ISO/IEC 27001:2022
380 records. Direct records match this source; context records explain their connections.
Read the first JSON page · Data retrieval guide
Mappings may provide partial coverage. Read mapping properties, residual requirements and source notes before relying on a connection.
control · Direct
A.5.1 — Policies for information security
Policies for information security
control · Direct
A.5.10 — Acceptable use of information and other associated assets
Acceptable use of information and other associated assets
control · Direct
A.5.11 — Return of assets
Return of assets
control · Direct
A.5.12 — Classification of information
Classification of information
control · Direct
A.5.13 — Labelling of information
Labelling of information
control · Direct
A.5.14 — Information transfer
Information transfer
control · Direct
A.5.15 — Access control
Access control
control · Direct
A.5.16 — Identity management
Identity management
control · Direct
A.5.17 — Authentication information
Authentication information
control · Direct
A.5.18 — Access rights
Access rights
control · Direct
A.5.19 — Information security in supplier relationships
Information security in supplier relationships
control · Direct
A.5.2 — Information security roles and responsibilities
Information security roles and responsibilities
control · Direct
A.5.20 — Addressing information security within supplier agreements
Addressing information security within supplier agreements
control · Direct
A.5.21 — Managing information security in the ICT supply chain
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain
control · Direct
A.5.22 — Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services
Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services
control · Direct
A.5.23 — Information security for use of cloud services
Information security for use of cloud services
control · Direct
A.5.24 — Information security incident management planning and preparation
Information security incident management planning and preparation
control · Direct
A.5.25 — Assessment and decision on information security events
Assessment and decision on information security events
control · Direct
A.5.26 — Response to information security incidents
Response to information security incidents
control · Direct
A.5.27 — Learning from information security incidents
Learning from information security incidents
control · Direct
A.5.28 — Collection of evidence
Collection of evidence
control · Direct
A.5.29 — Information security during disruption
Information security during disruption
control · Direct
A.5.3 — Segregation of duties
Segregation of duties
control · Direct
A.5.30 — ICT readiness for business continuity
ICT readiness for business continuity
control · Direct
A.5.31 — Legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements
Legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements
control · Direct
A.5.32 — Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property rights
control · Direct
A.5.33 — Protection of records
Protection of records
control · Direct
A.5.34 — Privacy and protection of personal identifiable information (PII)
Privacy and protection of personal identifiable information (PII)
control · Direct
A.5.35 — Independent review of information security
Independent review of information security
control · Direct
A.5.36 — Compliance with policies, rules and standards for information security
Compliance with policies, rules and standards for information security
control · Direct
A.5.37 — Documented operating procedures
Documented operating procedures
control · Direct
A.5.4 — Management responsibilities
Management responsibilities
control · Direct
A.5.5 — Contact with authorities
Contact with authorities
control · Direct
A.5.6 — Contact with special interest groups
Contact with special interest groups
control · Direct
A.5.7 — Threat intelligence
Threat intelligence
control · Direct
A.5.8 — Information security in project management
Information security in project management
control · Direct
A.5.9 — Inventory of information and other associated assets
Inventory of information and other associated assets
control · Direct
A.6.1 — Screening
Screening
control · Direct
A.6.2 — Terms and conditions of employment
Terms and conditions of employment
control · Direct
A.6.3 — Information security awareness, education and training
Information security awareness, education and training
control · Direct
A.6.4 — Disciplinary process
Disciplinary process
control · Direct
A.6.5 — Responsibilities after termination or change of employment
Responsibilities after termination or change of employment
control · Direct
A.6.6 — Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements
Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements
control · Direct
A.6.7 — Remote working
Remote working
control · Direct
A.6.8 — Information security event reporting
Information security event reporting
control · Direct
A.7.1 — Physical security perimeters
Physical security perimeters
control · Direct
A.7.10 — Storage media
Storage media
control · Direct
A.7.11 — Supporting utilities
Supporting utilities
control · Direct
A.7.12 — Cabling security
Cabling security
control · Direct
A.7.13 — Equipment maintenance
Equipment maintenance
control · Direct
A.7.14 — Secure disposal or re-use of equipment
Secure disposal or re-use of equipment
control · Direct
A.7.2 — Physical entry
Physical entry
control · Direct
A.7.3 — Securing offices, rooms and facilities
Securing offices, rooms and facilities
control · Direct
A.7.4 — Physical security monitoring
Physical security monitoring
control · Direct
A.7.5 — Protecting against physical and environmental threats
Protecting against physical and environmental threats
control · Direct
A.7.6 — Working in secure areas
Working in secure areas
control · Direct
A.7.7 — Clear desk and clear screen
Clear desk and clear screen
control · Direct
A.7.8 — Equipment siting and protection
Equipment siting and protection
control · Direct
A.7.9 — Security of assets off-premises
Security of assets off-premises
control · Direct
A.8.1 — User endpoint devices
User endpoint devices
control · Direct
A.8.10 — Information deletion
Information deletion
control · Direct
A.8.11 — Data masking
Data masking
control · Direct
A.8.12 — Data leakage prevention
Data leakage prevention
control · Direct
A.8.13 — Information backup
Information backup
control · Direct
A.8.14 — Redundancy of information processing facilities
Redundancy of information processing facilities
control · Direct
A.8.15 — Logging
Logging
control · Direct
A.8.16 — Monitoring activities
Monitoring activities
control · Direct
A.8.17 — Clock synchronization
Clock synchronization
control · Direct
A.8.18 — Use of privileged utility programs
Use of privileged utility programs
control · Direct
A.8.19 — Installation of software on operational systems
Installation of software on operational systems
control · Direct
A.8.2 — Privileged access rights
Privileged access rights
control · Direct
A.8.20 — Networks security
Networks security
control · Direct
A.8.21 — Security of network services
Security of network services
control · Direct
A.8.22 — Segregation of networks
Segregation of networks
control · Direct
A.8.23 — Web filtering
Web filtering
control · Direct
A.8.24 — Use of cryptography
Use of cryptography
control · Direct
A.8.25 — Secure development life cycle
Secure development life cycle
control · Direct
A.8.26 — Application security requirements
Application security requirements
control · Direct
A.8.27 — Secure system architecture and engineering principles
Secure system architecture and engineering principles
control · Direct
A.8.28 — Secure coding
Secure coding
control · Direct
A.8.29 — Security testing in development and acceptance
Security testing in development and acceptance
control · Direct
A.8.3 — Information access restriction
Information access restriction
control · Direct
A.8.30 — Outsourced development
Outsourced development
control · Direct
A.8.31 — Separation of development, test and production environments
Separation of development, test and production environments
control · Direct
A.8.32 — Change management
Change management
control · Direct
A.8.33 — Test information
Test information
control · Direct
A.8.34 — Protection of information systems during audit testing
Protection of information systems during audit testing
control · Direct
A.8.4 — Access to source code
Access to source code
control · Direct
A.8.5 — Secure authentication
Secure authentication
control · Direct
A.8.6 — Capacity management
Capacity management
control · Direct
A.8.7 — Protection against malware
Protection against malware
control · Direct
A.8.8 — Management of technical vulnerabilities
Management of technical vulnerabilities
control · Direct
A.8.9 — Configuration management
Configuration management
risk · Context
Excessive privilege and wrong assignment of access rights
Overly broad or wrongly assigned access rights, applications/services running with excessive privileges, and failure to enforce least privilege — a compromise or insider then gains broad access to systems and data.
risk · Context
Abuse of rights, forged rights, and repudiation of actions
Authorized users or administrators exploit legitimate access beyond permitted scope, fabricate or forge credentials/rights to gain privileges, and repudiate performed actions — undermining accountability and audit-trail integrity.
risk · Context
Weak account provisioning/de-registration and access review
No formal user registration/de-registration procedure and no periodic access-rights review, so orphaned or excessive accounts accumulate and access is not revoked when roles change or personnel leave.
risk · Context
Unauthorized use of equipment and unauthorized access escalation
Use of systems, networks, or devices without authorization, and users with authorized access reaching resources that exceed their authorization, potentially to exfiltrate data or conduct attacks.
risk · Context
Weak authentication and password management
Absent password policy, no MFA, credentials transmitted in clear text, and no session lock/logout on unattended workstations, making account compromise, brute-force login, and session hijacking easy.
risk · Context
Adversarial attacks, data poisoning and prompt injection
Data-poisoning corrupts training data and embeds backdoors; adversarial evasion, prompt injection, and jailbreaks fool deployed models at inference; model extraction steals proprietary weights/logic — enabling harmful or policy-violating outputs.
risk · Context
Emergent behaviour and unsafe AI system integration
Large-scale or multi-model pipelines exhibit emergent capabilities/failures not present in any component and not predictable from component testing; integration with legacy systems introduces interface mismatches and configuration errors.
risk · Context
GPAI transparency, systemic-risk and synthetic-content obligations
GPAI providers failing transparency/copyright/training-data obligations; systemic-risk models (>10^25 FLOPs) lacking red-teaming, incident reporting, and cybersecurity; unlabeled deepfake/synthetic content; and concentration of GPAI capability creating ecosystem single points of failure.
risk · Context
Public-safety harm from AI in critical infrastructure
Because AI acting as a safety component in critical digital infrastructure, road traffic, or utilities (Annex III(2)) operates without the required risk management, robustness, and human oversight, it can fail or behave unsafely, resulting in service disruption and threats to public safety and continuity.
risk · Context
Insecure AI-generated code and hallucinated or typosquatted dependencies
Code-generating AI produces insecure defaults (injection-prone queries, weak authentication and session handling, unsafe logging) or specifies non-existent, hallucinated, or typosquatted packages that attackers pre-register, introducing vulnerabilities and malicious dependencies into production software.
risk · Context
AI privacy leakage and re-identification
Model inversion and membership-inference attacks reconstruct training data or reveal individuals in the training set; AI inference re-identifies anonymized data and infers sensitive attributes; training on data without consent/legal basis creates regulatory liability.
risk · Context
AI supply-chain compromise and provider concentration
Because the organization relies on third-party pretrained models, datasets, and libraries that may carry backdoors, malicious code, or bias, and concentrates on a few external AI API providers, AI-dependent workflows are exposed to both supply-chain compromise and provider outage or insolvency, resulting in compromised model behaviour or sudden loss of AI capability.
risk · Context
Aging hardware with no periodic replacement scheme
Because maintenance routines and replacement schedules are absent, equipment is run beyond its reliable service life, so hardware fails - including correlated, pervasive disk failures from same-batch aging - resulting in outages and data loss.
risk · Context
Incomplete asset inventory and classification
No authoritative inventory of information and associated assets, missing ownership, acceptable-use, classification, labelling, or handling rules — preventing effective protection, risk assessment, and secure disposal.
risk · Context
Uncontrolled copying to removable media / unmanaged software installs
Absence of controls over copying data to removable devices, and users freely downloading/installing untested or unlicensed software, expands the attack surface and introduces malicious or unlicensed code into the environment.
risk · Context
Inadequate security awareness and training
Personnel lacking security awareness and training are more likely to make harmful mistakes, misconfigure systems, or be deceived — providing weak human defence and undermining every technical control. Includes insufficient privacy training.
risk · Context
No acceptable-use policy for messaging and telecoms
Because acceptable-use policies for email, messaging, and telecommunication services are absent, personnel use insecure channels without guidance, so sensitive information is inadvertently or deliberately disclosed through unsanctioned communications.
risk · Context
Phishing, spear-phishing and social engineering
Adversary counterfeits trustworthy communications (email, phone, spoofed websites) to trick individuals — including high-value executives — into revealing credentials or sensitive information, or into enabling wire-transfer/BEC fraud.
risk · Context
Missing role-based and ongoing security/privacy training
Because no role-based training program or ongoing awareness refresh exists for staff handling sensitive data or privileged systems, personnel cannot execute security procedures correctly or recognize evolving attacks, so avoidable errors and successful social-engineering compromises follow.
risk · Context
User error and mishandling of sensitive information
Authorized users make mistakes — incorrect data entry, misconfiguration, improper procedures, incorrect privilege settings, or spilling/mishandling sensitive information — causing harm to information assets without malicious intent.
risk · Context
IT resilience failure — unplanned outage, data loss, slow recovery
Critical technology infrastructure or applications experience unplanned outages, data loss, or prolonged recovery times — including failure of DR systems to activate — disrupting operations and harming stakeholders.
risk · Context
Absent or untested business continuity / disaster recovery plan
No BCP/DR plan, or plans that exist but have never been exercised end-to-end, so a natural disaster, pandemic, civil unrest, or infrastructure failure disables critical processes with no tested recovery path.
risk · Context
Single-site / single-region / single-supply concentration
Headquarters, data centers, or manufacturing concentrated in one region, single power feed or network path with no redundancy, and no failover — so one catastrophe or outage disables the whole service. Includes backup-facility loss destroying backups.
risk · Context
Environmental regulatory non-compliance
Unauthorized emissions or discharges, improper hazardous-waste handling, missing permits, or non-compliance with PFAS/chemical-reporting rules under EPA/RCRA/Clean Air & Water Acts — driving penalties and remediation.
risk · Context
Improper business or market practices
Losses from antitrust violations, market manipulation (spoofing, layering, front-running), benchmark/rate rigging, unlicensed business activity, and sanctions/export-control violations in the conduct of business.
risk · Context
Intellectual property loss or infringement
Patent, trade-secret, copyright, or trademark infringement claims (competitors or NPEs), loss of key IP through invalidity rulings, inadequate protection of proprietary technology, or inability to enforce own IP against infringers.
risk · Context
Litigation, investigation and enforcement exposure
Adverse judgments, class actions, contract/IP disputes, government subpoenas, DOJ/FTC/SEC investigations, consent decrees, or deferred-prosecution agreements imposing penalties, remediation, and management distraction.
risk · Context
Lack of independent audit and compliance review
Because independent internal and external audit and review of information security are not performed, control deficiencies and non-conformities are neither detected nor challenged, so weaknesses persist unremediated and management and the board lose reliable assurance over control effectiveness.
risk · Context
Adverse regulatory or policy change
Changes in law, regulation, tax policy, or government programs materially alter the entity’s cost structure, competitive dynamics, or permissible business practices, requiring costly adaptation.
risk · Context
Sector regulatory non-compliance (financial, healthcare, trade)
Non-compliance with sector regimes — banking prudential rules, consumer-lending laws, payment-network rules, healthcare (FDA/HIPAA/CMS, Anti-Kickback/Stark, False Claims), export controls (EAR/ITAR), antitrust, and environmental/labor rules — triggering fines, sanctions, or loss of license.
risk · Context
Internet-exposed or misconfigured systems
Adversary gains access through the Internet to systems not authorized for Internet connectivity or that do not meet configuration requirements, and exploits attacks over unauthorized ports, protocols, and services.
risk · Context
Poor configuration management and insecure baseline drift
Without documented, enforced baseline configurations and change control, systems drift into insecure states, contain unauthorized changes, or expose unnecessary network services, expanding attack surface.
risk · Context
Absent or weak change-control procedures
Changes to systems, software, hardware, or configurations without formal approval and testing (including unauthorized or poorly tested hardware/config changes) introduce new vulnerabilities, instability, or failed releases.
risk · Context
Compromised or counterfeit certificates / certificate authority
Adversary counterfeits or compromises a certificate authority so that malware or connections appear legitimate, defeating trust in TLS and code-signing and enabling man-in-the-middle or malicious-code delivery.
risk · Context
Weak or absent encryption and key management
Sensitive data stored or transmitted without adequate encryption, or use of weak/flawed cryptography and poor key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction — enabling interception, disclosure, or tampering of data.
risk · Context
Attacks by capable, motivated threat actors
Because capable, motivated threat actors - outsiders, privileged and non-privileged insiders, organized groups, competitors, malicious partners or suppliers, and nation-states - actively target the organization's cyber resources, deliberate attacks are attempted against its systems and data, resulting in compromise, disruption, or theft when defenses are outmatched.
risk · Context
Coordinated multi-stage / APT campaigns
Adversary coordinates continuous, adaptive, multi-staged campaigns (hopping across systems, combining insider/outsider/supply-chain vectors, spreading from existing presence) to persist and progressively undermine mission/business functions.
risk · Context
Adversary reconnaissance and information gathering
Because adversaries scan perimeters, sniff exposed networks, mine open-source and public information, and surveil personnel and processes, they build a detailed map of the IT environment and its weaknesses, resulting in better-targeted, more likely-to-succeed follow-on attacks.
risk · Context
Unauthorized disclosure / breach of sensitive information
Unauthorized disclosure of information to parties not entitled to receive it, whether by insecure controls (insecurity), spillage, or authorized users induced to expose data — resulting in identity theft, economic loss, and loss of trust.
risk · Context
Corruption or integrity loss of critical data
Intentional or accidental alteration, deletion, defacement, or injection of false-but-believable data into systems (including web defacement and data from untrustworthy sources) renders data inaccurate and erodes confidence in it.
risk · Context
Excessive collection, purpose creep and secondary use
Collecting more personal data than necessary (data-minimization failure) and using it for purposes materially different from those disclosed without fresh notice/consent, expanding attack surface and violating purpose-limitation.
risk · Context
Data exfiltration and theft of information by attackers
Adversary (outsider, insider, nation-state, or competitor) installs malware or sniffers to locate and exfiltrate sensitive/proprietary information, or steals data by external actors — including systems-security losses from hacking.
risk · Context
Privacy-program non-compliance (GDPR, CCPA, state laws)
Failure to honour data-subject rights (access, deletion, portability, restriction) on time, missing lawful-basis/consent documentation, defective consent mechanisms, invalid cross-border transfer mechanisms, or inadequate notices — driving fines and private rights of action.
risk · Context
Re-identification and unanticipated revelation from data
Insufficient de-identification/pseudonymization, plus inference or linkage attacks and metadata leakage, re-identify individuals or reveal information they did not intend to disclose — causing embarrassment, harm, and regulatory exposure.
risk · Context
Residual data on improperly disposed or re-used media
Retrieval of recycled or discarded media, and disposal/reuse of storage without proper erasure, exposes residual sensitive information; also insecure/incomplete data deletion in multi-tenant/cloud environments.
risk · Context
Unlawful retention or premature deletion of records
Retaining personal data beyond necessity/mandated schedules (privacy and breach risk) or deleting records before required retention periods (litigation-hold, regulatory, tax risk); records-management policy not enforced technically.
risk · Context
Physical climate risk to facilities and supply chains
Extreme weather (flooding, wildfires, hurricanes, heat stress), sea-level rise, and resource scarcity damage owned/leased facilities, disrupt supplier operations, and impair logistics beyond insurance coverage.
risk · Context
Climate transition risk — carbon pricing and stranded assets
Carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, and mandatory Scope 1-2-3 reporting increase operating costs or strand carbon-intensive assets; failure to credibly plan a net-zero transition jeopardizes access to capital and changing consumer preferences.
risk · Context
Data-quality and IPE integrity failures in reporting
Poor data lineage, inconsistent master-data definitions, or uncontrolled data transformation (weak IPE completeness/accuracy) cause management decisions and regulatory reports to rest on inaccurate or incomplete data.
risk · Context
Financial-statement fraud and management override
Intentional misstatement through fictitious revenue, phantom inventory/assets, ghost-employee payroll, or management override of controls — inflating results and deceiving investors and regulators.
risk · Context
Ineffective ICFR / undisclosed material weakness
Because internal control over financial reporting is not maintained effectively - material weaknesses undetected or undisclosed and certifications signed despite known deficiencies - financial statements may be materially misstated and filings delayed or restated, resulting in SEC enforcement, delisting, securities-fraud liability, and loss of investor confidence.
risk · Context
Manual journal entries and management-override risk
Manual/automated journal entries posted with transposition errors, wrong account codes, or amounts; recurring entries not updated; and top-side entries used to override controls and manage earnings at period-end.
risk · Context
Revenue-recognition misstatement (fictitious, mis-timed, mis-measured)
Fictitious or channel-stuffed revenue, revenue not recorded for delivered goods, incorrect transaction-price allocation or percentage-of-completion, and principal-vs-agent gross/net errors — the highest-risk assertion cluster in the revenue cycle.
risk · Context
Segregation-of-duties conflicts in financial processes
Incompatible duties (initiate, approve, record, and custody) concentrated in one role or via broad system access enable unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to be recorded and concealed.
risk · Context
Credit and market (rate/FX) risk
Counterparty/customer default exceeding collateral, receivables concentration in deteriorating credits, and unhedged exposure to interest-rate, foreign-exchange, commodity, or equity movements causing material P&L or cash-flow volatility.
risk · Context
External fraud — third-party theft, forgery, payment and account fraud
Third parties defraud the entity: cheque/payment-card forgery, counterfeit currency, identity theft, account takeover with stolen credentials, fraudulent loan applications, and first-party (bust-out) fraud by customers.
risk · Context
Internal fraud — asset misappropriation, embezzlement, forgery
Employees defraud the entity for financial gain: embezzlement or theft of company/client funds, fraudulent expense/payroll claims, forgery to obtain unauthorized disbursements, bribery/kickback schemes, insider trading on own account, and wilful tax evasion.
risk · Context
Unauthorized activity — rogue trading, position mismarking, concealment
Losses from transactions not reported or of an unauthorized type, deliberate mismarking of positions, fictitious trade bookings to conceal losses, and circumvention of position/risk limits without disclosure (e.g. rogue trader).
risk · Context
Missing or insufficient security and privacy policies
Because documented, approved, and enforced security and privacy policies are missing and roles and duties are undefined, personnel operate without guidance on required controls and behaviours, so controls are applied inconsistently and accountability gaps leave violations undetected and unaddressed.
risk · Context
Major project / program delivery failure
Large programs — ERP implementations, digital transformations, or major capital projects — fail to deliver expected benefits on time and within budget due to poor governance, scope creep, or capability gaps.
risk · Context
Weak internal control environment enabling fraud and error
Because the internal control environment is weak - segregation of duties absent, authorization frameworks inadequate, and tone at the top poor - fraudulent and erroneous transactions can be initiated and concealed, resulting in material misstatement and financial, regulatory, and reputational loss.
risk · Context
Discrimination, harassment and hostile-workplace culture
Systemic harassment or discrimination (race, gender, age, disability, etc.), pay-equity violations, retaliation, and inadequate speak-up channels resulting in regulatory action, litigation, attrition, and reputational harm.
risk · Context
Insufficient personnel screening and vetting
Failure to vet employees, contractors, or third parties before granting access enables insider threats or introduces compromised individuals; adversaries may deliberately place subverted individuals into (privileged) positions.
risk · Context
Missing security terms in contracts and no disciplinary process
Employment and supplier contracts omit security/confidentiality obligations, and there is no disciplinary process for security violations — removing legal recourse and the deterrent effect against repeat offenders.
risk · Context
Workplace health, safety and well-being failures
Workplace accidents, occupational illness, missing PPE, OHS-regulation violations, premises-liability incidents, and burnout leading to injury claims, workers-compensation, regulatory penalties, and productivity loss.
risk · Context
Failure to detect, assess, and notify breaches on time
Failure to detect, assess, and notify affected individuals and regulators of personal-data breaches within required timeframes and content (GDPR Art.33/34, HIPAA breach rule), resulting in sanctions and compounded individual harm.
risk · Context
No or insufficient incident-response procedures
Without documented, tested incident-response procedures, breaches and failures are handled inconsistently, slowly, or ineffectively, prolonging exposure and amplifying loss.
risk · Context
Missing or insufficient logging and audit trails
Absence of logging/audit trails means unauthorized activity cannot be detected, investigated, or attributed, and adversary actions (obfuscation of intrusion detection, tampering with logs) go unnoticed.
risk · Context
No security monitoring or supervision of privileged activity
Absence of monitoring mechanisms and supervision of personnel actions (especially privileged users) allows undetected misuse, and no process exists to supervise and escalate detected security breaches.
risk · Context
Cloud multi-tenancy isolation and data-scavenging exploits
Adversary exploits multi-tenancy in a cloud environment to observe organizational processes, violates isolation mechanisms, or scavenges data used and deleted by cloud processes, compromising confidentiality and availability.
risk · Context
Communications interception, eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle
Passive monitoring/sniffing of communications, interception of unencrypted or weakly encrypted channels, wireless interception, and man-in-the-middle attacks capture or corrupt transmitted data — including TEMPEST-type emanation capture.
risk · Context
Poor network architecture and unprotected public connections
Because externally-facing connections lack perimeter controls (firewalls, DMZ) and the network lacks segmentation, redundancy, and defense-in-depth, attackers can breach the boundary and move laterally and single points of failure go unmitigated, resulting in intrusion, data exfiltration, and outage.
risk · Context
Remote-work, mobile and split-tunneling exposure
Uncontrolled work outside the premises, split-tunneling, and exploitation of mobile devices/personal systems outside physical and firewall protection expose information through insecure environments and reintroduce compromised devices into the enterprise.
risk · Context
Session hijacking and unauthorized-protocol egress
Adversary hijacks established legitimate sessions (externally or internally based) and conducts attacks/exfiltration using unauthorized ports, protocols, and permitted information flows across the perimeter.
risk · Context
Acceptance of data from untrustworthy sources
Injection or acceptance of data from untrusted or malicious sources (including position-detection/tracking data) causes incorrect processing or decisions and can seed downstream integrity loss.
risk · Context
Core process breakdown and inability to scale
Poorly designed, undocumented, or poorly executed business processes lead to errors, rework, cost overruns, service failures, and inability to scale operations reliably; large change programs fail to deliver benefits on time and budget.
risk · Context
Client intake, documentation and account-management failures
Missing signed agreements, incomplete legal/ISDA documentation, unretained KYC/AML records, misfiled client files, unauthorized access to client accounts, and negligent loss of client assets held in custody.
risk · Context
Product design and model errors
Defective product design, errors in model or pricing assumptions embedded in products, and failure to investigate customer complaints cause systematic customer harm and mis-selling losses.
risk · Context
Physical and cyber-physical attacks on facilities and infrastructure
Adversary conducts physical attacks on facilities (arson) or supporting infrastructure (cuts power/water), or cyber-physical attacks (remotely altering HVAC), damaging systems and supporting utilities.
risk · Context
Physical damage to assets from disaster, terrorism or vandalism
Loss or damage to facilities, equipment, or physical property from natural disaster (earthquake, flood, hurricane, wildfire), terrorism, civil unrest, vandalism, utility-infrastructure damage, vehicle/aircraft collision, or environmental contamination.
risk · Context
Environmental degradation of equipment (dust, humidity, temperature, EMI)
Equipment sited without environmental controls suffers from dust, corrosion, freezing, humidity, voltage or temperature variation, and electromagnetic/thermal radiation or EMP, causing malfunction or failure.
risk · Context
Inadequate protection against fire, flood and physical hazards
Absence of fire suppression, smoke detection, flood barriers, or drainage in facilities housing information assets, and poor cabling infrastructure susceptible to damage, tapping, or accidental disconnection.
risk · Context
Inadequate physical protection and access controls
Buildings and sensitive areas lacking perimeter security, key-card/lock/mantrap controls, or supervision of visitors and cleaning/outside staff allow unauthorized physical access to equipment and media — including tailgating past physical checks.
risk · Context
Remote spying and shoulder-surfing of screens/documents
Observation of screens, documents, or activities from a distance (shoulder surfing, optical surveillance) and interception of compromising emanation signals capture sensitive information without system access.
risk · Context
Theft of equipment, media or unattended devices
Physical stealing of storage media, printouts, or computing/network equipment (including unattended laptops outside the perimeter), potentially exposing stored data. Unprotected storage locations increase exposure.
risk · Context
Cross-border personal-data transfer without safeguards
Transferring personal data to jurisdictions lacking equivalent protection without SCCs, BCRs, adequacy decisions, or other recognized mechanisms, exposing individuals and the organization to legal risk.
risk · Context
Absence of privacy-by-design and default
Because systems and products are built without embedding privacy controls at the architecture level, privacy protections are bolted on after launch rather than applied by default, so personal data is over-collected and exposed and costly manual remediation is required.
risk · Context
Applications running with excessive privilege / insecure design
Applications or services running under privileged accounts, opening unnecessary network connections, or lacking secure-by-design architecture mean a single compromise grants broad system access and expands attack surface.
risk · Context
Malware delivery, insertion and compromise of systems
Adversary crafts and delivers known, modified, or targeted malware (via email, web, removable media, or downloadable software) and compromises system software to take control, exfiltrate data, or degrade functions.
risk · Context
Ransomware disrupting operations and data availability
Criminal groups deploy ransomware that encrypts systems and data, disrupting operations, causing losses, and demanding extortion payment — a high-impact convergence of malware, availability, and continuity risk.
risk · Context
Vulnerabilities introduced during software development
Inherent weaknesses in programming languages and development environments introduce errors and exploitable vulnerabilities into software products, and software malfunctions cause incorrect outputs, crashes, or security weaknesses.
risk · Context
Geopolitical, macroeconomic and sovereign risk
Armed conflict, political instability, sanctions, trade-policy reversals (tariffs, export bans, data-localization, forced tech transfer), expropriation/nationalization, and adverse macroeconomic cycles disrupt operations, supply chains, and cost structures.
risk · Context
Hardware and equipment failure
Malfunction or breakdown of storage, processing, communications, sensor, controller, or display equipment (aging, resource depletion, disk errors) disrupting availability or integrity — including intermittent/degraded operation producing incorrect results.
risk · Context
Loss of essential services (power, HVAC, telecoms)
Interruption of power supply, air-conditioning/water utilities, or telecommunications — from unstable grids, single power feeds, UPS/generator failure, or carrier/fiber outages — stops operations or harms equipment and personnel.
risk · Context
Software and information-system failure
Failure or malfunction of operating-system, networking, or application software (defects, resource depletion, failed releases) causing loss of availability/integrity and impeding mission/business functions — including core banking/payments outages.
risk · Context
Use of unlicensed, counterfeit or pirated software
Fraudulent copying of software and deployment of pirated/counterfeit software (unlicensed or inadequately controlled) that may lack security patches or contain malicious code — a legal and security exposure.
risk · Context
Critical vendor failure, insolvency or concentration
A key supplier, SaaS provider, or outsourced partner becomes insolvent, exits the market, or suffers a prolonged outage; sole-source and shared-tier concentration (multiple tier-1 vendors on a common tier-2) creates hidden single points of failure with no backup.
risk · Context
Supply-chain disruption of critical inputs
Geopolitical events, natural disasters, port congestion, or logistics failures interrupt supply of critical raw materials or components (semiconductors, rare earths); just-in-time models are exposed to demand spikes.
risk · Context
Malicious supply-chain injection of tampered hardware/software
Adversary creates false-front suppliers or intercepts the supply chain to insert counterfeit or tampered hardware, corrupted software/firmware, or malicious components into products and information systems.
risk · Context
Third-party compliance failure creating vicarious liability
A vendor, subcontractor, or channel partner violates labor, environmental, anti-bribery (FCPA/UKBA), or data-protection rules, exposing the company to liability and reputational harm; fourth-party/N-tier dependencies are opaque.
risk · Context
Vendor/outsourcing service non-performance and disputes
Outsourced processing, IT, payroll/HR, print/mail, or sub-custodian providers fail to meet service levels, deliver defective software, make incorrect payments, or breach contractual deliverables, causing processing errors, outages, and loss.
risk · Context
Weak supplier security requirements and monitoring
Because supplier contracts omit security requirements and SLAs and third-party service delivery is not monitored, processors and sub-processors operate without equivalent, audited obligations, so third-party weaknesses and breaches propagate into the organization undetected.
risk · Context
Inadequate vulnerability scanning and pre-release testing
Software released without adequate testing, and no regular vulnerability scanning or penetration testing, leaves exploitable defects undiscovered until they manifest — or are exploited — in production.
risk · Context
Exploitation of known, unpatched vulnerabilities
Use of software with publicly known, unpatched flaws (CVEs) that adversaries readily exploit — including recently discovered vulnerabilities exploited before mitigations are in place, and internal-system vulnerability exploitation.
risk · Context
Zero-day exploitation
Adversary employs attacks that exploit as-yet-unpublicized vulnerabilities (targeted, based on reconnaissance, or nontargeted), compromising systems before any patch or signature exists.
standard · Direct
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-02 — Review user access rights periodically
All user and privileged access rights are reviewed at least annually, and more frequently for high-risk systems, by system or data owners who confirm each entitlement remains limited to business need. Unnecessary accounts and excess privileges identified in reviews are disabled or removed within a defined SLA. Completed reviews and remediation evidence are retained.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-03 — Enforce least privilege, need-to-know, and segregation of duties
A documented access control policy grants access strictly on business need-to-know, with entitlements defined through roles that default to least privilege. Segregation-of-duties conflicts (e.g., request versus approve, develop versus deploy) are defined in a conflict matrix, enforced in systems, and mitigated with compensating controls where unavoidable. Role and entitlement definitions are approved by data or system owners and re-approved whenever they change.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-04 — Restrict privileged rights, utilities, and unauthorized software
Privileged access rights are individually authorized against a business justification, time-bound or periodically recertified, and issued on separate accounts distinct from daily-use identities. Use of utility programs capable of overriding system or application controls is restricted to authorized administrators and logged. Application allowlisting or equivalent controls prevent installation and execution of unauthorized software on managed systems.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-05 — Enforce approved authorizations for information and functions
Systems mediate every access attempt through a tamper-resistant, always-invoked enforcement mechanism that applies approved authorizations before granting access to information or functions. Restrictions use roles and security attributes bound to data and subjects, limiting access to sensitive information, source code, and administrative functions to explicitly authorized identities. Enforcement rules are applied consistently across applications, databases, and infrastructure and are tested for effectiveness.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-06 — Manage unique identities and identifiers end to end
Every user, service, and device is assigned a unique identifier from an authoritative source; shared or group identifiers are prohibited except under documented approval with compensating controls. Identifiers are issued through a controlled process, mapped to accountable owners, deactivated promptly when no longer needed, and not reused for a defined period.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-08 — Manage and protect authenticators across their lifecycle
Authenticators (passwords, tokens, keys, certificates) are issued through a verified process, with vendor defaults changed before use and minimum strength requirements enforced. Authentication information is protected in storage (salted hashing or encryption) and in transmission, masked during entry, and never embedded in code or scripts. Authenticators are revoked on compromise or separation and rotated at defined intervals or events.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-09 — Authenticate all users with multi-factor authentication
Every user is uniquely identified and authenticated before access, with multi-factor authentication enforced for remote access, privileged access, and access to sensitive data environments. Authentication follows secure log-on practices: credentials are validated only over protected channels, and federated identity assertions (e.g., SAML/OIDC tokens) are signed, protected, and verified. External and non-organizational users are held to the same authentication rigor, with authentication strength documented against the risk of the interaction.
unified · Context
UC-ACCESS-18 — Log and monitor system activity, capacity, and incidents
Systems generate log records that are protected and made available for continuous monitoring. Performance, capacity, and security events are monitored against thresholds, with alerts triaged and incidents identified and resolved through a tracked process. Resource use is projected and tuned to meet current and future capacity requirements.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-01 — Maintain a complete inventory of systems, hardware, and software
Maintain a documented inventory of all hardware, software, systems, and services, recording owner, location, and the attributes needed for accountability and security management. Update the inventory as part of component installation, removal, and change, and reconcile it at least quarterly to correct discrepancies. Include every in-scope component so the inventory serves as the authoritative record of protected information assets for audit and compliance scoping.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-03 — Classify, prioritize, and label information and assets
Classify information and associated assets under a documented scheme based on sensitivity, criticality, and business impact, and prioritize assets and protections accordingly. Apply labels and markings, including on physical media, that identify the classification and any distribution or handling limitations. Identify confidential information at creation or receipt and keep classifications and priorities current through periodic review.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-04 — Control storage media through use, storage, and destruction
Restrict access to and use of removable and other storage media to authorized personnel and approved media types, and physically secure media commensurate with the classification of the data it holds. Sanitize or destroy media and equipment containing storage using approved techniques before disposal, reuse, or release from control, and verify that data can no longer be read or recovered before protections are discontinued. Retain records of media use, movement, sanitization, and destruction.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-06 — Govern acceptable use of endpoints, off-site, and external systems
Define, communicate, and require acknowledgment of acceptable-use rules for information and associated assets. Protect user endpoint devices with enforced safeguards such as encryption, screen locking, and centralized management, and protect organizational assets used off premises against loss, theft, and observation. Permit use of or connection to external systems only under established terms and conditions consistent with the trust relationship, including restrictions on processing organizational information and on portable storage.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-07 — Manage assets through their life cycle and recover them at exit
Manage systems, hardware, software, services, and data through their full life cycles from acquisition through secure retirement, with defined ownership and handling at each stage. Recover all organizational assets from personnel and other interested parties upon termination or change of engagement, tracking issuance and verified return.
unified · Context
UC-ASSET-08 — Transfer information securely under defined rules and agreements
Establish rules, procedures, and agreements that protect information transferred within the organization and with external parties, covering electronic transfer, physical media in transit, and verbal disclosure. Require safeguards proportionate to classification, such as encryption in transit and tracked courier services, and bind external recipients through transfer agreements.
unified · Context
UC-AUDIT-23 — Coordinate independent assurance reviews across providers
The organization plans and obtains independent reviews of its approach to managing and implementing information security - including people, processes, and technologies - at planned intervals, after significant changes, and where required by applicable law or regulation. Before relying on another provider's work, each reliance decision assesses and records the provider's independence and objectivity, competence and methodology rigor, evidence quality and reperformance capability, and recency against the covered risk's cadence, together with the resulting reliance level and rationale. Assurance activities are coordinated across internal and external providers to ensure coverage, minimize duplication, and support reliance on others' work. Material reliance limitations, assurance gaps, and duplication remain visible to management and the board. Results are reported to management and the board and drive corrective actions.
unified · Context
UC-AUDIT-24 — Manage compliance with external legal and regulatory requirements
The organization identifies applicable external legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements - including intellectual property rights and software licensing obligations - and maintains them in a compliance register with assigned owners. Compliance with these requirements is evaluated on a defined cadence, confirmed through documented reviews, and non-compliance is remediated with status reported to management. The register and evaluation results are retained as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-AUDIT-25 — Maintain quality records and information for internal control
The organization obtains or generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the functioning of internal control, with defined expectations for accuracy, completeness, and timeliness. Records are protected against loss, destruction, falsification, and unauthorized access or release, and are retained and disposed of in accordance with retention schedules aligned to legal, regulatory, contractual, and business requirements.
unified · Context
UC-BCDR-01 — Maintain business continuity and disaster recovery plans
Maintain documented, management-approved business continuity and disaster recovery plans that cover critical business functions and ICT services, recovery time and recovery point objectives, assigned roles, and how information security is preserved at required levels during disruption. Base the plans on a business impact analysis, distribute them to responsible personnel, and review and update them at least annually and after significant organizational or technology changes.
unified · Context
UC-BCDR-03 — Back up data and verify restorability
Back up information, software, and system images at a frequency and scope aligned to defined recovery point objectives, protect backup copies from unauthorized access and modification, and keep copies separate from the primary environment. Verify backup integrity and restorability through periodic test restores, and verify the integrity of backups before using them for restoration.
unified · Context
UC-BCDR-04 — Provide redundant and alternate processing, storage, and telecom
Implement redundancy and alternate capability sufficient to meet availability and recovery objectives: an alternate storage site for backup media, alternate processing capability sufficiently separated from the primary site to avoid shared hazards, and diverse or alternate telecommunications services with priority-of-service provisions. Ensure alternate facilities provide security controls equivalent to the primary site and can assume operations within recovery time objectives.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-01 — Harden systems to approved secure configuration baselines
Establish, document, and maintain current baseline configurations and mandatory secure settings for all system components, including network security controls, aligned to accepted industry hardening standards. Configure systems for least functionality by disabling or restricting unnecessary ports, protocols, services, and functions. Monitor deployed configurations for deviations from baseline and for changes that introduce vulnerabilities, remediating drift as findings, and reassess baselines periodically and upon significant change.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-02 — Authorize, test, and approve changes before production
Manage changes to applications, databases, infrastructure, configurations, and procedures through a documented process in which changes are requested, analyzed for security and risk impact, authorized, tested, approved, and implemented by appropriate personnel. Require migration to production to be performed by individuals independent of development, and retain records evidencing each step. Define rollback plans and an emergency-change path with retrospective review and approval.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-03 — Separate environments and protect production data in testing
Separate development, test, and production environments, and enforce physical and logical access restrictions so only authorized personnel can make changes to production systems. Select, protect, and manage information used for testing, anonymizing or masking production data before use in non-production environments and removing it when testing completes.
unified · Context
UC-CONFIG-05 — Permit only authorized software installation and use
Restrict installation of software on operational systems to authorized personnel installing approved software from trusted sources, and govern user-installed software through explicit policy and technical enforcement such as allowlisting. Combine these restrictions with anti-malware controls that prevent or detect and act upon unauthorized or malicious software. Track software installation and use to comply with contract terms and license entitlements.
unified · Context
UC-CRYPTO-02 — Use approved algorithms and validated cryptographic modules
A cryptography standard defines approved algorithms, protocols, key lengths, and certificate profiles aligned to current industry guidance, and prohibits deprecated primitives (e.g., SSL/early TLS, SHA-1, RSA below 2048 bits). Cryptographic operations protecting sensitive data use independently validated cryptographic modules operating in approved modes. The standard is reviewed at least annually against emerging cryptanalytic and post-quantum developments.
unified · Context
UC-DATA-09 — Retain personal and confidential data per schedule, then destroy it
Maintain an approved retention schedule for personal and confidential information tied to documented legal and business requirements, and retain data no longer than the schedule permits. When retention ends, delete or irreversibly destroy the information wherever it resides, including in external services, using methods that prevent reconstruction, and record disposal actions as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-DATA-11 — Control data flows, leakage, and cross-border transfers
Enforce approved authorizations for information flows within and between systems using technical flow-control mechanisms, and deploy data-leakage-prevention measures on systems and channels that could exfiltrate sensitive data. Transfer personal data across borders only under a valid transfer mechanism (adequacy decision, standard contractual clauses, binding corporate rules, or a documented derogation), with the transfer risk assessed and the safeguard recorded.
unified · Context
UC-DATA-12 — De-identify, mask, or pseudonymize personal data
Apply masking, pseudonymization, or de-identification when full identifiers are not required, following policy and the applicable legal standard (e.g., expert determination or safe-harbor methods, limited data sets under agreement). Protect the keys and mappings that could re-identify data, and prohibit re-identification attempts.
unified · Context
UC-DATA-13 — Safeguard personal information with reasonable security
Identify the statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements that apply to the personal information the organization holds, and implement reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to its volume and sensitivity. Assign responsibility for PII protection, verify the safeguards periodically, and remediate identified gaps.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-03 — Identify and manage legal, regulatory, and contractual obligations
Identify, document, and keep current all legal, statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements relevant to information security and privacy — including privacy and civil-liberties obligations — and define and assign the organization's approach to meeting each. Assess and document applicability determinations, including any regulatory exemptions claimed, and file the notices required to support those determinations. Review the obligations register at planned intervals and upon regulatory or business change.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-06 — Define security roles, responsibilities, and authorities
Establish and document organizational structures, reporting lines, and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities for information security, risk management, and internal control, with board oversight of their design. Communicate assignments to the individuals and teams concerned, keep them current through organizational and personnel change, and enforce them in practice so that ownership of each security obligation is unambiguous.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-07 — Hold individuals accountable for control responsibilities
Management requires all personnel to apply information security in accordance with established policies and procedures and holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities. Accountability is enforced through defined expectations, documented rules of behavior acknowledged before access is granted and re-acknowledged when updated, performance measures and incentives, and disciplinary consequences for violations.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-08 — Segregate conflicting duties and areas of responsibility
Identify duties and areas of responsibility that conflict — such as requesting versus approving access, development versus production deployment, or initiating versus approving transactions — and segregate them among different individuals or roles. Where segregation is impracticable, apply and document compensating controls such as enhanced monitoring, logging, or independent review.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-14 — Establish and maintain approved security policies and procedures
Establish, approve, publish, and maintain the organization's information-security policy suite as a governed whole: a top-level policy plus the topic-specific policies, each with an accountable owner, board/management approval, planned review cycles, and communication to relevant parties. Domain-specific policy content is governed by its own unified control; this objective owns the suite-level lifecycle (inventory, approval chain, review cadence, communication, exceptions).
unified · Context
UC-GOV-22 — Assess control effectiveness and authorize systems
Maintain a documented assessment and authorization policy with procedures, defined performance measures, and quality monitoring to regularly evaluate whether security policies, standards, and risk-management measures are implemented, complied with, and effective — including managers' reviews of compliance within their areas of responsibility. Feed assessment results into a formal, risk-based authorization process in which a senior official explicitly accepts residual risk before systems operate and at defined intervals thereafter, and track findings to closure.
unified · Context
UC-GOV-23 — Maintain contacts with authorities and special interest groups
Establish, document, and maintain contacts and communication channels with relevant authorities (e.g., regulators, supervisory bodies, law enforcement) and with special interest groups, security forums, and professional associations, defining when and by whom each contact is used, including during incidents. Review contact lists at defined intervals to keep them current, and use these channels to stay abreast of recommended practices, emerging threats, and regulatory expectations.
unified · Context
UC-HR-01 — Screen personnel commensurate with position risk
Every position is assigned a risk designation that determines its screening requirements and is reviewed as roles change. Background verification, including identity, employment and education history, and criminal or other checks as permitted by law, is completed before employment and before access to systems or sensitive information, proportional to position risk and data sensitivity. Personnel in high-risk roles are rescreened at defined intervals, and screening records are retained.
unified · Context
UC-HR-02 — Formalize security responsibilities in employment terms
Employment contracts and terms state each individual's information security responsibilities, including obligations that survive employment. Personnel sign confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements and access agreements before being granted access, and re-sign when agreements are materially updated. Position descriptions document role-specific security duties, and signed acknowledgments are retained as evidence.
unified · Context
UC-HR-03 — Secure termination and transfer of personnel
A documented separation process ensures that on termination, system access is revoked and organizational assets are recovered on a defined timeline, same-day for involuntary separations, with exit discussions reaffirming surviving confidentiality obligations and notification of relevant parties. On transfer or role change, access is re-evaluated and adjusted to the new role within a defined period, with changes logged.
unified · Context
UC-HR-04 — Enforce a formal disciplinary process for violations
A formal, communicated disciplinary process is applied to personnel who violate information security policies, providing graduated, consistent sanctions proportional to severity and intent. Violations, sanctions applied, and notifications to defined roles are documented and retained, and outcomes feed back into awareness and control improvements.
unified · Context
UC-HR-05 — Hold third-party personnel to equivalent security terms
Contracts with suppliers and external organizations whose personnel access systems or data require equivalent personnel security measures, including screening, confidentiality agreements, and defined security responsibilities, and oblige the provider to notify the organization of personnel transfers or terminations affecting access. Third-party compliance with these personnel requirements is monitored.
unified · Context
UC-HR-07 — Secure remote working arrangements
A remote-working policy defines the physical, device, and communications security measures required when personnel work outside organizational premises, including screen privacy, secured work environments, encrypted connectivity, and rules for handling sensitive information remotely. Compliance is attested, and equipment and configuration requirements are enforced before remote access is granted.
unified · Context
UC-IR-01 — Maintain an approved incident response plan
Maintain a written incident response plan that defines the mission and scope of the response capability, incident definitions and severity structure, roles, responsibilities, and communication paths, and how the capability coordinates with business continuity and third parties. Have the plan approved by designated management, distribute it to named response personnel, and review and update it on a defined frequency and after significant incidents or organizational changes, protecting it from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
unified · Context
UC-IR-03 — Provide channels to report events and obtain response help
Operate well-known channels — such as a monitored mailbox, hotline, or service portal — through which all personnel can and are directed to report observed or suspected security events as quickly as possible. Provide an incident response support resource, integral to the response capability, that offers advice and assistance to users on reporting and on handling suspected events. Acknowledge every report and route it into triage.
unified · Context
UC-IR-04 — Triage, categorize, and escalate reported security events
Triage every reported security event: validate that it is genuine, assess it against the agreed classification scheme, and decide whether to declare it an incident. Categorize and prioritize declared incidents by type, severity, and business impact, and escalate or elevate them to defined roles and management tiers according to documented thresholds and timeframes. Record triage decisions and their rationale in the incident system of record.
unified · Context
UC-IR-06 — Respond to, contain, and eradicate declared incidents
On declaration of an incident, execute the incident response plan in coordination with internal teams and relevant third parties such as providers, law enforcement, and insurers. Contain the incident using predefined strategies for its category, eradicate the cause by removing malicious artifacts and closing exploited weaknesses, and coordinate handling with contingency and recovery activities through to resolution. Communicate response status as the plan requires and document all response actions taken, feeding lessons into response procedures.
unified · Context
UC-IR-07 — Investigate incidents and preserve evidence and records
Track and document every incident from declaration to closure in a system of record covering status, actions performed, decisions, and timeline. Collect incident data and evidence using documented procedures that preserve integrity, provenance, and chain of custody so evidence remains suitable for disciplinary and legal proceedings, and record investigation actions as they are performed. Perform analysis, including root-cause analysis, to establish what took place and why, and record the conclusions.
unified · Context
UC-IR-10 — Learn from incidents and communicate corrective actions
Hold post-incident reviews for incidents meeting defined thresholds to capture what happened, what worked, and what failed. Convert lessons into tracked corrective actions — updates to controls, plans, training, and configurations — and use incident trends to identify and reduce recurring exposure. Communicate identified deficiencies and corrective-action status in a timely manner to the parties responsible for remediation, including senior management and, where significant, the board.
unified · Context
UC-LOG-01 — Log security-relevant events across all systems
Enable audit logging on all systems, applications, and network components, generating records for a defined catalog of security-relevant event types — at minimum authentication, all access to sensitive or regulated data (such as cardholder data), privileged actions, account and configuration changes, and security-tool events. Review and update the event catalog periodically with system owners, ensure logging is enabled by default on newly deployed components, and verify logging coverage on a defined cadence.
unified · Context
UC-LOG-02 — Record complete audit content with synchronized clocks
Capture audit records whose content establishes what happened, when it happened, where it occurred, the source, the outcome, and the identity of associated users or subjects, with centrally managed additional fields where investigations require them. Synchronize clocks on all logging systems to an approved authoritative time source, record timestamps in a consistent format mappable to UTC with defined granularity, and monitor for and correct clock drift.
unified · Context
UC-LOG-04 — Continuously monitor systems for anomalous activity
Operate continuous monitoring under a documented strategy that defines what is monitored, the metrics, and the frequencies — including ongoing assessment of security-control effectiveness — and report security status to defined roles on a defined cadence. Deploy monitoring across hosts, networks, and applications, at the perimeter and interior, to detect attacks, indicators of compromise, unauthorized connections, and anomalous behaviour indicative of malicious acts, natural disasters, or errors. Analyze flagged anomalies promptly to determine whether they represent security events requiring further evaluation.
unified · Context
UC-LOG-08 — Secure and monitor networks and network services
Secure and actively manage networks and network services: document the security features, service levels, and management responsibilities of all network services (including outsourced ones), harden and control network devices, and monitor delivered network services for conformance with the documented security features and service levels, addressing deviations.
unified · Context
UC-NET-01 — Segment networks and defend the external boundary
Segment networks into zones based on trust level, sensitivity, and function, and mediate all traffic at managed interfaces (firewalls, gateways, proxies) with deny-by-default rules at the external boundary and key internal boundaries. Monitor and control communications crossing each boundary to protect against threats originating outside the system boundary, and review segmentation and rule sets periodically.
unified · Context
UC-NET-13 — Control mobile code and web content
Define acceptable and unacceptable mobile-code technologies, and authorize, monitor, and control mobile code so unauthorized active content cannot execute in browsers, documents, or email. Filter access to external websites by category and reputation to reduce exposure to malicious content, and log enforcement actions.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-01 — Restrict physical access to facilities and secure areas
Define physical security perimeters and secure areas, and authorize, issue, and periodically review physical access credentials so only authorized personnel can enter facilities, offices, and sensitive locations such as data centers and backup media storage. Enforce entry controls at every access point, escort and log visitors, and apply defined rules for working in secure areas. Maintain physical access audit logs for entries and exits at controlled access points, and secure, inventory, and rotate physical access devices such as keys, combinations, and badges when compromised or when personnel change. Revoke or adjust physical access promptly upon termination or role change.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-02 — Monitor physical access and retain visitor and entry records
Continuously monitor physical access to facilities and sensitive areas using surveillance, intrusion detection, and review of physical access logs. Maintain visitor access records including identity, date, time, and purpose of entry. Review monitoring output and access records on a defined cadence, retain them for the required period, and investigate anomalies and apparent violations.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-03 — Protect facilities against fire, water, and environmental hazards
Design and equip facilities to protect technology assets from fire, water, temperature, humidity, and other physical and environmental threats. Deploy and independently maintain fire detection and suppression, water damage detection with accessible shutoff valves, and environmental monitoring and control at required levels. Configure alarms to notify responsible personnel automatically when protective systems activate or parameters go out of range.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-04 — Site facilities and equipment to minimize hazards and exposure
Position facilities and system components to minimize damage from physical and environmental hazards and to reduce opportunities for unauthorized access and observation. Consider physical and environmental risk when selecting facility locations, and apply compensating safeguards for equipment sited in higher-risk locations.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-05 — Provide emergency power, lighting, and resilient utilities
Protect supporting utilities such as power, HVAC, and telecommunications from failure and disruption, with inspection and maintenance on a defined schedule. Provide uninterruptible power and generator capacity sized to enable orderly shutdown or continued operation of critical systems, and automatic emergency lighting covering evacuation routes. Provide accessible, protected emergency shutoff capability to cut power to systems safely in an emergency.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-06 — Protect power and communications cabling from damage and taps
Protect power equipment and power and telecommunications cabling from interception, interference, and damage, using measures such as protected conduits, separation of power and communications lines, and controlled access to patch panels, wiring closets, and transmission infrastructure. Periodically inspect cabling and access points for tampering or unauthorized devices.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-08 — Maintain equipment to preserve availability and integrity
Maintain equipment according to manufacturer specifications and a defined schedule, using only authorized maintenance personnel. Record all maintenance activity and suspected or actual faults, and apply safeguards that prevent information exposure during servicing, including clearing or supervising equipment sent off site for repair.
unified · Context
UC-PHYS-09 — Prevent information exposure at desks, screens, and outputs
Enforce clear desk and clear screen rules so sensitive information is not left visible on unattended workspaces, displays, or printed materials. Restrict physical access to printers, scanners, and other output devices so only authorized individuals can retrieve output, and require prompt collection of printed material.
unified · Context
UC-RISK-02 — Integrate risk management into enterprise processes and projects
Risk management is integrated into organizational structures, decision-making, and business activities rather than operated as a standalone silo. Cybersecurity and information security risk activities are incorporated into enterprise risk management processes, and information security risk is addressed within project management for all projects from initiation through delivery. ERM artifacts referencing cyber risk and project gate documentation with security risk sections evidence operation.
unified · Context
UC-RISK-17 — Operate threat intelligence and threat hunting
Information relating to threats is collected from internal and external sources and analyzed to produce actionable strategic, tactical, and operational threat intelligence that informs risk assessments and defensive measures. A threat hunting capability proactively searches organizational systems for indicators of compromise that evade existing detection controls. Intelligence products and hunt reports are produced on a defined cadence and drive response actions.
unified · Context
UC-SDLC-01 — Follow a secure development lifecycle with approval gates
Define and follow a documented development lifecycle with security integrated into every phase from requirements through design, build, test, and release, including defined security activities, secure development standards and tooling, and management approval gates. Ensure new systems and significant changes are designed, developed, tested, and approved in accordance with management's specifications before migration to production. Monitor adherence to and performance of the secure development process.
unified · Context
UC-SDLC-03 — Define and approve security requirements for applications
Elicit, analyze, document, and approve functional and non-functional requirements, including application security requirements such as authentication, authorization, input and output handling, logging, and data protection, before solution design and build, assessing feasibility and alternative options. Manage requirement changes and requirements risk, and obtain stakeholder and management approval of the final requirements.
unified · Context
UC-SDLC-04 — Engineer systems with secure architecture and design
Design and build systems using established secure architecture and engineering principles: least privilege, defense in depth, isolation of execution domains (process and memory separation), fail-safe defaults, and attack-surface minimization, applied from concept through implementation. Require developers to produce and maintain a security architecture description consistent with the enterprise architecture. Engineer solutions to remain accurate, robust, and resilient against errors, faults, and adversarial manipulation.
unified · Context
UC-SDLC-05 — Enforce secure coding and input validation standards
Establish and enforce secure coding standards for in-house and reused code, covering common weakness classes and secure use of components. Validate all information inputs for syntax, semantics, type, length, and range at trust boundaries, rejecting or safely encoding unsafe input. Verify adherence through code review and static analysis before release.
unified · Context
UC-SDLC-10 — Oversee outsourced development and vet developers
Direct, monitor, and review outsourced and third-party development: contractually define secure-development requirements, intellectual property ownership, and audit rights, review deliverables against requirements, and obtain evidence of security testing. Screen developers of critical systems against defined criteria before granting them access to development environments.
unified · Context
UC-SDLC-14 — Protect production systems during audit testing
Plan and agree audit and assurance testing of operational systems between the tester and appropriate management before testing begins: define and approve scope, limit testers to read-only access where possible or use isolated copies, schedule tests to minimize disruption, and monitor and log all audit access.
unified · Context
UC-TPRM-01 — Operate a third-party security risk management program
Establish and operate a management-approved third-party and supply-chain risk management program with a written strategy, policies, and procedures, reviewed at defined intervals and after significant changes to the supply chain or threat landscape. Define and communicate roles and responsibilities for supplier, customer, and partner relationships, and integrate third-party and supply-chain risk into enterprise and cybersecurity risk management. Maintain a register of third-party relationships and contractual arrangements prioritized by criticality, and assess criticality, substitutability, and concentration risk before contracting. Apply risk-based due diligence, embed security requirements, audit and access rights, termination rights, and sub-outsourcing conditions in agreements, and protect organizational information processed, stored, or transmitted on external systems. Define, agree, and periodically review service agreements and supplier performance, reassess third parties on a defined cycle, operate controls to identify and address weaknesses across the relationship life cycle, and maintain documented, tested exit strategies for providers supporting critical or important functions.
unified · Context
UC-TPRM-04 — Monitor vendor performance, services, and risk
Continuously monitor third-party performance, service delivery, and security posture against contractual and risk requirements throughout the relationship. Conduct periodic reassessments and reviews, such as questionnaires, assurance reports, and audits, at a frequency based on criticality, and manage changes to supplier services. Record, prioritize, and track identified vendor risks through response and remediation.
unified · Context
UC-TPRM-07 — Verify component authenticity, provenance, and integrity
Document and maintain the provenance of critical systems, components, and data through the supply chain, for example with bills of materials and chain-of-custody records. Apply anti-tamper and anti-counterfeit measures: tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and design, inspection of systems and components at receipt and on indication of tampering, and verification of component authenticity with training and reporting of suspected counterfeits.
unified · Context
UC-TPRM-08 — Govern security of external and cloud service use
Define and enforce processes for acquiring, using, managing, and exiting external system services and cloud services in line with the organization's information security requirements. Require external providers to comply with those requirements, define oversight roles and responsibilities on both sides, agree service and exit terms, and monitor provider compliance on an ongoing basis.
unified · Context
UC-TRAIN-01 — Deliver security awareness training to all personnel
Provide security and privacy awareness training to all personnel as part of onboarding, at least annually thereafter, and when threats, policies, or systems change materially. Include practical exercises reflecting current threats, such as phishing simulations and social-engineering awareness, and update content based on lessons learned and emerging risks. Require timely completion as a condition of continued system access.
unified · Context
UC-VULN-03 — Remediate identified flaws within defined timeframes
Identify, evaluate, and install security-relevant software and firmware updates within documented, risk-based timeframes (for example, critical flaws within 15 days and high-severity within 30). Test patches for effectiveness and side effects before production deployment, use central patch-management tooling to measure coverage, and verify remediation by rescan or configuration check. Document time-bound compensating measures or formal risk acceptance for any flaw that cannot be corrected on schedule.
unified · Context
UC-VULN-04 — Test software security during development and acceptance
Require developers and project teams to perform security testing throughout development and at acceptance, including a documented test plan, static and dynamic analysis appropriate to the technology, and retained evidence of test execution and results. Define security acceptance criteria for new systems and major upgrades, and remediate weaknesses found before release into production.
unified · Context
UC-VULN-05 — Block malware, spam, and phishing across all systems
Deploy centrally managed anti-malware protection on all system components commonly affected by malicious software, with real-time and periodic scanning, automatic signature and engine updates, and tamper protection so users cannot disable or alter it. Quarantine or block detected code, alert responders, and log all detections; periodically re-evaluate components deemed not commonly affected. Filter email and web channels for spam and phishing at entry and exit points, and support the technical controls with user awareness on malware and phishing.
workflow · Context
Cybersecurity Assurance Review
Cybersecurity Assurance Review — a CAE-owned assurance engagement that runs on the EXISTING Audit item opened from the audit plan (audit_type=it_audit, status PLANNED, lead_auditor and scope already set): the workflow instance attaches to that item and enriches it end to end, never creating a duplicate engagement record. It covers the three IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement domains (governance, risk management, and control activities) over the cyber estate bounded in the engagement memo (in scope: named legal entities, networks, cloud tenants, and OT/ICS where included; out of scope: areas whose assurance is documented as delivered by other engagements), testing against the NIST 800-53 Rev 5 catalog with CSF 2.0 / ISO 27001 as the aggregation frame. It originates from the audit plan (no upstream workflow) and produces the findings register (one four-Cs Issue per finding), the cyber posture summary carrying the per-domain and overall Standard 14.5 conclusions, and the approved engagement package — which it hands to the downstream Audit Report Drafting workflow.
workflow · Context
Fraud & Forensic Investigation Engagement
Fraud & Forensic Investigation Engagement as a decision-aware workflow. It runs on a dedicated Audit item (audit_type: investigation) created for this allegation at intake — the confidential case record — with the workflow instance attached to that item and its visibility restricted to the named investigation team. In scope: one specific fraud allegation, worked predication-gated and confidentially from intake through evidence preservation, forensic procedures, interviews, loss quantification, and audit-committee reporting; the named deliverables are the chain-of-custody register, the findings memorandum with its loss-quantification schedule, and the privilege-marked audit-committee fraud report. Out of scope: the enterprise fraud risk profile (owned by Fraud Risk Assessment & Anti-Override Control Review, which receives scheme intelligence from this case rather than being rerun here) and any unrelated conduct discovered in passing (which gets its own intake record). It consumes the hotline intake package from Control Responsibility Communications & Ethics Hotline when so routed, and hands each control breakdown off as an Issue item — control-gap findings to Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring and ICFR-affecting deficiencies to SOX Deficiency Remediation — rather than duplicating that work.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Trust Services Readiness
Runs on the existing Audit engagement with its system description, service commitments, review period, control and risk registers, and available evidence; assesses CC1–CC9 design readiness and consumes reviewed companion assessments for selected optional Trust Services categories. Delivers the criterion-to-control mapping, criterion-level evidence and design conclusions, owned gap register, and approved SOC 2 readiness disposition to management for remediation and examination planning; Type II testing, management-owned PBC preparation and management assertion remain separate workflows.
workflow · Context
ITGC Change & Provisioning Testing
Runs ON a control item (a change-management or access-provisioning ITGC). Validates the change and provisioning populations for the period, draws reproducible samples, tests each sampled ticket against the control attributes (approval before migration, segregation of developer and migrator, approval before access, access matches the requested profile), records design and operating conclusions on the control, and raises every exception as an issue.
workflow · Context
Third-Party Vendor Assurance Engagement
Runs on the existing Audit item for this engagement (audit_type=vendor_review) — the workflow enriches that already-planned engagement record, it never creates a duplicate — consuming the confirmed scope, criteria, and calendar handed off from Audit Engagement Planning. An IA-led third-party vendor assurance engagement that concludes on the design and operating effectiveness of the organization’s TPRM program — governance, risk tiering, vendor control-environment reliance, monitoring, exclusions, and reporting. Vendors under test are the existing Vendor items, each finding is an Issue item, and the named deliverable is a reperformable engagement workpaper package. In scope: assuring the program (IA evaluates management’s third-party risk management; it does not operate it). Out of scope: operating the vendor lifecycle (onboarding, tier refresh, remediation), which belongs to the second-line Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle workflow; deep single-report SOC work, which can be delegated to the reusable Vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 Report Review & CUEC Mapping workflow; and ICT arrangements caught by regulatory regimes, which route to Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance. Findings and the engagement conclusion exit through Audit Report Drafting, and action plans route to Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring.
workflow · Context
Continuous Controls Monitoring (ISCM) Cycle
Run the continuous controls monitoring (ISCM) cycle: pull the current-period control metrics and score them against thresholds, triage degraded and failed controls, update the POA&M, report control health to governance, recalibrate the monitoring strategy, then classify the disposition and prepare, hand off, and archive the cycle package. Each interval runs as one workflow instance attached to the existing Process item that represents the ISCM / continuous-controls-monitoring program (process_type = security_process) — enrich that program record every cycle, never create a duplicate. The monitored control set is the existing Control items (Control.frequency doubles as the monitoring cadence, Control.control_owner as the accountable owner) and the POA&M is the existing Issue register (issue_type = deficiency, source = self_assessment); metric definitions and pass/degraded/fail threshold bands have no native field, so they live in the ISCM strategy document carried on the anchor Process item. The cycle produces the control-health scorecard, the reconciled POA&M, the control-health / security-status report, and the recalibrated ISCM strategy. In scope: the recurring NIST 800-137 monitoring loop — metric collection, threshold comparison, triage, POA&M maintenance, security-status reporting, and monitoring-strategy tuning for the controls under continuous monitoring. Out of scope: formal security control assessment and driving gap remediation to closure, which is owned by the downstream Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation workflow that consumes this cycle's handoff package. No upstream workflow feeds this one; it is triggered by the arrival of the monitoring interval.
workflow · Context
Technical Security Testing & Pentest Engagement
Runs ON an existing Audit item (audit_type: it_audit) that represents the authorized penetration-test engagement — the workflow instance attaches to that record and enriches it (scope, ratings, dates, and the assurance conclusion write back to its fields); it never creates a duplicate engagement record. In scope: authorized technical testing (reconnaissance, discovery, exploitation validation, severity rating, reporting, and retest) of the defined system boundary against its control baseline and assessment objective, with each confirmed finding recorded as an Issue linked to the anchor Audit and its affected Controls. Out of scope: any testing beyond the agreed rules of engagement, and the downstream remediation program itself — confirmed control gaps and open POA&M findings are handed to the Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation workflow, and the assurance conclusion to the Cybersecurity Assurance Review workflow. No upstream workflow feeds this engagement; its inputs are the anchor Audit, the in-scope system boundary (Process items), the control baseline (Control items, framework nist-800-53), the assessment objective and signed authorization, and any open Issue items (source: penetration_test / vulnerability_scan) from prior engagements.
workflow · Context
Vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 Report Review & CUEC Mapping
Reach a defensible reliance conclusion on a service organization's SOC 1/SOC 2 report. The workflow instance runs on an Audit item (audit_type: vendor_review) created for this vendor's SOC report period — enrich that item, never duplicate it; its native fields carry the report and reliance metadata (external_firm = CPA firm, opinion = service auditor's opinion, period_start/period_end = report coverage, report_date, rating = overall reliance verdict). Consumes the vendor risk handoff package from the Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle workflow — the existing Vendor item, its tier, and the dependent Process items. In scope: report scope and type confirmation, the service auditor's opinion and exception analysis, complementary user entity control (CUEC) mapping, bridge/gap-period coverage, and the documented reliance decision — producing the SOC reliance memo and the reviewer-ready reliance package. Out of scope: the vendor's initial risk tiering and onboarding, and ongoing control monitoring. Hands the completed reliance package to the Continuous Controls Monitoring (ISCM) Cycle (and Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance) workflows.
workflow · Context
User Access Review & Recertification
Runs on the existing Control item for UC-ACCESS-02 (user access review) — with UC-ACCESS-03 linked by item relationship — enriching that Control, never creating a duplicate; each quarterly or event-triggered cycle is a workflow instance attached to it, so archived instances accumulate as the de-facto control execution log. A decision-aware workflow covering entitlement extraction, manager certification, revocation, and independent verification. Consumes at start the prior cycle's scope-change carry-forward Issues and prior signed report (both attached to the same Control) plus the period's source-of-record entitlement extracts and period-end HR roster. Produces a signed, audit-ready recertification evidence package and control-owner report as the named deliverable. In scope: SOX-significant applications, systems holding data classified Confidential or above, identity infrastructure (directory, SSO, PAM), and privileged-reach platforms, across all account populations (standard, privileged, service, shared, emergency break-glass, third-party); triggered on scheduled cadence or by event (post-incident, auditor request). Out of scope: lifecycle provisioning and the privileged-access model itself — systemic findings hand off to the Joiner-Mover-Leaver Access Lifecycle (lifecycle gaps) and Privileged Access & Authorization Model Management (privileged-model findings) workflows.
workflow · Context
Vulnerability & Patch Management Cycle
Recurring vulnerability & patch management lifecycle covering NIST SP 800-53 RA-5 (vulnerability scanning) and SI-2 (flaw remediation) and NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA and PR.PS. Each cycle runs as one recurring instance anchored to the EXISTING vulnerability & patch management Control item (a Control with domains = vulnerability_patch_management — e.g. the UC-VULN-01 scanning control, control_owner = cycle owner); the instance enriches that Control's evidence trail rather than creating a new subject, and the instance itself is the cycle record. In scope: authenticated scanning of the confirmed asset inventory, severity-based triage against the SLA matrix, standard and emergency remediation, rescan verification, time-bound risk acceptance of residuals, metrics reporting, and cycle closure. Named deliverables: the deduplicated, enriched finding register (one vulnerability_scan Issue per finding, linked to the Control), rescan closure evidence, time-bound compensating-control-backed risk-acceptance exceptions (policy_exception Issues), and the cycle KPI & trend report. Consumed as inputs, not produced: the authoritative asset inventory / CMDB and the enterprise change-approval policy (a Policy item). The workflow is self-triggered by its own scheduled scan window (or an actively-exploited advisory) with no upstream or downstream workflow — its carry-forward package feeds the next iteration of this same cycle at intake.
workflow · Context
Business Continuity & DR Test Exercise
Run one operating cycle of an existing business continuity / disaster recovery plan-testing Control (the BC/DR test control this instance attaches to, UC-BCDR-04 "tests"): plan, execute, and evaluate a BC/DR exercise against the RTO and RPO objectives, then fold the resulting gaps back into the BC and DR plans as versioned redlines — a decision-aware workflow. It consumes as declared inputs the in-force BC and DR plans (existing Policy items), the business impact analysis (BIA), and prior after-action reports; it creates an Audit item (audit_type=operational) as the definitive exercise record, and produces named deliverables: an approved exercise package, an actual-versus-target RTO/RPO scorecard, remediation findings (Issue items), and a signed-off after-action report with an indexed evidence package. In scope: scoping, running, and evaluating one scheduled or triggered BC/DR exercise for the selected in-scope systems and business services, and folding resulting gaps back into the BC and DR plans. Out of scope: real incident response, and recovery-objective (RTO or RPO) changes to systems outside the agreed exercise scope. Standalone: no upstream or downstream workflow is required; any cross-workflow linkage — for example a related incident-response or BIA-maintenance workflow — is expressed as a declared input, not a predecessor.
workflow · Context
Security Awareness Training Campaign
Security Awareness Training Campaign as a decision-aware workflow covering curriculum, launch, completion tracking, phishing simulation, escalation of non-completers, and effectiveness reporting. It runs on the EXISTING security-awareness training Control item (framework iso-27001 / nist-800-53, domains include awareness_training, control_owner = campaign owner): each cycle is one workflow instance attached to that Control — enriching it, never creating a duplicate control — and the prior cycle's archived instance on the same Control is the baseline for content refresh and simulation trends. No upstream workflow feeds this campaign; each cycle is driven by the campaign charter (trigger, window, audience segments, inclusion/exclusion rules, mandated topics, completion target, and phishing click/report thresholds) supplied at launch, together with the HR headcount and contractor/vendor rosters and the prior campaign report. In scope: running one campaign cycle end-to-end for all in-scope staff, contractors, and third parties with system access, against the campaign charter. Out of scope: routine LMS administration outside a campaign and HR disciplinary action beyond the policy consequence ladder. The named deliverables are the campaign effectiveness report and the indexed evidence archive, presented to the security governance / management review forum. No downstream workflow consumes it; the next cycle and any interim micro-training are scheduled at close (recorded on the campaign record — AssureSwarm has no compliance-calendar surface).
workflow · Context
ISMS Internal Audit & Management Review
Runs one ISO 27001 clause 9.2 internal audit and clause 9.3 management review cycle — including clause 10.1 corrective actions — against the existing Audit item for this cycle (audit_type=internal), whose scope, lead_auditor, and period dates already carry the ISMS audit-programme entry: the workflow enriches that Audit item and its findings, never creates a duplicate audit. Upstream it consumes the Annex A control population (Control items, framework iso-27001) and the applicability decisions in the Statement of Applicability, the risk register (Risk items) and treatment plan, the prior-cycle Audit and open Issue records, and the org's ISMS policies and procedures (Policy items) as audit criteria. Named deliverables: the internal audit findings report, the clause 10.1 corrective-action records (recorded on the finding Issue items), the management review pack, and the approved clause 9.3 minutes and action register. Out of scope: the certification-body external audit and day-to-day control operation. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle and no single downstream workflow consumes its output; at close the cycle is archived on the Audit item as retained ISMS documented information, and carry-forward items re-enter the audit programme (the next PLANNED Audit item), the risk register, or the next review's inputs.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Readiness & Evidence Collection
SOC 2 Readiness & Evidence Collection runs ON an already-opened Audit item — the SOC examination engagement record (audit_type readiness, or external_attestation) whose scope (report type and Type 1/Type 2), examination period (period_start/period_end), and CPA firm (external_firm) are already set. That Audit item is an INPUT: this workflow enriches it and attaches its run to it, never creating a duplicate engagement. It consumes the organization's own Control library — the Control items, framework tagged soc2/soc1 — and no upstream workflow feeds it. In scope: one SOC examination cycle end to end — map the Control library to each in-scope Trust Services criterion (Security always; Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, or Privacy only where a customer commitment requires it) and SOC 1 control objective, close readiness gaps, run the provided-by-client (PBC) evidence request list with QA, and coordinate the CPA firm through fieldwork and follow-ups. Named deliverables: the criteria-to-control mapping matrix and graded gap matrix, the owned PBC evidence request list, the QA'd evidence set, and the cross-referenced PBC response package — all attached to the anchor Audit and its workflow instance. Out of scope: the SOC report the CPA firm drafts and continuous control monitoring between examinations. No downstream workflow is declared; this run's next-cycle seed artifacts (the PBC list and control calendar) stay on the close step as the de facto handoff to the next examination.
workflow · Context
Cryptographic Key Management Review
Periodic cryptographic key management review as a decision-aware workflow covering inventory, custody, rotation, algorithm strength, and verified remediation. The workflow instance attaches to the existing Audit item opened for this review cycle (audit_type it_audit or compliance; Audit.scope = the review scope statement; Audit.period_start/period_end = the review period; Audit.lead_auditor = the review owner) — enrich that record, never create a duplicate — and it links to the cryptographic Control items under review (domains cryptography_key_management, e.g. UC-CRYPTO-02, UC-CRYPTO-03). In scope: all managed key stores — cloud KMS, HSM partitions, certificate stores, secrets managers, and code-signing infrastructure — across in-scope environments. Out of scope: application-layer data classification and the identity provider, which are covered by their own reviews. No upstream workflow feeds this review; it is triggered by its periodic cadence, an incident, an audit request, or an algorithm-deprecation notice — scope is set on the Audit at kickoff, not handed off. The named deliverables are the signed cryptographic key management attestation (mapped to ISO 27001 A.8.24 and NIST SP 800-53 SC-12/SC-13) and the indexed, redacted evidence package filed against the anchor Audit; there is no downstream handoff workflow.
workflow · Context
Joiner-Mover-Leaver Access Lifecycle
Run one instance per HR-triggered joiner, mover, or leaver event as a decision-routed access-lifecycle control that enriches the EXISTING Control item for JML / user-access provisioning-deprovisioning (control library, domains=access_control_identity, framework nist-800-53 + iso-27001) - attach the instance to that control, never create a duplicate. Consume the authoritative HR event record from the external HR system of record (the trigger): classify the event, then provision role-based access, adjust with SoD checks on transfer, or evidence timely removal on exit, and file the named audit-ready access-lifecycle evidence package before closing. In scope: identity-provider, directory, HR-system, ERP, and connected-SaaS entitlements for the affected worker. Out of scope: HR record creation itself, physical-security badge policy, and system-owner entitlement design. The run is terminal - no upstream or downstream AssureSwarm workflow: it starts from the external HR event and ends at the archived evidence package attached to the Control item. The anchor Control links (item relationship) to the access Risk it mitigates.
workflow · Context
CSF 2.0 Profile & Maturity Assessment
Runs on an Audit item created for this assessment cycle (audit_type = readiness) — the CSF assessment engagement the workflow instance attaches to and enriches as it progresses (scope, period, rating, and report fields are written on that Audit item; every in-scope Control is linked to it so the controls-scoped profile is queryable). Build, against that boundary, a NIST CSF 2.0 Current Profile, a Target Profile, an organizational Tier rating, a subcategory gap analysis, and a CISO-ready remediation roadmap. The workflow originates on its own — scoping ingests prior CSF profiles and open POA&M (Issue) items as data, not as a named upstream handoff. In scope: rating the in-scope control set against the CSF 2.0 Core, setting target outcomes, assigning a Tier, and producing a prioritized roadmap. Out of scope: executing the remediation projects themselves and re-performing independent assurance testing. The named deliverable is the assessment package (profiles, gap analysis, Tier, posture report, roadmap, closure artifact), handed off to TWO downstream workflows that consume it rather than repeat the profiling: the Cybersecurity Assurance Review (always) and the AI Governance & Risk/Impact Assessment (only when AI systems fall inside the boundary).
workflow · Context
Threat Intelligence & Insider Threat Program
Runs on the existing Process item "Threat Intelligence & Insider Threat Program" (process_type=security_process, process_owner = program lead) — a long-lived program record related to the Control items it operates (UC-RISK-17, UC-BCDR-16, UC-GOV-37); each cycle is one recurring workflow instance attached to that Process, enriching the standing program rather than creating a new one. Decision-aware, covering NIST SP 800-53 PM-12, PM-16, and RA-10 and NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA and DE.CM. In scope: cyclic intake and curation of threat intelligence into a validated intake register and intel cards, governed internal dissemination and TLP-marked outbound sharing packages, intel-driven threat hunts (producing the hunt summary) and any resulting investigation record, and privacy-guarded review of insider-threat indicators with a governed board disposition and a restricted insider case file, closing with a program-effectiveness report and a reperformable cycle archive. No upstream workflow feeds it; the only cross-run input is the prior cycle's carry-forward package (the carry-forward document from the previous instance's program-effectiveness report step, which closes each cycle), and each cycle emits the next one. Out of scope and handed off only in prose (no terminal handoff node): incident-response execution (the incident-response process, once an incident is declared at open-investigation) and HR/legal employment actions (owned by those functions within an insider case). Each cycle's intel-and-hunt track and its insider-threat track start in parallel from their own inputs.
workflow · Context
Data Retention & Secure Disposal
Each cycle runs as a workflow instance attached to the existing data-retention-and-secure-disposal Control item in the control library (UC-DATA-09/UC-DATA-10) — enrich that Control with this run's evidence, never create a duplicate control. A decision-aware cycle covering expired-data identification, disposition approval, verifiable disposal, media sanitization, evidence assembly, and stakeholder reporting. In scope: identifying and disposing of data whose retention has expired across in-scope stores (databases, file shares, document repositories, email archives, backup sets, and physical media) governed by the approved retention schedule. Out of scope: authoring the retention schedule itself — it is consumed as a standing input (the retention Policy item and its attached schedule), not produced here — and any data under an active legal or audit hold, which is fenced off from disposal. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle; it is triggered by the disposal calendar, a storage threshold, a system decommission, or a data-subject erasure request. It produces a signed disposition list, a disposal evidence package (job logs, hash manifests, chain-of-custody records, and certificates of destruction), a cycle dashboard, and an approved cycle report mapped to ISO 27001 A.8.10/A.7.10, NIST SP 800-53 SI-12/MP-6, and GDPR Article 5(1)(e). Downstream it hands nothing to another workflow: open exceptions, deferrals, and accepted gaps carry forward as Issue items in the risk/issue register, and schedule-maintenance gaps are forwarded to the retention-schedule owner as a closure notice.
workflow · Context
Incident Reporting Channels & Spillage Response
Standing operator workflow that runs on the existing Control item for the incident-reporting and information-spillage control (UC-IR-03; framework nist-800-53 | iso-27001 | nis2, domains incident_management_response) — one recurring workflow instance per operating cycle attaches to and enriches that Control item, never a duplicate. It consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward from the same Control: the last-sweep timestamp from the previous instance's close-and-archive record, plus the still-open corrective-action and obligation Issues linked to the Control. In scope: intake acknowledgment and triage routing across the monitored mailbox, hotline, and service portal; spillage containment/eradication and obligation assessment; and maintenance of the authorities and special-interest-group (SIG) contact register — spanning NIST 800-53 IR-6, IR-7, IR-9, and PM-15; ISO 27001 A.6.8, A.5.5, A.5.6; and NIS2 reporting duties. Named deliverables: the deduplicated intake register and acknowledgment log, the batch routing decision, the spill case with verified eradication, the obligation assessment and exposed-personnel training evidence, the refreshed authority/SIG contact register, the capability-health dashboard, the corrective-action register, and the archived operating record. Out of scope: full containment, investigation, and forensic response for genuine security events — those are handed off to the detect-to-respond workflow (via the route_to_incident_triage routing decision plus the linked intake Issues) rather than duplicated here.
workflow · Context
Information Security Program Governance Review
Standing operator workflow for the CISO's quarterly information security program governance review and its annual leg. Each cycle runs as one workflow instance attached to the existing "Information Security Program Governance" Process item (process_type: security_process, owner CISO), with the four governing Control items UC-GOV-06/09/10/15 linked to it. It is a decision-aware flow that enriches — never recreates — the senior-management-approved information security program plan (held as a Policy item) and the current role assignments every cycle, and branches into the written board report, workforce competency review, and plan reapproval when the annual interval or a significant change requires it. Named deliverables: the reapproved information security program plan (the Policy item, re-versioned and re-signed), the roles-and-authorities register, the annual written board report to the governing body, and the workforce competency review — each retained on the workflow instance. In scope: the program plan, security roles/authorities/reporting lines, the annual board report, and workforce competency for this organization; out of scope: executing the underlying protective controls and enterprise ERM governance, which are owned by their own workflows (coso-erm is referenced here only for oversight-of-design of the governance structure). There is no upstream or downstream workflow handoff — this cycle is genuinely self-contained: it starts from its own cadence trigger, consumes its own prior-cycle governance record, and seeds the next cycle at close.
workflow · Context
Privileged Access & Authorization Model Management
Standing operator workflow for the quarterly privileged-access recertification cycle, separate-account and utility-program controls, and application allowlisting, paired with role and security-attribute authorization-model maintenance and enforcement spot-testing across applications, databases, and infrastructure. Each quarterly instance runs as the operating cycle of the existing privileged-access Control item in the control library (UC-ACCESS-04, with UC-ACCESS-05 linked) — it enriches that Control's operating-effectiveness record rather than creating a new subject, and reads risk context from the linked Risk item (category cyber_security, domains access_control_identity). Consumes standing account, log, change-queue, and org-change feeds pulled live from IAM/PAM, directory, SIEM, allowlist tooling, and the HR system of record, plus the prior quarter's archived instance for its inventory register and carryover exceptions; it consumes no upstream workflow's handoff package. In scope: privileged and administrative accounts, control-overriding utility programs, the application allowlist, and the role and attribute authorization model with its enforcement points. Out of scope: standard non-privileged joiner-mover-leaver provisioning, network and perimeter controls, and application change management, each handled by its own workflow. Every exception and enforcement gap normalizes to an Issue item linked to the anchor Control, and the archived workflow instance is the cycle's evidence of record — open Issues are the cross-cycle carry-forward. Runs on a routine quarterly cadence, or out of cycle when an audit finding, incident, or major organizational change (reorg, new system, acquisition) requires it; no upstream workflow feeds it and it hands off to no single downstream workflow. Owned by the IAM Operations Lead.
workflow · Context
Cybersecurity Incident Response
Cybersecurity incident-response cycle as a decision-aware workflow spanning detection and validation, scoping, incident declaration and response-plan activation, containment with evidence preservation, eradication and recovery, POA&M updates for the control deficiencies the incident exposed, and a technical lessons-learned retrospective, closed through a disposition decision and archival. The workflow instance runs on the incident record — an Issue item (issue_type=exception, source=management_identified, severity per the org scheme) created at detection, since the schema has no native Incident type — and enriches that one record through to archival rather than creating duplicates. In scope: security events and confirmed incidents affecting the system boundary and its NIST 800-53 IR-family controls — the detection sources (logging/monitoring Control items, UC-LOG-06), affected systems (Process items, UC-ASSET-11), containment and recovery actions, forensic evidence, the deficiency Issues that become the POA&M, and their linked Risk items. Out of scope: the enterprise incident-management ticketing lifecycle and external breach-notification/legal reporting, which run in their own workflows. Where an Incident Management Lifecycle workflow is running, this cycle consumes its handoff package (initial ticket, reporter, affected systems); it hands the closed incident's control-deficiency findings — the open POA&M Issues (issue_type=deficiency) — to the Continuous Controls Monitoring (ISCM) Cycle as shared items it queries directly.
workflow · Context
Identity & Authenticator Lifecycle Administration
Standing operator workflow for identity issuance and ownership, shared-identifier exception handling, the dormancy and non-reuse sweep, identity proofing and credential binding, and the full authenticator lifecycle from verified issuance through protection, exposure scanning, and scheduled rotation or revocation. Each monthly cycle runs as a new workflow instance attached to the existing identity & authenticator lifecycle Control item (the UC-ACCESS-06/07/08 family; domains=access_control_identity, frequency=monthly) — the run enriches that standing control's evidence trail, never creating a duplicate control. It consumes no upstream workflow: its inputs are the prior cycle's own carry-forward Issue items (open corrective actions, pending shared-ID review dates, deferred rotations, each linked to the anchor Control) plus current request, source, and inventory extracts. Named deliverables: the issuance & ownership register, the dormancy/non-reuse sweep log, the shared-ID exception disposition and its compensating-control Control items, the identity-proofing evidence package with credential-binding records, the authenticator issuance/strength/default-change log, the protection/exposure-scan disposition, the rotation-and-revocation log, and the identity & authenticator lifecycle-health dashboard — all rolled into an archived, immutable operating record. Because no Identifier/Authenticator/Credential item type exists in the schema, per-identifier, per-binding, and per-authenticator records live as rows in these step-attached registers and logs; only exceptions, gaps, and carry-forwards are promoted to Issue items linked to the anchor Control, and approved shared-identifier waivers are recorded as compensating-control Control items plus a policy_exception Issue. In scope: unique-identifier issuance and ownership mapping for users, services, and devices; shared/group-identifier exceptions; the monthly dormancy and non-reuse sweep; identity proofing proportional to assurance level and credential binding; and authenticator issuance, hardening, protection, exposure remediation, rotation, and revocation across passwords, tokens, keys, and certificates. Out of scope: access authorization and entitlement reviews, joiner/mover/leaver approval routing, and privileged-session management, which are operated by their own workflows. There is no downstream handoff workflow — corrective actions and carry-forward items are tracked to closure within this cycle and seed the next monthly instance of the same control.
workflow · Context
Authentication Platform & Session Policy Operations
Monthly authentication-platform operating cycle. Anchor: this instance runs on the existing Process item for authentication-platform / session-management operations (process_type: security_process, frequency: monthly) — enrich that standing Process each cycle, never create a duplicate — with the four operated Control items UC-ACCESS-09/11/12/13 (framework tags carrying the standards mapping, domains: access_control_identity) linked to it. In scope: MFA enforcement and enrollment across remote, privileged, and sensitive-data access; secure log-on and federation-trust verification; lockout and anomalous-logon defense; session lifecycle controls (inactivity lock, automatic termination, concurrent-session limits, re-authentication for sensitive operations); and system-use, last-logon, and failed-attempt notices, across the IdP or SSO tenant, VPN or remote-access gateway, PAM tooling, and applications classified as housing sensitive data. Out of scope: identity provisioning and joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle, access certification, and privileged-access request approval, which are operated by their own workflows. There is no upstream workflow dependency: the instance is self-originating on its own initial inputs — the authentication-platform inventory (a document on the anchor Process, refreshed each cycle) and the prior-cycle operating record (the prior Workflow instance on the same Process plus its carried-forward open Issue items). The four operating areas run in parallel and reconverge at the platform-posture disposition. Named deliverables: the MFA enforcement-coverage register, the authentication-posture memo, the lockout-and-anomaly log, the session-policy compliance matrix, the banner-and-notice verification record, the platform-health dashboard and readiness summary, and the corrective-action register — each attached to its step, with every gap raised as a self_assessment Issue linked to the Control it degrades. There is no downstream handoff: this terminal recurring cycle seeds its own successor via carry-forward Issue items at close.
workflow · Context
Workplace & Remote Work Security Cycle
Standing operator workflow that runs the quarterly workplace and remote-work security cycle. Each quarterly instance ENRICHES the existing "Workplace & Remote Work Security" Process item (process_type: security_process, frequency: quarterly) — never a new one — and links to the three Control items it operates: UC-HR-07 (remote working), UC-PHYS-09, and UC-PHYS-11 (physical / output-device security). Three pillars run in parallel — the office walkthrough (clear-desk, clear-screen, output-device compliance), remote-work attestation verification and enforcement (device, screen privacy, secured environment, encrypted connectivity), and alternate-work-site control review and effectiveness assessment — and reconverge at the cycle-disposition decision, remediating exceptions in-cycle and tracking residual gaps to closure. Named deliverables: the signed walkthrough log and remediation log, the remote-work attestation-and-enforcement register, the alternate-site register and its site-effectiveness assessment, the corrective-action register, and the closure record. In scope: the offices and floors selected for this cycle, the remote-work population due for attestation, and currently approved and in-use alternate work sites. Out of scope: broader physical-security program design, HR remote-work policy authoring, and incident investigation itself. No upstream or downstream workflow feeds this cycle: it is self-seeding — at close it archives the run as the audit trail and hands its own next run a carry-forward package (open corrective-action Issues, the office/floor and alternate-site registers, next-quarter attestation renewals, and next alternate-site review dates) that is the explicit input to the next run.
workflow · Context
Facility Access Administration & Monitoring
Standing monthly operator workflow anchored to the existing **Facility Access Administration** Process item (process_type: security_process), with the operated Control items UC-PHYS-01, UC-PHYS-02, and UC-ACCESS-19 (control_category: physical, frequency: monthly) linked to it; each cycle runs as a fresh workflow instance and its reconciliation packages, decision forms, and Issue items attach to that instance. It covers credential authorization, entry control and visitor logging, key/badge custody and revocation — plus the monthly surveillance, access-log, and environmental-safeguards review with facilities, including the data-center and protected-asset access confirmation. In scope: authorization, issuance, and periodic re-justification of physical credentials; entry-control and visitor-escort enforcement; key/combination/badge custody, rotation, and revocation; and the monthly surveillance, access-log, visitor-record, and environmental-safeguards review across all facilities, perimeters, and secure areas including the data center and other protected-asset locations. Out of scope: logical/system access provisioning and full incident-response investigation — a confirmed intrusion or data-center compromise is handed off to the incident-response process. No upstream workflow feeds this capability; it runs on its own monthly cadence and on personnel-change and reported-anomaly triggers, and terminates at close-and-archive (the run itself is the retained audit trail — no other downstream workflow consumes the cycle package). Control references: NIST 800-53 PE-2/PE-3/PE-6/PE-8, ISO 27001 A.7.1–A.7.4/A.7.6.
workflow · Context
Environmental & Utility Systems Maintenance
Standing operator workflow for the monthly environmental and utility systems preventive-maintenance calendar — fire/water/environmental protection, emergency power and lighting, protected cabling, and electromagnetic shielding — producing the single maintenance-and-inspection log required as evidence. Anchor: each monthly cycle runs as a new workflow instance attached to the existing umbrella physical/environmental-maintenance Control item in the control library (control_category=physical, frequency=monthly, framework nist-800-53|iso-27001|nist-csf-2), with the specific UC-PHYS-03/05/06/07 Control items linked — the run enriches that Control's execution history, never creates a duplicate control. Consumes its inputs directly with no feeder workflow: the PM calendar entry, the fire/water/power/lighting/cabling/shielding asset inventories, and the independent maintenance vendor's service tickets and test records (the vendor is a Vendor item in the third-party register; its tickets attach as step evidence). The prior cycle's archived export and its still-open deficiency Issues (linked to the anchor Control) are the only carry-forward channel. In scope: the physical environmental and utility protection systems for the in-scope facilities and rooms (fire detection and suppression, water-damage detection and shutoff valves, temperature/humidity monitoring, UPS and generators, emergency lighting and power shutoffs, protected cabling and wiring closets, and electromagnetic shielding). Out of scope: logical access, network security, and the building's base construction. There is no downstream workflow: this standing cycle drains to its own retained archive and seeds next month's cycle with the corrective-action Issues left open.
workflow · Context
Equipment Maintenance, Movement & Marking Control
Standing operator workflow that runs on the existing physical-equipment Control item (the UC-PHYS-04/08/10/12 control, domains=physical_environmental_security, frequency=quarterly): each maintenance, movement, or installation/relocation event opens one workflow instance against that Control item and enriches it with the cycle's evidence, never creating a duplicate control. It covers equipment maintenance, asset movement, and installation/relocation siting and marking, converging into the quarterly reconciliation that ties all three evidence streams together. In scope: scheduled and unscheduled maintenance events, asset delivery/removal/movement events through isolated loading areas, and installation/relocation siting and hardware marking within the facility's data halls, plus the quarterly reconciliation of the three. Out of scope: media sanitization and data-disposal workflows and physical access-control administration, which are governed by their own controls. Named deliverables: the maintenance record pack, the asset movement record with designated-asset tracking reconciliation, the siting-and-marking record, and the consolidated quarterly reconciliation evidence set, plus Issue items for faults, movement investigations, and marking gaps. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle and it hands off to no downstream workflow; it is triggered directly by a maintenance, movement, installation/relocation, or quarterly-reconciliation event, is owned by the Data Center Operations Coordinator, and its close-and-archive step seeds its own next cycle via carry-forward Issue items linked to the Control.
workflow · Context
IT Asset Inventory & Classification Upkeep
Standing operator workflow for the quarterly IT asset inventory reconciliation and the information and asset classification and labeling review. Anchor: each quarterly run is a workflow instance attached to the EXISTING Control item for the IT asset inventory & classification control (domains asset_management_inventory, frequency quarterly, framework including nist-800-53 / iso-27001 — e.g. control_id CM-8 / UC-ASSET-01) as its operating and execution record; enrich that Control, never create a duplicate. In scope: reconciling the authoritative hardware, software, systems, and services inventory against network, endpoint, cloud, and SaaS discovery scans and change records for the in-scope business units, and reviewing the classification, priority, and labeling of information and associated assets including physical media. Out of scope: the remediation engineering behind a decommission or security investigation (handed to those owners) and the downstream security-scoping processes that consume this cycle's outputs. Upstream: no upstream workflow — the cycle runs on the org's live inventory and discovery systems (external ITAM/CMDB, scanners, change/ticketing) plus the prior run's carry-forward Issue items linked to the anchor Control. Converges on two named deliverables — a signed reconciliation record and an updated classification register with an exported extract; that packaged, dual-signed record is the de-facto handoff package that downstream security-scoping processes consume (there is no named downstream workflow).
workflow · Context
Endpoint, Media & Information Handling Custody
Standing monthly operator desk for endpoint, media, and information-handling custody. The workflow instance is the monthly operating cycle attached to the EXISTING Control item for this custody control (control_id UC-ASSET-04/06/08 and UC-NET-12, Control.frequency monthly, Control.framework spanning nist-800-53, iso-27001, soc2, pci-dss) — each cycle enriches that standing Control rather than creating a new one. In scope: fleet endpoint safeguard and acceptable-use verification, off-premises and external-system use, port/I/O/sensor and collaboration-device restriction, removable-media authorization/custody/sanitization/destruction, and the information-transfer rulebook and agreements across electronic, physical-courier, and verbal channels. Out of scope: identity/access provisioning and network-perimeter engineering, which run under their own controls. No upstream workflow feeds this desk — the prior cycle's close-and-archive export is the carry-forward input that seeds each run (the fleet inventory, media custody register, and transfer rulebook are its own standing inputs). Named deliverables: the fleet-safeguard exception list, the endpoint-posture and custody-cycle disposition decisions, the removable-media authorization log and custody register, sanitization verification evidence and retained destruction certificates, the transfer-rule status, and two corrective-action registers backed by Issue items. Endpoint, media, and transfer streams run in parallel and reconverge at two decision checkpoints that route exceptions to tracked corrective action; terminal by design — it hands off to nothing but its own next monthly cycle.
workflow · Context
Change & Release Management (CAB)
Change & Release Management (CAB) as a decision-aware workflow that runs one recurring weekly instance against the EXISTING change-management ITGC Control item in the control library (domains: secure_configuration_change_management; mapped via Control.framework to nist-800-53, cobit-2019, iso-27001, and soc1, alongside the related UC-CONFIG-02/03, UC-ACCESS-16, and UC-SDLC-06/07/08/09 controls) — it enriches that control's operating evidence each cycle, it does not create the control. Upstream it consumes the open change-request queue and the emergency-change log exported from the ticketing system, plus the prior cycle's closure export as its carry-forward backlog. It covers change intake, security and risk impact analysis, environment segregation and configuration-baseline control, acceptance testing, the single CAB authorization gate, the emergency-change path, and controlled deployment with rollback and post-implementation verification — producing the prioritized CAB agenda and authorization packet, per-change risk-assessment memos, the environment-and-baseline verification memo, acceptance-testing summaries, the deployment-and-verification record, and the archived per-cycle evidence set. In scope: application, database, infrastructure, configuration, and procedure changes across development, test, and production environments. Out of scope: authoring the change itself — this workflow governs authorization and release, not development of the underlying code or configuration. Studio ships no native Change Request item type, so per-change records live as lines in step documents and in the workflow instance rather than as items. This is a terminal workflow with no downstream handoff: closure archives the cycle evidence set in place under retention, and the next cycle's intake reads this instance's closure export as its carry-forward source.
workflow · Context
Secure Baseline & Integrity Drift Management
Standing monthly operator workflow for the secure-baseline and integrity-drift cycle: maintain and approve hardening baselines and least-functionality settings against accepted industry standards, run configuration-compliance scanning and remediate drift as findings, triage file-integrity, hash/signature, and secure-boot alerts while verifying security functions self-test correctly, and keep the configuration management plan current annually or after significant environment change. In scope: system components and network security controls governed by CM-2/CM-6/CM-7/CM-9 and SI-6/SI-7 (ISO 27001 A.8.9, PCI DSS Req.1/Req.2, NIST CSF PR.PS-01/DE.CM-09). Out of scope: incident containment and response — unexplained changes are escalated as potentially adverse events to the detect-to-respond incident-analysis practice rather than contained here. Anchor: each monthly run is a recurring workflow instance attached to the EXISTING secure-configuration Control item (the CM-2/CM-6/CM-7 hardening-baseline control — domains=secure_configuration_change_management, frequency=monthly, framework nist-800-53/pci-dss/iso-27001); the cycle enriches that standing Control and never creates a new one. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle — it is self-seeding: its inputs are the prior instance's archived operating record, the approved hardening-baseline standards (Policy items linked to the Control), the open drift/integrity backlog and baseline-reassessment carry-forward (Issue items linked to the anchor Control), and the CM-plan review calendar. Named deliverables: the approved hardening-baseline standards and least-functionality list, the configuration-compliance scan-result register, the integrity-alert and self-test register, drift and corrective-action findings (Issue items linked to the Control), the reviewed configuration management plan (Policy item), the cycle-health dashboard and readiness summary, and the signed, archived cycle operating record. The only cross-workflow handoff is the adverse-event escalation package handed to the detect-to-respond incident-analysis practice.
workflow · Context
Authorized Software & Component Integrity Control
Authorized Software & Component Integrity Control run as a decision-aware monthly cycle that enriches the existing "Authorized Software & Component Integrity" Control item in the control library (control_id UC-CONFIG-05/UC-CONFIG-06, frequency monthly, domains secure_configuration_change_management + third_party_supply_chain_risk) — each run is a workflow instance attached to that Control item, never a newly created control. It originates on its own (parallel entry threads consuming the cycle's own software-inventory, catalog/allowlist, install-rights, supplier-intake, and telemetry feeds) and also carries forward the prior cycle's still-open Issue items linked to the same Control. In scope: reconciling installed software across the in-scope endpoints, servers, and system images against the approved catalog and technical allowlist (the discrepancy register), triaging unauthorized installations to catalog-update / removal / escalation, verifying installation rights stay restricted to the authorized-installer roster from trusted sources (the install-rights and trusted-source exception list), tracking usage against license entitlements (the license-position report), and verifying supplier trust and signature integrity for every component acquired this cycle (the component verification register). Named deliverables — the discrepancy register, triage dispositions, catalog/allowlist change record, per-host removal evidence, install-rights and trusted-source exception list, component verification register, blocked-component investigation findings, and license-position report — are archived as the signed monthly cycle record on the workflow instance. Out of scope: incident containment and forensics — any suspected-malicious component is handed off, evidence intact, to the incident-response workflow, which owns that containment; this control cycle does not duplicate it.
workflow · Context
Malware, Email & Web Content Defense Operations
Standing operator workflow for anti-malware coverage, detection handling, spam and phishing filtering, and mobile-code and website-content control, run on a monthly cadence by the security operations malware defense lead. Each monthly run is a new workflow instance attached to the existing Process item "Malware, Email & Web Content Defense Operations" (process_type: security_process, frequency: monthly), with Item relationships to the Control items it operates — UC-VULN-05 (malicious code protection) and UC-NET-13 (mobile code) in the control library (framework: nist-800-53, iso-27001, pci-dss). In scope: every system component commonly affected by malicious software, the email and web filtering entry and exit points, the mobile-code technologies in use, and website category and reputation filtering. Out of scope: endpoint patching and vulnerability remediation, incident response beyond first-line quarantine and alerting, and network firewall rule management. No upstream workflow feeds it: the monthly scope, the in-scope component and channel list, the accountable owners, and the prior-cycle carryover — the previous instance's open Issue items and step documents — are its own initial inputs. It produces the coverage reconciliation report, the detection-and-response log, the mobile-code authorization list, the tuned email/web and website-content filtering packages, a capability-health dashboard, a signed readiness classification, and a corrective-action register. It is terminal by design: rather than hand off to a downstream workflow, the close-and-archive step preserves the signed operating record under retention and loops carry-forward Issue items into the next monthly cycle.
workflow · Context
Secure Development & Release Security Gate
Each run attaches as a workflow instance to the existing Control item for the secure-development/release-security-gate control (domains: secure_development_sdlc + vulnerability_patch_management) — enrich that Control, never create a duplicate; release runs and the quarterly checkpoint are separate instances on the same anchor Control. This workflow originates on its own artifacts (the release candidate, design artifacts, and the standing portfolio registers) and receives no upstream handoff package. Decision-aware: it branches on trigger type. In scope — for a release or major upgrade entering development, run security-and-privacy-by-design engineering, security test-plan execution, and runtime-hardening verification as parallel evidence streams, then resolve the release security disposition and assemble the release security evidence package with its acceptance-criteria index; for the quarterly portfolio checkpoint, run the vulnerability, patch, and end-of-life software review, publish the portfolio-health dashboard, and log corrective actions. Out of scope — the final production go/no-go, which the separate SDLC gate review workflow owns using the evidence package this workflow hands off to it. The release track and the quarterly track never force each other's steps.
workflow · Context
Network Segmentation & Boundary Rule Management
Network Segmentation & Boundary Rule Management as a decision-aware operator workflow covering trust-zone maintenance, gated rule-change implementation, boundary threat monitoring, the quarterly segmentation and rule-set review, and cross-domain exchange-policy enforcement. This cycle runs on the EXISTING boundary-protection Control item (domains network_communications_security; framework NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, ISO 27001, SOC 2; frequency quarterly; the boundary control owner as control_owner) — each quarterly run is one workflow instance attached to and enriching that Control, never a new control record. In scope: the trust-zone model, the managed interfaces (firewalls, gateways, proxies) mediating traffic between zones, the external boundary and key internal boundaries, and the cross-domain interconnection points, all under a deny-by-default baseline (NIST 800-53 SC-7, SC-16, SC-46; NIST CSF 2.0 PR.IR-01; ISO 27001 A.8.22; SOC 2 CC6.6). No upstream workflow feeds this cycle; it self-seeds from its own prior-cycle carry-forward — open corrective-action Issue items linked to the Control plus the prior run's closure record and archived rule-change record log. Named deliverables: the reconciled trust-zone model, the verified rule-change record log, the boundary threat-monitoring summary, the cross-domain exchange-policy enforcement report, the quarterly segmentation & rule-set review report, the boundary-posture dashboard, and corrective-action Issues linked to the Control. Downstream, it hands off only to its own next cycle via the carry-forward closure record; a confirmed intrusion is escalated to the incident-response workflow (out of scope), as are host/endpoint controls.
workflow · Context
Identity Assurance Review
This review runs on an Audit engagement item created for the review cycle (audit_type: it_audit; scope: the identity assurance boundary) — the workflow instance attaches to that Audit, and the five in-scope UC-ACCESS Control items (UC-ACCESS-07/08/09/11/12) link to it. It is self-originating: no upstream workflow feeds it — it starts from the review trigger, the governing controls, and the collected evidence. Review the IAL, AAL, and FAL assurance requirements against the current identity proofing, authentication, and federation controls for the in-scope systems, then remediate, document, and hand off open gaps. It produces the target-level register, the current-state control inventory, the scored gap register, the per-control assurance determination memo, and the compiled assurance review package; each open gap is recorded as an Issue (POA&M) item linked to its UC-ACCESS Control and the anchor Audit. In scope: NIST SP 800-63 identity assurance levels for the systems named in the locked workplan. Out of scope: broader access provisioning, joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle, and privileged-access certification. Hands off the assurance determination and any open POA&M items to the Security Control Assessment and POA&M Remediation workflow.
workflow · Context
Audit Logging Coverage & Integrity Operations
Monthly operator cycle that verifies audit-logging coverage against the security-relevant event catalog, validates record content-completeness and clock synchronization, and confirms log protection, alerting, and retention, producing the coverage matrix, record content-completeness results, clock-drift report, and retention and capacity attestation evidence pack each cycle. Each instance attaches to the EXISTING audit-logging Control in the control library (control_id UC-LOG-01; framework nist-800-53 / iso-27001 / pci-dss / nydfs-500; domain logging_monitoring_detection; monthly frequency), with UC-LOG-02 / UC-LOG-03 linked by item relationships — enrich that Control's operating history, never create a duplicate control. Every gap, remediation, and carry-forward is logged as an Issue related back to that Control. In scope: every in-scope system, application, and network component, the security-relevant event catalog, and log protection and retention configuration. Out of scope: SIEM detection-rule tuning and incident investigation — surfaced detection gaps hand off to the SOC / SIEM-operations and incident-response workflows, not this cycle. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle; the prior cycle's open corrective-action and carry-forward Issue items (related to the anchor Control) plus the prior cycle's archived workflow instance are its only inputs, and close-and-archive seeds the next monthly run of itself.
workflow · Context
Security Monitoring & Detection Operations
Each weekly cycle is a recurring instance attached to the existing continuous security-monitoring Control item (domains: logging_monitoring_detection, control_type: detective, frequency: weekly) — the cycle enriches that standing Control with its operating record, never creating a duplicate control. It consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward (unresolved queue Issues, open watchlist entries, open corrective actions) and the documented continuous-monitoring strategy (a Policy item linked to the Control), and produces named deliverables: the deployment coverage-and-effectiveness assessment, the enriched central SIEM analysis queue, the maintained detection watchlist, and the signed cycle security-status report. In scope: verifying monitoring deployment and effectiveness, working the central SIEM threat-intel analysis queue, triaging flagged anomalies, maintaining the detection watchlist, reporting security status to the defined roles, and verifying continuous protection-service health and tuning across hosts, networks, and applications at both the perimeter and the interior. Out of scope: incident containment, eradication, and recovery — confirmed security events are handed off mid-cycle to the Security Incident Response workflow rather than duplicated here.
workflow · Context
Network & Provider Service Monitoring
Each monthly run attaches to the EXISTING network & provider monitoring Control item (UC-LOG-08/UC-LOG-09, frequency = monthly; framework = iso-27001 | nist-csf-2 | nist-800-53) — enrich that Control's evidence trail, never create a duplicate control. The cycle keeps network devices hardened and controlled, network-service documentation (including outsourced services) current, delivered services monitored for conformance, and external providers reviewed against their contractual obligations, feeding every deviation into a single owned remediation log — Issue items linked to the anchor Control — and producing a signed monthly monitoring record archived under retention. In scope: in-scope network devices and services, external service providers (the Vendor register) and their contracts, cross-organizational audit-trail exchange arrangements, and the deviations they produce. Out of scope: incident response and investigation for a provider-reported security event, which is tracked in its own incident case rather than in this monitoring cycle. Consumes no upstream workflow — self-originating, triggered by its own monthly cadence, a newly onboarded network service or provider, or a carried-forward deviation requiring follow-up; the previous instance hands off its still-open remediation Issues (linked to the same Control) as this cycle's carry-forward inputs. Terminal: it hands off to nothing downstream — closure seeds its own next cycle.
workflow · Context
Incident Response Readiness Program
Standing operator workflow that runs against the EXISTING incident-response Control item — UC-IR-01 (domains=incident_management_response, frequency=annual) — with the training-and-testing Control UC-IR-02 linked to the same instance; both carry framework=[nist-800-53, iso-27001], and those governing standards drive the plan's required elements. It maintains and approves the written IR plan (a Policy item, policy_type=procedure, framework=[nist-800-53, iso-27001], review_frequency=annual, whose governed redline attaches to the item), distributes and protects it to named responders, delivers role-based training, runs the scheduled capability test (an Audit item, audit_type=readiness, linked back to the two Controls), and feeds exercise and training gaps back into the plan and training program as corrective-action Issue items (source=self_assessment). Named deliverables: the redlined IR plan on its Policy item, the exercise after-action report, the IR readiness dashboard, and the routed corrective-action register (Issue items). In scope: the IR plan's required elements (mission and scope, incident definitions and severity structure, roles and responsibilities, communication paths, and business-continuity/third-party coordination), the named-responder and leadership training population, and the scheduled capability test. Out of scope: live incident handling itself — this workflow builds and tests readiness, it does not run the response to an active incident. It runs on an annual cadence and off-cycle whenever a significant incident or a material organizational/system change occurs; no upstream workflow feeds it and it hands off to no downstream workflow — identified gaps re-enter this same workflow as corrective-action Issues.
workflow · Context
Resilience & Failover Readiness Verification
Standing quarterly operator workflow that verifies alternate storage, alternate processing, and diverse telecommunications capability (UC-BCDR-04) and validates the safe-mode, alternate-communications, and alternate-security-mechanism design configured on critical systems (UC-BCDR-11). Each quarterly instance runs against the EXISTING UC-BCDR-04 alternate-capability Control item in the Control library (frequency quarterly), with the UC-BCDR-11 degraded-mode Control item linked as the second in-scope control — it enriches the evidence trail on those existing controls, never creating a duplicate control. Self-originating: it consumes no upstream workflow handoff, reading the two governing Control items (control_id UC-BCDR-04 and UC-BCDR-11), the prior quarter's archived readiness instance, and the open corrective-action Issues carried forward on those controls; all operational reference data (backup schedule, alternate-site media/replication log, site records, telecom inventory, system design specs and configs) enters as PBC uploads on the verifying step, since none of it is item-typed. In scope: confirming that this alternate capability and degraded-mode design remain current, hazard-separated, secured to primary-site parity, and ready to assume operations within RTO. Out of scope: the live failover exercise that actually cuts over to the alternate site, run separately by the assure-line DR test workflow that consumes the readiness state this workflow maintains. Named deliverables: six verification memos (storage-site, processing-capability, telecom, safe-mode, alternate-communications, alternate-security), a readiness dashboard and a signed readiness summary, and a corrective-action register — every gap converts into an owned corrective-action Issue (issue_type: deficiency, source: self_assessment) linked to the impaired Control, with any recovery-time-impacting gap escalated immediately rather than held for end-of-cycle closure. Downstream handoff: the archived readiness summary and dashboard serve as the readiness-state package the assure-line DR test workflow reads (no terminal handoff node exists yet — see the closure step).
workflow · Context
Supply-Chain Integrity & OPSEC Operations
Standing monthly operator workflow run against the existing supply-chain integrity Control item (UC-TPRM-07, frequency=monthly, domains=third_party_supply_chain_risk), with the OPSEC need-to-know Control (UC-TPRM-09) linked as the second in-scope control — enrich these existing Control items, never recreate them; the workflow instance attaches to the anchor Control as the durable operating record. Two concurrent workstreams. In scope: receipt-time tamper-evidence and authenticity inspection of critical systems and components, provenance and chain-of-custody upkeep, suspected-counterfeit disposition (each raised as a finding Issue linked to the anchor Control and the implicated Vendor) with inspector-training refresh where a lapse is found, and the OPSEC need-to-know review of the sensitive supply-chain information register with remediation of any overexposure. Named deliverables: the authenticated provenance and chain-of-custody register, the counterfeit-disposition cases, the OPSEC exposure-review worksheet, and the confirmed need-to-know-restricted disclosure footprint. No upstream workflow feeds this cycle — its inputs are the period's own receiving log and the sensitive supply-chain information register. This is a terminal standing control: procurement and vendor onboarding, contract-level third-party risk assessment, and facility physical security are out of scope, each handled by its own workflow; a substantiated counterfeit or compromised supplier is escalated to the third-party/vendor risk workflow rather than resolved here.
workflow · Context
Secure SDLC Phase-Gate Program
Operate the secure SDLC phase-gate program as a modular, decision-aware workflow where the accountable control owner chairs the intake, requirements, design, and build/release gates end to end. Each recurring operating cycle runs as a new workflow instance attached to the existing secure-SDLC phase-gate Control item (domains = secure_development_sdlc; framework = nist-800-53 / iso-27001 / cobit-2019 / nist-csf-2) — that Control already exists in the library, so the instance enriches it with this cycle's gate evidence rather than creating a duplicate control. In scope: chairing those four security-integrated lifecycle gates for every development initiative due this cycle, remediating held or blocked initiatives, and monitoring the process itself; it is self-initiating and consumes no upstream workflow package, and it seeds its own next cycle. Out of scope and distinct from it: the independent SDLC gate review's release-milestone verification, and the release-security-gate's technical testing practice.
workflow · Context
Outsourced & Critical-Component Development Oversight
Quarterly outsourced- and critical-component development oversight, run as a recurring operating cycle against the EXISTING Control item for outsourced/critical-component secure development (UC-SDLC-10 / UC-SDLC-11; domains secure_development_sdlc + third_party_supply_chain_risk; NIST 800-53 SA-20/SA-21/SA-23, ISO 27001 A.8.30) — the workflow enriches that Control, it never creates a duplicate. Each quarter it inventories the active outsourced/third-party development engagements (enriching the Vendor register), verifies contract secure-development / IP-ownership / audit-rights terms, traces deliverables to requirements with security-test evidence on file, screens critical-system developers before access, refreshes the register of components critical to security or mission, and re-tests the specialized-development rationale and assurance evidence. It consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward Issue items (open corrective actions, contract renewals, components due for rationale review) and the archived prior workflow instance's registers; every gap it surfaces becomes an Issue linked to the anchor Control, giving one queryable corrective-action population. In scope: active outsourced and third-party development engagements and the register of components critical to security or mission; out of scope: internal-only development with no third-party contributor and general procurement risk unrelated to development. Self-terminating: no downstream workflow consumes this cycle's output — corrective actions are tracked to closure within this workflow and carried forward to the next quarter.
workflow · Context
Onboarding & Access Provisioning
Runs on the existing personnel item. Provision a joiner access from an approved role profile, evidence each grant, and approve the provisioning record that ITGC access testing samples. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
ISO 27001 SoA Review & Controls Assessment
Review the ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability and assess the controls behind it. Each run attaches to an Audit item created for the review cycle (audit_type = compliance, e.g. "ISO 27001 SoA Review 2026-H2"), which accumulates the scope, the per-control test instances, the assessment package, the approval, and the rating. The workflow locks the assessment workplan, reconciles every Annex A control's applicable/excluded decision and justification against the current risk treatment plan, verifies implementation evidence, assesses the sampled controls for design and operating effectiveness, routes deficiencies to owners, and approves and publishes the version-controlled Statement of Applicability (SoA) — then classifies the disposition and prepares, approves, hands off, and archives the review package. In scope: reconciling and assessing the SoA's Annex A control applicability decisions and their implementation for the ISMS in scope, and publishing the approved SoA version. It consumes the ISMS Risk Assessment & Treatment Cycle's handoff package (the current risk register, the risk treatment decisions, and the required-controls determination) and hands its named deliverable — the approved, version-controlled published SoA and the assessment package — off to the downstream ISO 27001 Certification Readiness workflow. Out of scope: the enterprise risk assessment and treatment decisions that determine which controls are required (owned upstream by the ISMS Risk Assessment & Treatment Cycle) and the certification audit preparation that follows (owned by the downstream ISO 27001 Certification Readiness workflow, which consumes this review's approved package). The trigger is the scheduled SoA review interval or a material change to scope, risk, or the control environment.
workflow · Context
Transfer & Access Modification
Runs on the existing personnel item. Modify a mover access for a new role, remove entitlements the prior role no longer justifies, and approve the modification record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Periodic User Access Review
Runs on the existing system item. Run a periodic entitlement recertification for a system, evidence reviewer decisions, and confirm that required revocations were executed. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Backup & Recovery Testing
Runs on the existing system item. Test recoverability for a system by performing an actual restoration and measuring the result against recovery objectives. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
New System Implementation (SDLC)
Runs on the existing system item. Take a new system from control requirements through testing and acceptance to an evidenced go-live readiness decision. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Privileged Access Review
Runs on the existing system item. Review privileged, service, and emergency accounts on a system for continued business justification, supporting activity, and compensating monitoring. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Security Control Assessment & POA&M Remediation
Run this assessment on the EXISTING Audit item for the engagement (audit_type: it_audit or compliance) — enrich that record, never create a duplicate: Audit.scope carries the authorization boundary and Audit.period_start/period_end the assessment window. Consumes, from the upstream SSP-development / system-categorization effort, the approved System Security Plan (SSP), the FIPS 199 system categorization, and the tailored NIST 800-53 baseline (existing Control items, framework: nist-800-53). Assess each in-scope control with 800-53A examine/interview/test methods, record satisfied / other-than-satisfied determinations, open a POA&M Issue for every gap, re-validate remediation, and issue the Security Assessment Report (SAR). In scope: control assessment, determinations, the POA&M lifecycle, and the SAR for the authorization boundary agreed at kickoff. Out of scope: the authorization (ATO) decision itself and the steady-state continuous-monitoring cadence. On completion, the frozen SAR and POA&M package are handed to the NIST RMF System Authorization (ATO) Cycle.
workflow · Context
ISO 27001 Stage 1 ISMS Documentation Review
Certification-body Stage 1 review of the ISMS against ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clauses 4–10: context and leadership, planning and support, operation, and performance evaluation with improvement - walking each clause group against the governing documents and the operating processes that carry it, and concluding Stage 2 readiness with dual sign-off. Stage 1 documentation and readiness review for ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clauses 4–10, conducted under the engagement methodology. It informs Stage 2 planning and does not issue a certification decision. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
workflow · Context
ISO 27001 Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit
Attach to the existing Audit engagement, owned by Internal Audit, using its approved Statement of Applicability, risk treatment plan, scope, review period and operating evidence; produce the Stage 2 Annex A Controls Audit report, four signed theme conclusions and finding register for the engagement and remediation owners. Apply the approved Statement of Applicability to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A.5.1–A.5.37, A.6.1–A.6.8, A.7.1–A.7.14 and A.8.1–A.8.34; document each exclusion and assess direct and inherited responsibilities. This Annex A assessment contributes to the engagement and does not independently establish full ISMS conformity or issue certification. Stage 1 and readiness remain separate workflows; any certification decision remains with the authorized certification body.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Availability Assessment
Design-readiness review of the SOC 2 availability series: capacity management, environmental protections with backup and recovery infrastructure, and recovery plan testing (A1.1–A1.3). Design-readiness assessment limited to the listed SOC 2 criteria. Evidence may include operating examples to assess the design; this module does not provide a SOC 2 Type II opinion. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Confidentiality Assessment
Design-readiness review of the SOC 2 confidentiality series: identification and maintenance of confidential information and its secure disposal at end of life (C1.1–C1.2). Design-readiness assessment limited to the listed SOC 2 criteria. Evidence may include operating examples to assess the design; this module does not provide a SOC 2 Type II opinion. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Privacy Criteria Assessment
Design-readiness review of the full SOC 2 privacy series: notice and choice, collection through disposal, data subject access and disclosure, and data quality with dispute monitoring (P1.1–P8.1), concluded with dual sign-off on the criteria-bearing final assessment. Design-readiness assessment limited to the listed SOC 2 criteria. Evidence may include operating examples to assess the design; this module does not provide a SOC 2 Type II opinion. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Type II Interim Testing
Interim fieldwork for the Type II examination: cycle walkthroughs, design assessment against the Trust Services Criteria, the first operating-effectiveness testing wave over the agreed interim evidence window, and exception triage feeding remediation and retest planning before the period closes. Interim SOC 2 Type II fieldwork for the listed control selections and agreed interim window. Later-period testing and the service auditor's independent opinion remain outside this module. Attach this workflow to the existing audit engagement item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
workflow · Context
Employee Offboarding
Run on an existing personnel item using an authorized departure record, access inventory and retention instructions. Produce the Employee Departure Package and hand remaining obligations to HR after IT removal evidence and manager handover review.
workflow · Context
Employee Onboarding
Run on an existing personnel item using signed engagement, screening references and an approved role profile. Produce an Onboarding Readiness Package with IT access evidence for HR, the manager and subsequent access reviews.
workflow · Context
GCP Physical and Environmental Subservice Reliance
Evaluate GCP assurance-report scope, physical and environmental controls, exceptions and user responsibilities; record a bounded reliance decision rather than claiming to operate provider facilities. This customer-side review relies on relevant independent reports, disclosed provider information and customer implementation evidence. It does not operate or certify GCP facility access or environmental safeguards. Preserve each report's permitted-use restrictions.
workflow · Context
System ITGC Operation
Operate and evidence the IT general controls on a system: authentication and password configuration, access provisioning and deprovisioning, the periodic user access review, change management (testing, sign-off, logs), and subservice SOC report reliance.
workflow · Context
Annual Policy Review
Runs on the existing policy item. Canonical annual policy review: establish scope, obtain the policy owner and policy team sign-offs, record any required change path, and approve a documented review outcome and next review date. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Policy Change
Runs on the existing policy item. Canonical policy-change governance: scope and propose a controlled change, obtain policy-team approval, publish only the approved version, and close with a traceable document and communication record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
SOC 2 Reporting and Management Assertion
Reporting close for the Type II examination: drafting and validating the system description under the carve-out method, preparing the management assertion, reviewing complementary user entity controls and subservice reliance, and the dual-approval close of the examination file at the agreed period end. Management-owned SOC 2 Type II reporting support: system description, management assertion, CUECs, subservice reliance, and auditee file closure. The independent service auditor retains responsibility for examination conclusions and the CPA opinion. Attach this workflow to the existing SOC 2 evidence or reporting process item; retain evidence and conclusions on its workflow steps.
workflow · Context
System and Third-Party Risk Review
Runs on the existing system item. Review system and provider dependencies, assess current risk and control evidence, select response actions, and approve the review record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Vendor Risk Assessment and Disposition
Runs on one existing System with vendor=true. Uses the supplier record, contracts, assurance/CUECs, access and continuity evidence to produce a reviewed vendor risk assessment and authorized disposition for the business/risk owner and readiness evidence consumers. Two checkpoints retain expert challenge and the owner’s choice of conditions, treatment and monitoring; executor work is recorded in step results and documents, with no collection forms or runtime branches.
workflow · Context
Interim Operating Effectiveness Testing
Runs on the existing SOX Audit using approved Control-hosted TOD/TOE results and the interim scope. Produces the program coverage and exception register, remaining-period commitments, all-controls auditor handoff and management status communications for year-end roll-forward.
workflow · Context
Period-End Roll-Forward Testing
Runs on the existing SOX Audit using approved interim results and remaining-period commitments. Produces independently reviewed year-end coverage, a separate Year-end Management Inquiry Package and the full-year conclusion for audit reporting and deficiency aggregation.
workflow · Context
Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle
Operate the third-party vendor risk lifecycle end to end: scope and tier the vendor population, gather and analyze assurance evidence (SOC reports and CUECs, plus C-SCRM controls), embed contractual protections, enroll ongoing monitoring, and reach a governed disposition and approval. The vendor register IS the set of Vendor items — tiered by criticality (tier) and data exposure (data_classification), owned (business_owner, risk_owner), and driven by reassessment_cadence with last/next assessment dates and monitoring_status; each assessment cycle runs as one workflow instance over that register. In scope: vendor and supplier third-party risk assessment, onboarding controls, and periodic reassessment. Out of scope: procurement sourcing and commercial negotiation, and the deeper fieldwork of a Third-Party Vendor Assurance Engagement, to which the approved package is handed off. This workflow is self-initiating and consumes no upstream workflow package.
workflow · Context
Code of Conduct & Workforce Accountability Cycle
Code of Conduct & Workforce Accountability Cycle as a decision-aware workflow that runs on an existing ethics Process item ("Ethics & Code of Conduct Program", process_type: business_process, frequency: annual): each annual cycle is a workflow instance attached to that Process, and the archived instances on it ARE the ethics register - version history plus the open-deviation log. The code of conduct and the rules of behavior are Policy items (policy_type: policy and procedure) enriched each cycle - never recreated - and the tone-at-the-top and acknowledgment Controls (UC-GOV-04, UC-GOV-07) are linked to the Process via item relationships. The cycle reissues the code and rules of behavior, secures leadership adoption, communicates expectations to personnel and business partners, gates access on acknowledgment, and evaluates adherence - routing violations through the documented disciplinary process and remediating deviations timely, with deviations and violations recorded as Issue items carrying the full remediation lifecycle. Named deliverables: the reissued code of conduct and rules of behavior (Policy items plus redline/change summary), the leadership adoption decision, the acknowledgment coverage report with access-gating evidence, the deviation and violation inventory (Issues), the disciplinary and remediation outcomes, and the archived self-contained cycle evidence package. In scope: one annual accountability cycle (a full reissue or an update-driven re-acknowledgment) covering all in-scope personnel and the business-partner populations bound by the code. Out of scope: the ethics-hotline intake that feeds reported concerns - an input, not a step here. No upstream workflow is required to start the cycle; it is triggered by its annual cadence or by a material change to the code or rules of behavior. Downstream, the operational access-provisioning system consumes this cycle's acknowledgment gate - the workflow's terminal handoff - before it grants access.
workflow · Context
Technology Investment & Project Risk Governance
Technology Investment & Project Risk Governance as a decision-aware checkpoint graph, run as a recurring workflow instance attached to the existing Process item for the technology-investment / portfolio-governance process (process_type: business_process) — each quarterly board cycle enriches that standing process record rather than creating a new one. In the cycle the investment board refreshes its criteria, scores and prioritizes the technology and innovation portfolio, routes the annual capital-planning leg that allocates security funding to the risk strategy, monitors in-flight value and reprioritizes or terminates where value is not realized, and enforces security-risk sections in every project gate with ERM-linked artifacts. In scope: the quarterly technology investment-board review (always), the annual capital-planning and security-budget leg (when the funding and staffing envelope must be set or re-planned this cycle), and every project stage gate falling due. Out of scope: individual project execution and delivery mechanics and day-to-day security operations. The cycle consumes the ERM cyber-risk register (Risk items, category: cyber_security) and the approved program business cases as standing inputs, and produces a board decision record and evidence pack as its named deliverable. There is no downstream workflow hand-off, so cross-references are recorded as linked records (Issue ↔ Risk) rather than routed onward; the scored portfolio, in-flight programs, and stage-gated projects have no native item type and live as step documents.
workflow · Context
Combined Assurance Mapping
Combined Assurance Mapping as a decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs as one workflow instance attached to an Audit item created for the cycle (audit_type: advisory, scope = the combined-assurance mapping scope for the period, period_start/period_end = the cycle period) — no other Studio type represents an assurance-coordination cycle, so the workflow enriches that Audit item rather than any pre-existing engagement. In scope: mapping assurance coverage across the Three Lines of Defense for the confirmed risk universe and entities this cycle — cataloging assurance providers, mapping their coverage onto the risk universe, assessing reliance, identifying gaps and duplication, coordinating coverage plans, publishing the combined assurance map, and preparing audit-committee reporting inputs. Out of scope: performing the underlying assurance engagements themselves (owned by internal audit, second-line functions, and external providers) and any risk, entity, or provider not named in this cycle's confirmed scope. It consumes the risk universe and residual positions (Risk items with their residual_rating and treatment) from the upstream Enterprise Risk Assessment & Portfolio Oversight Cycle and hands its named deliverables — the published combined assurance map, the reliance conclusions, and the gap action plans — to the downstream Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflow rather than duplicating repeated work.
workflow · Context
Subservice Organization & Third-Party Personnel Oversight
Subservice Organization & Third-Party Personnel Oversight as a checkpoint graph. Anchor: each run enriches the existing subservice-organization **Vendor** register entry for one provider - the workflow instance and every step document attach to it, and it is never recreated (initial vendor selection and onboarding due diligence are out of scope). In scope: the subservice organizations and third-party suppliers whose services support user-entity control objectives or whose personnel access the organization's systems or data - reconciling and enriching their Vendor register entries, verifying subservice and personnel-security contract terms, reviewing assurance (SOC) reports and mapping complementary user-entity controls (CUECs) to internal Control items, routing exceptions to tracked Issue items, collecting third-party personnel-compliance evidence, monitoring vendor performance, and running the quarterly issue follow-up through to closure. Out of scope: initial vendor selection and onboarding due diligence, and the organization's own internal personnel controls. Upstream: no workflow feeds it - it is built from the existing Vendor register, the prior cycle's archived vendor file, open Issue items, and the internal Control inventory, plus contracts, SOC reports, and performance data uploaded as evidence. Downstream: self-contained - no single workflow consumes its output; the archived, auditor-ready vendor file is the durable evidence record. It runs on the annual per-vendor cycle with quarterly issue follow-up.
workflow · Context
Personnel Screening, Agreements & Sanctions Administration
Runs on the existing "Personnel Security Administration" Process item (process_type: security_process; process_owner: the HR Personnel Security Partner): each cycle is one workflow instance attached to that Process - enriching the standing process, never creating a duplicate - and on the disciplinary track the violation-case Issue it opens becomes the cycle's second anchor, linked back to that Process. A modular, decision-aware workflow: it designates position risk, runs proportional background verification for new hires, role changes, and the annual high-risk rescreen sweep, produces and retains the signed employment security and confidentiality agreements required before access, and - when a policy violation is reported - runs the graduated disciplinary process through sanction determination, PS-8 notification, and retention. It originates on its own HR triggers (no upstream workflow feeds it) and hands access provisioning and revocation to the downstream Joiner-Mover-Leaver Access Lifecycle workflow rather than performing them here. Named deliverables per cycle: the position-risk designation memo and derived screening set, the background-verification packet, the signed employment security and confidentiality agreements plus security-bearing position description, the violation-case Issue, the sanction documentation and PS-8 notification record, the awareness and control-improvement feedback Issues, and the archived cycle record. In scope: one personnel-security trigger per cycle - a single new hire, role change, annual high-risk rescreen, or material agreement re-signature on the screening-and-agreements track, or one reported policy violation on the disciplinary track; a role change that also surfaces a violation is run as two separate cycles.
workflow · Context
Third-Party Risk Program & Vendor Oversight Cycle
A standing quarterly cycle the vendor-management office runs as control owner. The workflow instance is a recurring run attached to the EXISTING Process item "Third-Party / Vendor Risk Management" (process_type: operational, process_owner: Vendor Risk Program Lead, frequency: quarterly), linked to the Control items for the unified controls it operates (UC-TPRM-01/04/05/08) — it enriches that standing program, never recreating it. It consumes no upstream workflow handoff: each run is self-feeding, drawing its criteria and prior state from the program's own standing artifacts — the SCRM plan, third-party risk policy, and program strategy held as Policy items; the criticality-tiered Vendor register (Vendor items); and the prior cycle instance's step documents (the DORA Article 28(3) register of information and the ICT concentration-risk view). In scope: reaffirming or revising the governing Policy items; re-tiering the Vendor register; refreshing the DORA Article 28(3) register of information and the concentration-risk view (a dashboard over the Vendor items); verifying critical-provider exit strategies; executing this cycle's tier-based reassessments and driving findings to tracked third-party Risk items (remediation or risk-committee escalation); confirming external and cloud service provider oversight; and verifying critical suppliers carry live incident-notification coverage. Named deliverables: the refreshed criticality-tiered Vendor register, the updated DORA Article 28(3) register of information, the recomputed ICT concentration-risk view, the exit-readiness summary, this cycle's tracked Risk items, and the archived cycle evidence package on the workflow instance. Terminal at close-and-archive with no downstream handoff — open or escalated vendor risks persist as Risk items in the risk register. Out of scope and handled by separate workflows: the continuous monitor-line vendor lifecycle and the per-engagement due-diligence gate for onboarding a new vendor.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Exam & External Audit Management
Manage a live regulator examination or external audit end to end — from notification intake through request fulfillment, QC’d evidence release, fieldwork support, preliminary-findings response, and commitment closure. Runs on an Audit engagement item created per exam (audit_type = regulatory_exam, or external_attestation for an external audit); the workflow instance attaches to that Audit anchor, and preliminary findings and their corrective-action commitments become linked Issue items. No upstream workflow feeds this — it is triggered by the exam or audit notification itself. In scope: coordinating examiner requests, controlled evidence release, and management responses for a single exam or audit engagement. Out of scope: remediating the underlying control gaps — the findings and committed corrective actions hand off to Finding Remediation & Action-Plan Monitoring — and standing up new obligations surfaced by the exam, which hand off to Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage and Regulatory Obligation Implementation.
workflow · Context
Control Library Lifecycle
One control, one record: intake, author, classify, link, publish, review, retire — the library that audit RCM and SOX scoping read from.
workflow · Context
ESG-Related Risk Materiality & Integration
ESG-Related Risk Materiality & Integration as a decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs on the existing portfolio-level ESG Risk item (a Risk with category: esg — e.g. "ESG / sustainability risk — enterprise"): it enriches that umbrella entry and the ESG-tagged slice of the Risk register (Risk items tagged category: esg / taxonomies: esg_sustainability) rather than recreating them, and fans per-topic detail out onto the individual Risk items it creates or updates for each impact, risk, and opportunity (IRO). In scope: assessing ESG-related risks across the confirmed environmental, social, and governance topics, entities, and value-chain boundary for this cycle — defining the ESG risk universe (impacts, risks, opportunities), engaging affected stakeholders and information users, assessing double materiality and prioritizing the material topics, mapping controls and management responses, defining KRIs and disclosure metrics, and assembling disclosure inputs. Its named deliverables are the double-materiality assessment (the ranked material topic set with a materiality matrix), the control/response and assurance mapping, the disclosure metrics and leading KRIs, and the framework-mapped disclosure index (ESRS/CSRD, ISSB S1/S2, GRI, SEC climate). Out of scope: any ESG topic, entity, or business unit not named in this cycle's confirmed scope, and the drafting of the external sustainability report itself. It consumes the enterprise risk portfolio and residual positions from the upstream Enterprise Risk Assessment & Portfolio Oversight Cycle and hands its material ESG topics, KRIs, and disclosure inputs to the downstream Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflow rather than duplicating repeated work.
workflow · Context
Incident Management Lifecycle
Run the enterprise incident management lifecycle on a single governed incident record — an Issue item created at intake that every step enriches (there is no separate Incident type; the workflow instance anchors to that Issue). Open the record, analyze scope and impact, anchor the regulatory and remediation notification clocks to the detection date, contain/eradicate/recover, execute severity-based notifications, run lessons-learned and CAPA, classify the disposition, then prepare, hand off, and archive the governance package. Named deliverables: the scope-and-impact assessment, the root-cause analysis, the owned CAPA / remediation action plan, and the final evidence-and-decision governance package. In scope: operational and security incidents from detection through closure, including regulatory-notification clock management and corrective/preventive actions. Upstream: the incident originates on detection itself, but for a security-category incident this workflow consumes the containment-and-forensics handoff package produced by the Cybersecurity Incident Response workflow (linked in at the eradicate-and-recover step) rather than re-running SOC triage. Out of scope: real-time SOC triage and containment mechanics (owned by that Cybersecurity Incident Response workflow) and board-level reporting — the final governance package is handed off to the Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflow, which reports the outcome without re-investigating.
workflow · Context
Enterprise GRC Platform Integration Bridge
Runs on a Process item created at kickoff (process_type = it_general_control, process_owner = the integration owner, frequency = the sync cadence) that represents the bridge as an operated, auditable IT process — the workflow instance attaches to and enriches that Process item, never a duplicate. Bridges an external enterprise GRC platform (e.g., RSA Archer, ServiceNow GRC, Workday, AuditBoard) with AssureSwarm: define field and ID mappings, run the initial migration or provisioning (which creates Risk / Control / Issue / Audit / Policy items and Control-hosted testing workflows for imported control-test records), operate a monitored bidirectional scheduled sync, resolve conflicts, and confirm system-of-record agreement. This workflow originates the integration project — it consumes no upstream handoff. In scope: mapping design, initial load, ongoing sync operation and health monitoring, conflict resolution, and system-of-record sign-off. Out of scope: standing up the external GRC platform itself, and the downstream assurance analysis. The named deliverable is a version-stamped final bridge package (evidence index, executive summary, authoritative per-field system-of-record coverage table, open-items list), handed to the Combined Assurance Mapping workflow, which consumes it rather than re-deriving the record inventory.
workflow · Context
Policy Lifecycle Management
Run one policy through its full lifecycle, anchored to a Policy item in the policy library — created at authoring for a net-new policy, enriched in place on each refresh cycle (never duplicated). In scope: authoring and control/authority linkage, stakeholder review, formal approval, publication and workforce attestation, acknowledgement tracking, disposition, and scheduled alignment refresh. Consumes read-only upstream: the enterprise risk assessment (Risk items), control design (Control items), and obligation mapping — this workflow neither produces nor edits them. Produces four named deliverables: the published policy version, a frozen workforce attestation completion record, a section-by-section alignment verdict, and a single approval-ready policy package. Out of scope: enterprise risk assessment, control design, and obligation mapping. The approved policy package is handed off to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle, which runs the recurring regulatory attestation; the acknowledgement campaign launched here is the one-time publication attestation and is explicitly flagged in the handoff as not-to-be-repeated downstream.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle
Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle: runs on and enriches the existing Audit item created for this authority and reporting period (audit_type = compliance or regulatory_exam; scope = certification boundary; period_start/period_end = the reporting period) — that Audit item is the attestation record the cycle updates throughout, never a duplicate. Over the cycle: compile evidence for the authority source across the reporting period, validate and resolve evidence gaps, produce the five-section regulatory attestation package, route certifying-officer certification, and archive the package. In scope: the legal entities, products, geographies, and systems named in the certification boundary for that authority and period. Consumes the implemented, owned, control-mapped obligation baseline as the handoff package from the Regulatory Obligation Implementation workflow (the implementations themselves are the Control items whose framework multiselect includes this authority, linked to the anchor Audit). Out of scope: obligations under other authorities, entities outside the certification boundary, and the obligation-to-control implementation itself. Hands the certification outcome, exception register, action plans, and accepted risks off to Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting.
workflow · Context
Personal Data Quality & De-identification
Personal Data Quality & De-identification runs as a recurring operate cycle attached to the existing Control for personal-data quality & de-identification (framework gdpr/hipaa/ccpa/nist-800-53, domain data_protection_privacy): each period is a workflow instance that enriches that Control's operating record — never a new Control. The cycle consumes the data map / RoPA, the data-quality ruleset and retention schedule (Policy items), the individual correction-request queue, the disclosure log and the recipient/processor Vendor register, and the de-identification policy; it checks PII accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness, corrects or deletes failing records and notifies downstream recipients under GDPR Art. 19, adjudicates individual correction requests within statutory deadlines, and de-identifies datasets that do not require full identifiers. It produces the exception register (exception Issue items), the corrected-and-deleted set, the recipient correction/deletion notices, and the de-identification and residual-risk reports; systemic findings hand off to the internal privacy backlog as Issue items. This is a terminal operate cycle — the archived, regulator-ready cycle record is the deliverable, not a handoff package for a named downstream workflow.
workflow · Context
Privacy Safeguards & Notice Management
Privacy Safeguards & Notice Management as a decision-aware cycle that runs as a workflow instance attached to the standing "Privacy Program" Process item (process_type: business_process, process_owner: the privacy officer) — one archived instance per period is the cycle file. Each run refreshes the privacy requirements inventory, confirms PII-protection accountability over the PII stores (modeled as processing-activity Process items), verifies administrative, technical, and physical safeguards against data volume and sensitivity (the safeguard set is the Control items with control_category administrative|technical|physical and framework gdpr|ccpa|hipaa protecting each store), remediates gaps as tracked Issues, and authors, publishes, and version-retains the privacy notices and registrations (modeled as Policy items) kept accurate to actual processing. In scope: the periodic privacy program cycle over the confirmed PII stores, their safeguard control set, and the published notice and registration population; every run reconciles the affected notices to actual processing — a cycle that skips notice reconciliation is a different workflow. No upstream or downstream workflow feeds or consumes this cycle; its inputs are the organization's own privacy program records, and open remediation, treatment expiries, and deferred drift carry forward as open Issues that seed the next cycle's intake.
workflow · Context
Legal & Regulatory Compliance Register Evaluation
Runs the compliance office's recurring register-evaluation cycle as a compliance-review engagement: the workflow instance attaches to an Audit item created per cycle (audit_type: compliance, period_start/period_end bounding the evaluation period, lead_auditor = the compliance officer), and every gap, management directive, and result produced this cycle links back to that Audit. A decision-aware cycle that refreshes the register of applicable legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements — including intellectual-property and software-licensing obligations — confirms ownership, schedules and performs documented compliance evaluations on each requirement's defined cadence, remediates non-compliance, reports status to management, and retains the register and results as evidence. Consumes upstream: between-cycle regulatory change flows in as a data feed from the Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage workflow, swept at the register-refresh entry point (a feed, not a formal handoff package). Named deliverables: the dated register of record, the period evaluation schedule, the evaluation results register, the compliance determination, the exposure-ranked remediation set (Issues linked to the cycle Audit), the compliance status report and dashboard, and the retained cycle evidence set. Hands off downstream: obligations that need standing up route to the Regulatory Obligation Implementation workflow — named in prose at close-and-archive, with no handoff package produced here. In scope: the legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements already in the compliance register that fall due for evaluation this period — cadence-due, overdue, or event-triggered. Out of scope: standing up brand-new obligations. The cycle scope — register population, the due subset including overdue catch-ups, and the period boundaries — is set at the register-refresh entry point.
workflow · Context
Privacy Breach Assessment & Notification
Personal-data breach response, anchored on a breach-register Issue item created for the breach (issue_type: exception, source: management_identified, identified_date = the awareness timestamp); the workflow instance attaches to that Issue and the breach register is the queryable set of these Issues. Consumes the Incident Management Lifecycle workflow's handoff package (incident record, containment status, investigation timeline) and drives it from handoff to closure: a frozen, dated exposure inventory; a per-jurisdiction notifiability determination against GDPR Article 33, US state (California/CCPA included), and HIPAA clocks; regulator and data-subject notifications with milestone tracking; processor coordination against the processor's Vendor record and DPA; remediation and support Issue items; the Article 33(5) breach-register entry; and a post-breach review that hands off to the DPIA / Privacy Impact Assessment workflow for each affected processing activity. In scope: the notifiability judgment and notification execution downstream of the incident handoff; out of scope: incident containment and forensics, which stay with incident response.
workflow · Context
Requirement Applicability & Control Mapping
Runs on the existing requirement item. Interpret a requirement, determine supported applicability, map obligations to controls and evidence, and approve the mapping record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Change Intake & Impact Assessment
Runs on the existing requirement item. Validate a new or amended external obligation against its authoritative source, determine applicability, and assess the impact on controls, policies, processes and systems. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Obligation Implementation & Adoption
Runs on the existing requirement item. Deliver the control, policy and process changes an obligation requires, validate readiness evidence, and approve the adoption record. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
EU AI Act Obligation Impact Analysis
EU AI Act Obligation Impact Analysis runs on a compliance Audit item created at intake (`audit_type: compliance`, `scope` = the fixed entities/AI-systems/markets boundary) — the "impact-analysis item" the whole run enriches and closes. It parses in-scope EU AI Act provisions, classifies affected AI use cases by operator role and risk tier, crosswalks obligations to existing Control items, rates conformity gaps as Issue items, and routes high-risk gaps to the AIMS (ISO/IEC 42001 AI management system). Consumes the horizon-scanning handoff package from Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage. Named deliverables: the locked workplan, the obligation register (the durable run-to-run workbook), the per-use-case classification set, the obligation-to-control crosswalk, the ranked conformity-exposure list, and the version-pinned final analysis package. Hands its approved gap-and-action package to Regulatory Obligation Implementation. In scope: obligation parsing, use-case classification, control crosswalk, and gap rating for the entities, AI systems, and markets fixed at intake. Out of scope: implementing remediations, performing conformity assessments, and running fundamental-rights impact assessments (FRIAs) — FRIAs route to the AI Governance & Risk/Impact Assessment module.
workflow · Context
Compliance Monitoring & Attestation
Runs on the existing requirement item. Refresh evidence for an obligation on its review cycle, test continued conformance, and record the owner attestation with any exceptions. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage
Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage as a modular, decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs on an Audit item created for the scan window — `audit_type` = compliance, titled "Regulatory Horizon Scanning — <period>", with `period_start`/`period_end` set to the detection window; the workflow instance attaches to that Audit and is archived against it at close. It can stand alone, but is designed to exchange handoff packages with related workflows instead of duplicating repeated work. In scope: detecting and summarizing regulator publications, routing them to the authority-source register, applicability screening against the compliance profile, entity profile, and activity inventory, owner assignment, and queueing. Out of scope: obligation mapping, gap and impact analysis, and implementation — those belong to the downstream Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping workflow, which consumes this workflow's named deliverables: the prioritized impact-analysis intake queue and the cycle evidence package. There is no upstream workflow and no prior handoff to consume; this is the sensing edge of the regulatory-change chain, and its standing inputs are the monitored feed list, the prior cycle's cursor, the authority-source register, and the Policy items that cite those authorities.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping
Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping runs on a compliance Audit engagement record — an Audit item created per triggering instrument (audit_type=compliance) whose scope holds the locked scope statement and to which every gap Issue, risk acceptance, and the workflow instance attach. It consumes two upstream inputs: the triage handoff package from Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage (instrument, canonical citation, publication and effective dates, triage disposition) and the canonical instrument text itself — the Official Journal or regulator-register version, the authoritative source the whole analysis cites. It parses that instrument into obligations, maps them to the existing Policy and Control library, classifies and rates gaps, and reconciles the obligation register. Named deliverables: the cited regulatory impact note, the obligation inventory, the authority-to-policy crosswalk, the classified and rated gap Issues, the versioned obligation register, and the final evidence and decision package. In scope: obligation analysis, crosswalk, gap classification, exposure rating, and register reconciliation for the in-scope entities, products, and jurisdictions. Out of scope: remediation build-out (handed off to Regulatory Obligation Implementation) and re-prioritizing the instrument (owned by Regulatory Horizon Scanning & Triage). Confirmed gaps and their action plans hand off to Regulatory Obligation Implementation.
workflow · Context
Regulatory Obligation Implementation
Implement a new or changed regulatory obligation end to end on the Audit item created for this implementation (audit_type = compliance or readiness): its scope names the obligation and authority, its period_end holds the effective (compliance-by) date, and the workflow instance attaches to it. There is no native Regulation type, so the regulator, region, and obligation summary live in the anchor Audit.description with the operative source text uploaded to the gap-analysis step. The work — gap analysis, policy updates (Policy items), control design (Control items), process operationalization (a Process item), and coverage validation — enriches that Audit rather than creating a parallel record. In scope are the legal entities, products, systems, and vendor relationships (Vendor items) the obligation touches; entities and processing below the regulation's applicability thresholds are out of scope. This workflow consumes the obligation map handed off from Regulatory Impact Analysis & Obligation Mapping and hands its named deliverable — a validated coverage package (the gap list, the drafted policies and controls, the operationalized process, and the validation run) — to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle.
workflow · Context
Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance
Third-Party ICT Vendor Regulatory Assurance as a decision-aware workflow. Each cycle runs on its own Audit engagement item (audit_type = vendor_review) created at kickoff, with Audit.scope set to the in-scope legal entities, regimes, and vendor population; every workpaper, decision form, and gap attaches to that instance. In scope: ICT third-party service providers — including intra-group ICT providers — assessed against DORA, NIS2, and US interagency/FFIEC third-party expectations; out of scope: non-ICT vendors, which stay with the general vendor lifecycle. It consumes the arrangement-level inventory, tiering, and due-diligence handoff package from Third-Party Vendor Risk Lifecycle (whose provider records are the Vendor items); refers vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 reports carrying real reliance to the Vendor SOC 1/SOC 2 Report Review & CUEC Mapping workflow and folds back its reliance conclusions; and produces a provision-cited, severity-rated gap register (Issue items linked to the anchor Audit and the affected Control/Vendor records) plus a qualified final assurance package. It hands the validated obligation statuses to the Regulatory Compliance Attestation Cycle, exchanging handoff packages with related workflows instead of duplicating repeated work.
workflow · Context
Production Operations & Processing Integrity Cycle
Runs on the existing Process item for production/IT operations (process_type: it_general_control, frequency: daily — e.g. "Production Batch Operations & Processing Integrity"): one recurring instance per daily bridge/shift attaches to and enriches that Process, never creating a duplicate, and is archived against it at close. It operates the unified controls UC-ACCESS-17/18/20 (Control items, framework containing soc1|nist-csf-2|iso-27001) and consumes the prior cycle's carry-forward Issue items (open incidents, aged exceptions, backup gaps, tuning actions) as its opening population. A decision-aware workflow covering authorized batch execution and monitoring, failure and incident resolution, backup and restore-test verification, performance/capacity/security event monitoring with capacity tuning, and daily data-processing integrity through interface reconciliation and authorized-only output distribution. In scope: the authorized batch, interface, and report population, monitoring thresholds, and the backup and restore-test calendar for the daily processing bridge with weekly capacity and restore-test reviews layered in. Out of scope: application change management and access provisioning, handled by their own ITGC workflows — suspected change-control bypasses and access findings are cross-referred to those owners. No upstream or downstream workflow feeds this cycle; the certified-and-filed evidence step seeds the next run of this same cycle with carry-forward Issue items linked to the Process.
workflow · Context
Quarterly 302/906 Sub-Certification Cascade
Quarterly 302/906 sub-certification as a modular, decision-aware workflow: it maintains the certifier hierarchy, refreshes the questionnaire for new systems, reorgs, known control issues, and pending deficiencies, launches the tiered cascade, tracks completion and cures gaps at the cutoff, triages exceptions and qualifications with escalation to the disclosure committee where material, summarizes the population for principal-officer 302/906 sign-off, and archives the certification evidence with the period's support. The instance runs against a campaign-record Audit item created for the quarter (audit_type: compliance; period_start/period_end = the quarter; scope = the in-scope entity and process population), enriching that one record — every questionnaire form, certification register, decision form, dashboard, and attestation package hangs off it and the run's own instance is the audit trail. It consumes the in-scope Process items (each carrying its process_owner) and the open deficiency Issue log, originates on its own recurring quarterly cadence with no upstream handoff, and hands its deficiencies downstream as linked Issue items into the SOX Deficiency Remediation, Year-End Deficiency Aggregation & Severity Evaluation, and Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflows. In scope: the quarter's in-scope entities and processes per the current consolidation scope, from process-owner sub-certification through principal-officer 302/906 sign-off and archival, back-planned from the SEC filing date. Out of scope: the officers' external SEC filing mechanics, and the deficiency, year-end aggregation, and board reporting handled by the downstream SOX Deficiency Remediation, Year-End Deficiency Aggregation & Severity Evaluation, and Quarterly Board & Audit-Committee GRC Reporting workflows this cascade routes into.
workflow · Context
External Audit Support & PBC
Runs on the existing audit item. Govern external-audit PBC requests from intake and preparation through quality review, secure delivery, clarification, and complete request closure. Deliver the reviewed result and open actions to the responsible register owner and the named companion procedure.
workflow · Context
SOX ITGC Testing
SOX ITGC Testing as a modular, decision-aware workflow. It runs on the existing Audit engagement item for this ITGC cycle (audit_type: sox_testing, period_start/period_end = the test period) — enrich that item, never create a duplicate — while per-control operating-effectiveness results live on Control-hosted SOX testing workflows, one created per in-scope ITGC control per Workflow.customFields.sox.fiscalYear, each hosted directly on the Control under test. It consumes the ICFR scoping handoff package from Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment, produces the reperformable final ITGC testing package as its named deliverable, and hands the deficiencies off to SOX Deficiency Remediation. In scope: the operating-effectiveness conclusion on the ITGCs protecting in-scope financial systems, reached by referencing the controls-owned NIST 800-53 catalog and its test scripts — not by rebuilding procedures. Out of scope, owned by related workflows: scoping of significant accounts and applications (Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment), deep completeness-and-accuracy validation of system-generated populations (SOX IPE Validation), and remediation of what fails (SOX Deficiency Remediation, the downstream handoff). It can stand alone, but is designed to exchange handoff packages with these related workflows instead of duplicating repeated work.
workflow · Context
SOX Key Control Operation (Close Cycle)
Runs against the existing Financial Close **Process** item (process_type: financial_reporting, monthly) — one workflow instance per close period that operates that period's SOX key controls and is archived when the control owner's sub-certification closes the period, as the period's durable, control-indexed evidence trail; it enriches the standing Process and Control records, never recreating them. Consumes upstream: the in-scope close-cycle key-control population from the risk & control matrix — **Control** items (key_control: true, framework includes sox + coso-ic, domains includes financial_reporting_controls) produced by the *Annual ICFR Scoping & Risk Assessment* workflow and linked to this Financial Close Process — plus the prior period's carry-forward **Issue** items (aged reconciling items, approved carryovers). In scope: the close-cycle key controls operating each period — account reconciliations, management review controls, and journal-entry approval — scoped against the period-end close boundary. Named deliverables: the period IPE log, the signed account reconciliations, the completed MRC checklists, the journal-entry approval register, the control-indexed period evidence package, and the control owner's signed sub-certification (supporting the officers' Section 302 certification). Downstream handoff: the archived evidence package and control execution log stand as the sampling population for the *SOX Key Control TOD/TOE Test*; escalated potential deficiencies continue in the *Year-End Deficiency Aggregation & Severity Evaluation* (deficiency-evaluation) track. Out of scope: deficiency severity evaluation and TOD/TOE testing themselves, both of which consume this cycle's archived evidence.