks, incident follow-ups) that the cycle-metrics-and-report step links to the anchor Control so next month can query them as its prior-cycle input.
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ISO 27001 SoA Review & Controls Assessment
Review the ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability and assess the controls behind it. Each run attaches to an Audit item created for the review cycle (audit_type = compliance, e.g. "ISO 27001 SoA Review 2026-H2"), which accumulates the scope, the per-control test instances, the assessment package, the approval, and the rating. The workflow locks the assessment workplan, reconciles every Annex A control's applicable/excluded decision and justification against the current risk treatment plan, verifies implementation evidence, assesses the sampled controls for design and operating effectiveness, routes deficiencies to owners, and approves and publishes the version-controlled Statement of Applicability (SoA) — then classifies the disposition and prepares, approves, hands off, and archives the review package. In scope: reconciling and assessing the SoA's Annex A control applicability decisions and their implementation for the ISMS in scope, and publishing the approved SoA version. It consumes the ISMS Risk Assessment & Treatment Cycle's handoff package (the current risk register, the risk treatment decisions, and the required-controls determination) and hands its named deliverable — the approved, version-controlled published SoA and the assessment package — off to the downstream ISO 27001 Certification Readiness workflow. Out of scope: the enterprise risk assessment and treatment decisions that determine which controls are required (owned upstream by the ISMS Risk Assessment & Treatment Cycle) and the certification audit preparation that follows (owned by the downstream ISO 27001 Certification Readiness workflow, which consumes this review's approved package). The trigger is the scheduled SoA review interval or a material change to scope, risk, or the control environment.
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Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation
Run this assessment on the EXISTING Audit item for the engagement (audit_type: it_audit or compliance) — enrich that record, never create a duplicate: Audit.scope carries the authorization boundary and Audit.period_start/period_end the assessment window. Consumes, from the upstream SSP-development / system-categorization effort, the approved System Security Plan (SSP), the FIPS 199 system categorization, and the tailored NIST 800-53 baseline (existing Control items, framework: nist-800-53). Assess each in-scope control with 800-53A examine/interview/test methods, record satisfied / other-than-satisfied determinations, open a POA&M Issue for every gap, re-validate remediation, and issue the Security Assessment Report (SAR). In scope: control assessment, determinations, the POA&M lifecycle, and the SAR for the authorization boundary agreed at kickoff. Out of scope: the authorization (ATO) decision itself and the steady-state continuous-monitoring cadence. On completion, the frozen SAR and POA&M package are handed to the NIST RMF System Authorization (ATO) Cycle.
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ISO 27001 Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit
Attach to the existing Audit engagement, owned by Internal Audit, using its approved Statement of Applicability, risk treatment plan, scope, review period and operating evidence; produce the Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit report, four signed theme conclusions and finding register for the engagement and remediation owners. Apply the approved Statement of Applicability to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A.5.1–A.5.37, A.6.1–A.6.8, A.7.1–A.7.14 and A.8.1–A.8.34; document each exclusion and assess direct and inherited responsibilities. This Annex A assessment contributes to the engagement and does not independently establish full ISMS conformity or issue certification. Stage 1 and readiness remain separate workflows; any certification decision remains with the authorized certification body.
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GCP Physical and Environmental Subservice Reliance
Evaluate GCP assurance-report scope, physical and environmental controls, exceptions and user responsibilities; record a bounded reliance decision rather than claiming to operate provider facilities. This customer-side review relies on relevant independent reports, disclosed provider information and customer implementation evidence. It does not operate or certify GCP facility access or environmental safeguards. Preserve each report's permitted-use restrictions.
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System ITGC Operation
Operate and evidence the IT general controls on a system: authentication and password configuration, access provisioning and deprovisioning, the periodic user access review, change management (testing, sign-off, logs), and subservice SOC report reliance.
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SOC 2 Reporting and Management Assertion
Reporting close for the Type II examination: drafting and validating the system description under the carve-out method, preparing the management assertion, reviewing complementary user entity controls and subservice reliance, and the dual-approval close of the examination file at the agreed period end. Management-owned SOC 2 Type II reporting support: system description, management assertion, CUECs, subservice reliance, and auditee file closure. The independent service auditor retains responsibility for examination conclusions and the CPA opinion. Attach this workflow to the existing SOC 2 evidence or reporting process item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
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System and Third-Party Risk Review
Runs on the existing system item. Review system and provider dependencies, assess current risk and control evidence, select response actions, and approve the review record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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Vendor Risk Assessment and Disposition
Runs on one existing System with vendor=true. Uses the supplier record, contracts, assurance/CUECs, access and continuity evidence to produce a reviewed vendor risk assessment and authorized disposition for the business/risk owner and readiness evidence consumers. Two checkpoints retain expert challenge and the owner’s choice of conditions, treatment and monitoring; executor work is recorded in step results and documents, with no collection forms or runtime branches.
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ISO/IEC 42001 AI Management System Internal Audit
An independent internal-audit cycle for the AI management system: set scope and criteria, test governance, risk, documentation, operations, value-chain controls, and reporting, then issue findings and an evidence-backed conclusion. The audit supports management improvement and assurance; it does not certify conformity.
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AI Governance & Risk/Impact Assessment
Assess a single AI system end to end under ISO/IEC 42001 (AIMS) and the NIST AI RMF: govern and register the system, map context and risks, measure risks and impacts, manage treatment, produce transparency artifacts, and authorize deployment with monitoring. The instance attaches to an Audit item created for this assessment cycle (audit_type compliance, or advisory for a pre-deployment review); because Studio has no native AI System type, the system under assessment is named in that Audit's scope and its lifecycle/EU-AI-Act detail lives in the scoping memo and step documents. In scope: one named AI system or use case and its lifecycle risk posture. Out of scope: enterprise-wide AI policy authoring and detailed EU AI Act legal obligation mapping, which are consumed as an input handoff package from the EU AI Act Obligation Impact Analysis workflow. The named deliverable is the approved AI assessment package (executive summary plus recommended governance decision), backed by the AI risk register (Risk items, category ai_governance), the model/system card and AI impact-assessment record, and a deployment authorization with live drift/fairness monitoring; approved outputs hand off to Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting.
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Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting
Runs on the existing standing "Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting" governance Process item (process_type=business_process, frequency=quarterly): one workflow instance per quarter attaches to that Process and enriches it (the Process is not created here), and each closed instance is the prior-quarter baseline for the next run. The named deliverable is the quarterly board & audit-committee GRC pack (six-domain narrative deck, Word + PDF, redaction-cleared). It compiles that pack across six domains — risk profile, control health, open issues, regulatory deadlines, audit-plan progress, and SOX posture — computed over one quarter window. In scope: aggregating and synthesizing existing GRC records (Risk, Control, Issue, Audit, and Control-hosted SOX testing workflows) into a board-level narrative, obtaining executive and committee approval, and archiving the decision and action register. Out of scope: performing the underlying risk assessments, audits, or control tests themselves. Consumes two upstream handoff packages: the Enterprise Risk Assessment & Portfolio Oversight Cycle package (risk register, residual scores, appetite positions) and the Audit Report Drafting & Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle package (audit-plan status, issued reports, attestation status); there is no downstream workflow — the closed package feeds the next quarterly run of this workflow.
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Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle
Operate the third-party vendor risk lifecycle end to end: scope and tier the vendor population, gather and analyze assurance evidence (SOC reports and CUECs, plus C-SCRM controls), embed contractual protections, enroll ongoing monitoring, and reach a governed disposition and approval. The vendor register IS the set of Vendor items — tiered by criticality (tier) and data exposure (data_classification), owned (business_owner, risk_owner), and driven by reassessment_cadence with last/next assessment dates and monitoring_status; each assessment cycle runs as one workflow instance over that register. In scope: vendor and supplier third-party risk assessment, onboarding controls, and periodic reassessment. Out of scope: procurement sourcing and commercial negotiation, and the deeper fieldwork of a Third-Party Vendor Assurance Engagement, to which the approved package is handed off. This workflow is self-initiating and consumes no upstream workflow package.
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IT Governance Objective Review (COBIT)
Periodic review of selected COBIT 2019 governance and management objectives, run per cycle on an Audit item (audit_type: it_audit; scope = the in-scope objectives; period_start/period_end = the assessment cycle) that the workflow instance attaches to and archives at close. Each in-scope COBIT objective is a Process item (process_type: it_general_control) linked to that Audit, and the review produces named deliverables against it: an evidence register and pre-scored capability sheet, a signed capability profile, a gap table with the benchmark decision, a committed improvement roadmap of Issue initiatives, and the governance board report and dashboard. In scope: the COBIT 2019 objectives selected for this cycle, each with a justified 0-5 target capability level, a named accountable owner, and the review cadence; out of scope: objectives explicitly excluded with recorded rationale. Self-originating: its scope sheet and target profile are supplied as workflow inputs, and it hands off to no distinct downstream workflow — the carry-forward improvement Issues and the archived instance seed its own next cycle.
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Code of Conduct & Workforce Accountability Cycle
Code of Conduct & Workforce Accountability Cycle as a decision-aware workflow that runs on an existing ethics Process item ("Ethics & Code of Conduct Program", process_type: business_process, frequency: annual): each annual cycle is a workflow instance attached to that Process, and the archived instances on it ARE the ethics register - version history plus the open-deviation log. The code of conduct and the rules of behavior are Policy items (policy_type: policy and procedure) enriched each cycle - never recreated - and the tone-at-the-top and acknowledgment Controls (UC-GOV-04, UC-GOV-07) are linked to the Process via item relationships. The cycle reissues the code and rules of behavior, secures leadership adoption, communicates expectations to personnel and business partners, gates access on acknowledgment, and evaluates adherence - routing violations through the documented disciplinary process and remediating deviations timely, with deviations and violations recorded as Issue items carrying the full remediation lifecycle. Named deliverables: the reissued code of conduct and rules of behavior (Policy items plus redline/change summary), the leadership adoption decision, the acknowledgment coverage report with access-gating evidence, the deviation and violation inventory (Issues), the disciplinary and remediation outcomes, and the archived self-contained cycle evidence package. In scope: one annual accountability cycle (a full reissue or an update-driven re-acknowledgment) covering all in-scope personnel and the business-partner populations bound by the code. Out of scope: the ethics-hotline intake that feeds reported concerns - an input, not a step here. No upstream workflow is required to start the cycle; it is triggered by its annual cadence or by a material change to the code or rules of behavior. Downstream, the operational access-provisioning system consumes this cycle's acknowledgment gate - the workflow's terminal handoff - before it grants access.
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Combined Assurance Mapping
Combined Assurance Mapping as a decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs as one workflow instance attached to an Audit item created for the cycle (audit_type: advisory, scope = the combined-assurance mapping scope for the period, period_start/period_end = the cycle period) — no other Studio type represents an assurance-coordination cycle, so the workflow enriches that Audit item rather than any pre-existing engagement. In scope: mapping assurance coverage across the Three Lines of Defense for the confirmed risk universe and entities this cycle — cataloging assurance providers, mapping their coverage onto the risk universe, assessing reliance, identifying gaps and duplication, coordinating coverage plans, publishing the combined assurance map, and preparing audit-committee reporting inputs. Out of scope: performing the underlying assurance engagements themselves (owned by internal audit, second-line functions, and external providers) and any risk, entity, or provider not named in this cycle's confirmed scope. It consumes the risk universe and residual positions (Risk items with their residual_rating and treatment) from the upstream Enterprise Risk Assessment & Portfolio Oversight Cycle and hands its named deliverables — the published combined assurance map, the reliance conclusions, and the gap action plans — to the downstream Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflow rather than duplicating repeated work.
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Data Governance Council Operations
Data Governance Council Operations as a decision-aware workflow. Each quarterly cycle runs as one workflow instance attached to the existing UC-GOV-20 Control item (data governance council oversight; domains=governance_policy_oversight, frequency=quarterly) — it enriches that Control as its execution record and never creates a governing body. It validates the chartered council's charter and membership, runs the annual policy and lifecycle-standards review when due, compiles data-quality and integrity metrics, reviews and approves data-sharing and matching agreements, convenes the council with recorded minutes, and reports data governance status at the defined interval. Upstream, it consumes the prior cycle's archived governance record — the council and data-integrity-board charters (Policy items, policy_type: charter) and membership rosters, the current data-governance policy and data-lifecycle standards library (Policy items), the prior minutes and status report, and the open action-item register (Issue items linked to the Control). Named deliverables: the data-quality and integrity dashboard, the data-management oversight summary, the chair-approved council (and integrity board) minutes, the per-agreement dispositions, and the data-governance status report; the annual branch adds the refreshed policy and standards redlines and the charter and roster amendments. In scope each quarterly cycle: the named business units and data domains, the data governance council (always), and the data integrity board wherever data-matching (Privacy Act computer matching) or new data-sharing requires its review; a metrics-only cycle need not convene the integrity board. Out of scope: bodies and data domains not named in the cycle's scope. Downstream the workflow is self-contained — no separate workflow depends on it — but it chains cycle to cycle: this cycle's archived governance record, filed with the status report, is the next quarterly instance's primary input.
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Enterprise Risk Treatment Operations Cycle
Enterprise Risk Treatment Operations Cycle as a decision-aware workflow: it runs the documented risk methodology each cycle - identification and analysis of risks and opportunities, evaluation and prioritization against risk criteria, treatment selection and tracking for risks exceeding tolerance with residual re-evaluation, and risk-register and portfolio reporting to management and the board - triggering dynamic reassessment when internal or external change shifts the risk profile. This cycle has no anchor item of its own: the enterprise risk register it maintains IS the Risk item population, and the workflow instance is the cycle record and durable audit trail. In scope: entity-level and process-level risk across the enterprise, explicitly including cybersecurity, privacy, and financial-reporting risk alongside operational and strategic risk and opportunity. Out of scope: detailed control design and testing, which downstream control workflows own - a mitigate or share/transfer plan that creates or strengthens a control hands that work off to those workflows, which anchor on the affected Control items. This cycle has no upstream workflow feeding it; its starting inputs are the documented methodology, the consistent likelihood/impact scoring scales, the board-approved risk criteria and appetite/tolerance statements, and the risk-acceptance delegation matrix - all carried as Policy items - plus the existing control, insurance and transfer information (Control items and step documents) and the prior cycle's Risk register. Named deliverables: the maintained enterprise risk register (the Risk items), the prioritized risk heat-map dashboard, and the management and board portfolio report package.
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Subservice Organization & Third-Party Personnel Oversight
Subservice Organization & Third-Party Personnel Oversight as a checkpoint graph. Anchor: each run enriches the existing subservice-organization **Vendor** register entry for one provider - the workflow instance and every step document attach to it, and it is never recreated (initial vendor selection and onboarding due diligence are out of scope). In scope: the subservice organizations and third-party suppliers whose services support user-entity control objectives or whose personnel access the organization's systems or data - reconciling and enriching their Vendor register entries, verifying subservice and personnel-security contract terms, reviewing assurance (SOC) reports and mapping complementary user-entity controls (CUECs) to internal Control items, routing exceptions to tracked Issue items, collecting third-party personnel-compliance evidence, monitoring vendor performance, and running the quarterly issue follow-up through to closure. Out of scope: initial vendor selection and onboarding due diligence, and the organization's own internal personnel controls. Upstream: no workflow feeds it - it is built from the existing Vendor register, the prior cycle's archived vendor file, open Issue items, and the internal Control inventory, plus contracts, SOC reports, and performance data uploaded as evidence. Downstream: self-contained - no single workflow consumes its output; the archived, auditor-ready vendor file is the durable evidence record. It runs on the annual per-vendor cycle with quarterly issue follow-up.
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Personnel Screening, Agreements & Sanctions Administration
Runs on the existing "Personnel Security Administration" Process item (process_type: security_process; process_owner: the HR Personnel Security Partner): each cycle is one workflow instance attached to that Process - enriching the standing process, never creating a duplicate - and on the disciplinary track the violation-case Issue it opens becomes the cycle's second anchor, linked back to that Process. A modular, decision-aware workflow: it designates position risk, runs proportional background verification for new hires, role changes, and the annual high-risk rescreen sweep, produces and retains the signed employment security and confidentiality agreements required before access, and - when a policy violation is reported - runs the graduated disciplinary process through sanction determination, PS-8 notification, and retention. It originates on its own HR triggers (no upstream workflow feeds it) and hands access provisioning and revocation to the downstream Joiner-Mover-Leaver Access Lifecycle workflow rather than performing them here. Named deliverables per cycle: the position-risk designation memo and derived screening set, the background-verification packet, the signed employment security and confidentiality agreements plus security-bearing position description, the violation-case Issue, the sanction documentation and PS-8 notification record, the awareness and control-improvement feedback Issues, and the archived cycle record. In scope: one personnel-security trigger per cycle - a single new hire, role change, annual high-risk rescreen, or material agreement re-signature on the screening-and-agreements track, or one reported policy violation on the disciplinary track; a role change that also surfaces a violation is run as two separate cycles.
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Vendor Due Diligence & Contracting Gate
Vendor Due Diligence & Contracting Gate as a modular, decision-aware workflow. Anchor: the vendor's register entry — the Vendor item (slug: vendor). For a net-new engagement the gate creates the Vendor item and populates its tier, data_classification, business_owner, and risk_owner; for a renewal it enriches the existing Vendor item rather than duplicating it (enrich, never recreate). This is the first-line pre-contract gate the vendor-management office runs for every new engagement or renewal - tiering criticality, running proportionate due diligence into the vendor due-diligence report, documenting the risk-acceptance decision and any risk-reducing sourcing conditions, binding the contract to required security, privacy, and regulatory clauses, authorizing the specific information exchange before access begins, and - where personal data is involved - obtaining the signed written privacy commitments and scheduling compliance monitoring and incident-response routing. In scope: pre-contract due diligence, risk acceptance, and contract execution for one vendor engagement, ending with the Vendor item enrolled in monitoring (Vendor.monitoring_status = enrolled). There is no upstream workflow — the engagement trigger (a new prospective vendor or a renewal) is its own entry point. Downstream handoff: the archived gate record exported at close is the handoff package the ongoing third-party risk monitoring / vendor oversight lifecycle picks up to sustain the scheduled compliance checks and incident routing; that linkage is a prose handoff of live controls on the same Vendor item, not a triggered downstream node.
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Third-Party Risk Program & Vendor Oversight Cycle
A standing quarterly cycle the vendor-management office runs as control owner. The workflow instance is a recurring run attached to the EXISTING Process item "Third-Party / Vendor Risk Management" (process_type: operational, process_owner: Vendor Risk Program Lead, frequency: quarterly), linked to the Control items for the unified controls it operates (UC-TPRM-01/04/05/08) — it enriches that standing program, never recreating it. It consumes no upstream workflow handoff: each run is self-feeding, drawing its criteria and prior state from the program's own standing artifacts — the SCRM plan, third-party risk policy, and program strategy held as Policy items; the criticality-tiered Vendor register (Vendor items); and the prior cycle instance's step documents (the DORA Article 28(3) register of information and the ICT concentration-risk view). In scope: reaffirming or revising the governing Policy items; re-tiering the Vendor register; refreshing the DORA Article 28(3) register of information and the concentration-risk view (a dashboard over the Vendor items); verifying critical-provider exit strategies; executing this cycle's tier-based reassessments and driving findings to tracked third-party Risk items (remediation or risk-committee escalation); confirming external and cloud service provider oversight; and verifying critical suppliers carry live incident-notification coverage. Named deliverables: the refreshed criticality-tiered Vendor register, the updated DORA Article 28(3) register of information, the recomputed ICT concentration-risk view, the exit-readiness summary, this cycle's tracked Risk items, and the archived cycle evidence package on the workflow instance. Terminal at close-and-archive with no downstream handoff — open or escalated vendor risks persist as Risk items in the risk register. Out of scope and handled by separate workflows: the continuous monitor-line vendor lifecycle and the per-engagement due-diligence gate for onboarding a new vendor.
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Vendor Offboarding & Secure Termination
Vendor Offboarding & Secure Termination as a decision-aware workflow triggered on a relationship termination. It runs on the vendor's existing Vendor register item - the offboarding enriches that record, it never creates a duplicate: the run marks the Vendor `monitoring_status: exited` and stamps `contract_end_date`, and where the vendor's risk is registered it links to the existing third-party Risk item (`category: third_party`). In scope: executing one vendor's contractual exit end to end - inventorying the vendor's access, data, and dedicated components; containing access immediately on for-cause exits; transitioning each service to its successor; revoking every credential; verifying data return or destruction; disposing of internal-side components using defined techniques; and retaining the post-relationship evidence. Out of scope: the underlying contract-termination or renewal business decision and any separately-governed affiliate contracts. Initial inputs are the termination trigger and effective date, the vendor's contractual exit provisions (master agreement, data processing addendum, exit plan) - which also carry the data-disposition and evidence-retention clauses consumed downstream - and the existing Vendor register item with its risk tier; there is no upstream workflow. The named deliverable is the retained, audit-standing termination evidence package assembled at compile-termination-evidence-and-retain; the workflow is terminal - close-and-archive exports the run and hands off nothing downstream.
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AI Governance Framework, Roles & Obligations Review
AI Governance Framework, Roles & Obligations Review as a modular, decision-aware workflow. Each quarterly instance runs on the existing "AI Governance Program" Process item (process_type operational, quarterly, process_owner = AI Governance Officer) and enriches its standing registers — it never recreates them. It keeps the AI policy current and republished, refreshes the RACI and competency records, maintains each AI system's resource and dependency inventory, and walks the value-chain obligations register so every provider and deployer duty traces to an owner and evidence. Consumes at launch: the cycle trigger (interval, folded-in annual re-approval, or a regulatory/technology change) and prior-cycle registers — the AI policy as a Policy item (framework iso-42001 + eu-ai-act, domains ai_governance), the obligations register as EU AI Act / ISO 42001 Control items (control_owner = obligation owner), plus the in-scope AI system list, the RACI and competency register, and the per-system resource inventory, which have no native item type and travel as versioned step documents. Deliverables: the republished AI policy version, the refreshed RACI and competency register, the current resource and dependency inventory, the walked obligations register, and a four-area cycle evidence package. In scope: those four governance registers for the AI systems in boundary this quarter; out of scope: the AI systems' own development, risk assessment, and control testing. Terminal — no downstream workflow consumes the output; the cycle closes to its own archived workflow record, linked back to the anchor Process item.
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Control Library Lifecycle
One control, one record: intake, author, classify, link, publish, review, retire — the library that audit RCM and SOX scoping read from.
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AI Service Data Policy & Quality Management Cycle
AI Service Data Policy & Quality Management Cycle as a modular, decision-aware workflow. Each annual instance — and each semiannual regulatory-compliance checkpoint — runs on the existing "AI Service Data Policy & Quality Management" Process item (process_type operational, process_owner = AI Product Owner) and enriches its standing records; it never recreates them. Run by the AI Governance Lead (second line) and owned by the AI Product Owner (first line), it refreshes the customer-facing input data policy and output data policy, collects customer acknowledgements where the changes are material, reviews the AI quality management system for effectiveness, and refreshes the regulatory compliance documentation and obligations register shared with customers. Consumes at launch: the cycle trigger and mode, the in-scope AI service list with each service's value-chain role (a step document — there is no AI System item type), both data policies and the quality manual and procedures as Policy items, and the obligations register as Control items. Deliverables: the published policy versions with their acknowledgement records, the quality management system review record, the refreshed compliance statement and obligations register, the corrective-action log, and an indexed cycle evidence pack. Out of scope: the AI services' own development, risk assessment, and control testing, and fulfilment of individual customer data requests. Terminal — the cycle closes to its own archived workflow record, linked back to the anchor Process item.
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Emerging Risk & Horizon Scan
Runs on the existing risk item. Scan the forward horizon for signals of an emerging exposure, assess plausibility and velocity, and decide whether it enters the register or stays on the watchlist. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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SOC Report, Subservice & CUEC Review
Runs on the existing system item. Evaluate a service-organization report, subservice coverage, exceptions, and complementary user-entity controls for a governed reliance decision. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
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Policy Lifecycle Management
Run one policy through its full lifecycle, anchored to a Policy item in the policy library — created at authoring for a net-new policy, enriched in place on each refresh cycle (never duplicated). In scope: authoring and control/authority linkage, stakeholder review, formal approval, publication and workforce attestation, acknowledgement tracking, disposition, and scheduled alignment refresh. Consumes read-only upstream: the enterprise risk assessment (Risk items), control design (Control items), and obligation mapping — this workflow neither produces nor edits them. Produces four named deliverables: the published policy version, a frozen workforce attestation completion record, a section-by-section alignment verdict, and a single approval-ready policy package. Out of scope: enterprise risk assessment, control design, and obligation mapping. The approved policy package is handed off to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle, which runs the recurring regulatory attestation; the acknowledgement campaign launched here is the one-time publication attestation and is explicitly flagged in the handoff as not-to-be-repeated downstream.
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AI Transparency & Value-Chain Communications
Each quarterly instance runs against the existing "AI Transparency & Value-Chain Communications" Process item (process_type: business_process, frequency: quarterly), enriching it rather than recreating it, and links to the existing Control items UC-AI-10 and UC-AI-14 (framework: iso-42001 + eu-ai-act, domains: ai_governance) that the cycle executes. A recurring operate cycle that keeps AI system documentation, interaction disclosures, and content marking current with system changes, retains distribution evidence, evaluates AI suppliers (Vendor items) against responsible-AI requirements, and reviews customer needs and communications; the transparency policy and content-marking standard it enforces are Policy items. It consumes no upstream handoff package (a self-originating quarterly cadence) and terminates in no downstream workflow — systemic findings and carry-forwards land as Issue items in the AI governance backlog. In scope: every AI system in production or customer-facing use and every AI supplier providing an AI system, model component, training data, or inference service; out of scope: risk-classification and conformity assessment itself — purpose or risk-class drift is routed to the EU AI Act Impact Analysis workflow (as an observation Issue referencing it) rather than resolved in this cycle.
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GPAI Model Provider Compliance Cycle
Recurring operate cycle that fulfills Article 53 general-purpose AI model provider duties every release and quarterly refresh, and layers in Article 55 systemic-risk duties for models designated as posing systemic risk. The cycle runs as one Workflow instance on the existing Process item "GPAI model governance / provider compliance" (process_type: business_process, process_owner: Head of Model Governance) — enriched each cycle, never recreated — and links to the Control item implementing UC-AI-15. It consumes the prior cycle's archived instance on the same Process anchor (the per-model scope/exemption register and the prior version-of-record documentation carry forward), and produces the archived, authority-producible provider-obligation cycle record as its named deliverable. Note: the Studio catalog has no AI-Model item type, so per-model artifacts — scope, open-source-exemption determination, documentation and pack versions, publication records — live as version-stamped step documents and on the Workflow instance rather than on a model item, with the per-model scope register carried as a document on the anchor Process item. In scope: every general-purpose AI model this provider places on the EU market, scoped per model to Article 53 alone or Article 53 plus Article 55, with per-model provider-status and Article 53(2) open-source-exemption determinations carried on that scope register. Out of scope: the downstream integrator's own AI-system risk-class obligations, which each deployer operates separately; there is no named downstream workflow this cycle hands off to.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Change Intake & Impact Assessment
Runs on the existing requirement item. Validate a new or amended external obligation against its authoritative source, determine applicability, and assess the impact on controls, policies, processes and systems. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
EU AI Act Obligation Impact Analysis
EU AI Act Obligation Impact Analysis runs on a compliance Audit item created at intake (`audit_type: compliance`, `scope` = the fixed entities/AI-systems/markets boundary) — the "impact-analysis item" the whole run enriches and closes. It parses in-scope EU AI Act provisions, classifies affected AI use cases by operator role and risk tier, crosswalks obligations to existing Control items, rates conformity gaps as Issue items, and routes high-risk gaps to the AIMS (ISO/IEC 42001 AI management system). Consumes the horizon-scanning handoff package from Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage. Named deliverables: the locked workplan, the obligation register (the durable run-to-run workbook), the per-use-case classification set, the obligation-to-control crosswalk, the ranked conformity-exposure list, and the version-pinned final analysis package. Hands its approved gap-and-action package to Regulatory Obligation Implementation. In scope: obligation parsing, use-case classification, control crosswalk, and gap rating for the entities, AI systems, and markets fixed at intake. Out of scope: implementing remediations, performing conformity assessments, and running fundamental-rights impact assessments (FRIAs) — FRIAs route to the AI Governance & Risk/Impact Assessment module.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage
Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage as a modular, decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs on an Audit item created for the scan window — `audit_type` = compliance, titled "Regulatory Horizon Scanning — <period>", with `period_start`/`period_end` set to the detection window; the workflow instance attaches to that Audit and is archived against it at close. It can stand alone, but is designed to exchange handoff packages with related workflows instead of duplicating repeated work. In scope: detecting and summarizing regulator publications, routing them to the authority-source register, applicability screening against the compliance profile, entity profile, and activity inventory, owner assignment, and queueing. Out of scope: obligation mapping, gap and impact analysis, and implementation — those belong to the downstream Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping workflow, which consumes this workflow's named deliverables: the prioritized impact-analysis intake queue and the cycle evidence package. There is no upstream workflow and no prior handoff to consume; this is the sensing edge of the regulatory-change chain, and its standing inputs are the monitored feed list, the prior cycle's cursor, the authority-source register, and the Policy items that cite those authorities.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping
Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping runs on a compliance Audit engagement record — an Audit item created per triggering instrument (audit_type=compliance) whose scope holds the locked scope statement and to which every gap Issue, risk acceptance, and the workflow instance attach. It consumes two upstream inputs: the triage handoff package from Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage (instrument, canonical citation, publication and effective dates, triage disposition) and the canonical instrument text itself — the Official Journal or regulator-register version, the authoritative source the whole analysis cites. It parses that instrument into obligations, maps them to the existing Policy and Control library, classifies and rates gaps, and reconciles the obligation register. Named deliverables: the cited regulatory impact note, the obligation inventory, the authority-to-policy crosswalk, the classified and rated gap Issues, the versioned obligation register, and the final evidence and decision package. In scope: obligation analysis, crosswalk, gap classification, exposure rating, and register reconciliation for the in-scope entities, products, and jurisdictions. Out of scope: remediation build-out (handed off to Regulatory Obligation Implementation) and re-prioritizing the instrument (owned by Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage). Confirmed gaps and their action plans hand off to Regulatory Obligation Implementation.
workflow · Context
Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance
Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance as a decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs on its own Audit engagement item (audit_type = vendor_review) created at kickoff, with Audit.scope set to the in-scope legal entities, regimes, and vendor population; every workpaper, decision form, and gap attaches to that instance. In scope: ICT third-party service providers — including intra-group ICT providers — assessed against DORA, NIS2, and US interagency/FFIEC third-party expectations; out of scope: non-ICT vendors, which stay with the general vendor lifecycle. It consumes the arrangement-level inventory, tiering, and due-diligence handoff package from Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle (whose provider records are the Vendor items); refers vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 reports carrying real reliance to the Vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 Report Review & CUEC Mapping workflow and folds back its reliance conclusions; and produces a provision-cited, severity-rated gap register (Issue items linked to the anchor Audit and the affected Control/Vendor records) plus a qualified final assurance package. It hands the validated obligation statuses to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle, exchanging handoff packages with related workflows instead of duplicating repeated work.
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Quarterly 302/906 Sub-Certification Cascade
Quarterly 302/906 sub-certification as a modular, decision-aware workflow: it maintains the certifier hierarchy, refreshes the questionnaire for new systems, reorgs, known control issues, and pending deficiencies, launches the tiered cascade, tracks completion and cures gaps at the cutoff, triages exceptions and qualifications with escalation to the disclosure committee where material, summarizes the population for principal-officer 302/906 sign-off, and archives the certification evidence with the period's support. The instance runs against a campaign-record Audit item created for the quarter (audit_type: compliance; period_start/period_end = the quarter; scope = the in-scope entity and process population), enriching that one record — every questionnaire form, certification register, decision form, dashboard, and attestation package hangs off it and the run's own instance is the audit trail. It consumes the in-scope Process items (each carrying its process_owner) and the open deficiency Issue log, originates on its own recurring quarterly cadence with no upstream handoff, and hands its deficiencies downstream as linked Issue items into the SOX Deficiency Remediation, Year-End Deficiency Aggregation & Severity Evaluation, and Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflows. In scope: the quarter's in-scope entities and processes per the current consolidation scope, from process-owner sub-certification through principal-officer 302/906 sign-off and archival, back-planned from the SEC filing date. Out of scope: the officers' external SEC filing mechanics, and the deficiency, year-end aggregation, and board reporting handled by the downstream SOX Deficiency Remediation, Year-End Deficiency Aggregation & Severity Evaluation, and Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflows this cascade routes into.
workflow · Context
SOX ITGC Testing
SOX ITGC Testing as a modular, decision-aware workflow. It runs on the existing Audit engagement item for this ITGC cycle (audit_type: sox_testing, period_start/period_end = the test period) — enrich that item, never create a duplicate — while per-control operating-effectiveness results live on Control-hosted SOX testing workflows, one created per in-scope ITGC control per Workflow.customFields.sox.fiscalYear, each hosted directly on the Control under test. It consumes the ICFR scoping handoff package from Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment, produces the reperformable final ITGC testing package as its named deliverable, and hands the deficiencies off to SOX Deficiency Remediation. In scope: the operating-effectiveness conclusion on the ITGCs protecting in-scope financial systems, reached by referencing the controls-owned NIST 800-53 catalog and its test scripts — not by rebuilding procedures. Out of scope, owned by related workflows: scoping of significant accounts and applications (Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment), deep completeness-and-accuracy validation of system-generated populations (SOX IPE Validation), and remediation of what fails (SOX Deficiency Remediation, the downstream handoff). It can stand alone, but is designed to exchange handoff packages with these related workflows instead of duplicating repeated work.
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SOX Scoping Decision
Runs on the existing Process item for the one business process under decision — it enriches that Process item and the Control and Risk items in its RCM, never creating a duplicate. Determine whether the process is SOX-relevant and, if so, scope its key controls — otherwise document the exclusion. Consumes the Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment handoff package (accepted materiality set, scoping thresholds, aggregation floor). Named deliverables: the assessment worksheet, the SOX-relevance determination memo, the resulting Risk & Control Matrix (RCM) scope (Control and Risk items with live links), and the exclusion memo — compiled into a signed scoping decision package. Hands that signed package off to the downstream SOX Process Walkthrough for the in-scope slice, or routes a full exclusion into the annual monitoring/refresh cycle. Out of scope: entity-level materiality, significant accounts, and fraud-risk assessment, which are owned by the upstream Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment, and process understanding and control verification, which are owned by the downstream SOX Process Walkthrough.